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In the middle of a 1945 review of Bucklin Moon’s Primer for White Folks, Ralph Ellison proclaims that 
the time is right in the United States for a “new American humanism.”  Through exhaustive research in 
Ralph Ellison’s Papers at the Library of Congress, I contextualize Ellison’s grand proclamation within 
post-World War II American debates over literary criticism, Modernism, sociological method, and finally 
United States political and cultural history.  I see Ellison's “American humanism” as a revitalization of the 
Latin notion of litterae humaniores that draws heavily on Gilded Age American literature and philosophy.  
For Ellison, American artists and intellectuals of that period were grappling with the country’s primary 
quandary after the Civil War:  an inability to reconcile America’s progressive vision of humanism with 
the legacy left by chattel slavery and anti-black racism.  He saw writers like Mark Twain, Stephan Crane, 
Henry James, George Washington Cable and others attempting to represent a different version of the 
human in literature while confronting the various forces that the Civil War unleashed upon American life. 
As the Cold War and Civil Rights era reached their crescendo, Ellison’s attachment to the Gilded Age 
ossified.  By the late 60s, it took the romantic form of aesthetic and political conservatism.  This process 
is part of his participation in what Francis Saunders called the “Cultural Cold War” against communism.  
For many – including Ellison – this participation made their aesthetic investment in modernism 
commensurate with their anti-communist ideology.  In foregrounding the Cold War, I want to emphasize 
that the US State’s intervention into the sphere of culture is a watershed moment in America’s 
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conceptualization of Western humanism.  The CIA and the State Department’s role in funding academic 
literary and cultural periodicals, art festivals, fellowships and other institutions of knowledge during the 
Cold War is a chapter of American intellectual life that shaped Ellison’s world as well as those of his 
contemporaries.  Just as importantly, this moment illuminates the key roles African-American 
intellectuals played in America’s pursuit of humanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION:………………………………………………………………………………1 
1. RALPH ELLISON’S “BATTLE ROYAL”: AN ALLEGORY OF MODERNISM’S NEGRO 
PROBLEM?.......................................................................................................................41 
2. ELLISON AS EXILE: “TELL IT LIKE IT IS, BABY” AND THE PROBLEM OF 
RENAISSANCE…………………………………………………………………………89 
3. ARENDT AND ELLISON SPEAK FOR THE NEGRO………………………………..134 
4. AN INTEGRATIVE VERNACULAR…………………………………………………..170 
CODA: ELLISON AS CAVALCANTE………………………………………………...............221 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………..227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I have quoted extensively from Ralph Ellison’s notes, lectures, syllabi and other materials from 
his archived papers.  I was able to do so with the permission of the Library of Congress Division 
of Rare Book and Special Collections.  After spending two weeks there I can attest to the 
generosity and patience of the librarians and staff. 
I owe thanks and gratitude to the following people.  In one way or another all of them have been 
indispensable to my intellectual, professional and personal growth: 
To my past and present graduate student colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh: Jeff Hole, 
Chris Warnick, Malkiel, Dana, Manisha, Alex, Dan Kubis, Dan Wallenberg, Judy, Petra, Patrick, 
Lisa Coxson, Graham, Thomas and Stephanie, Carleton, Bill, Brenda, Jen Lee, Jonathan Moody, 
Llana, Micki and Rebecca Skloot. 
I would be remiss if I neglected to mention the following faculty members: Dr. Nancy Condee, 
Dr. Volodia Padunov, Dr. Marcus Rediker, Dr. John Beverly, Dr. Shalini Puri, Dr. Susan 
Andrade, Dr. William Scott, Dr. Lucy Fisher, Dr. Jane Feuer, Dr. Adam Lowenstein, Dr. Colin 
McCabe, Dr. Jim Seitz, Dr. Paul Kameen, Dr. Mariolina Salvatori, Dr. Steven Carr, Dr. Nancy 
Glazener, Dr. David Bartholomae, Dr. John Twyning, Dr. Jim Knapp, Dr. Don Bialostosky, Dr. 
Fiore Pugliano, Dr. Katherine Flannery, Dr. Marianne Novy, Dr. Kimberly Latta and Dr. Eric 
Clarke. 
I must thank the staff in the English Department as well as FAS: Angela Brown, Corinne Grubb, 
Denise Thomas, Jen Florian, Pat Rhenquist and Philippa Carter.  I must especially thank Meg 
Havran, Sandy Russo and Connie Arelt for being so supportive for so many years.  I wish 
viii 
 
Andrea Campbell was still here so I could tell her how important her support was through the 
years.  You are sorely missed.   
I benefitted from the financial support of the Provost Development Fund, Andrew Mellon and K 
Leroy Irvis Pre-Doctoral Fellowship Awards. 
I also want to give a special shout out to Sammy’s Deli for saving the pages of my fourth and 
final chapter from being blown across the intersection of Penn and Main St like so much confetti. 
I owe my dissertation committee so much.  To Marcia, who taught me to think trans-nationally.  
You introduced me to the work of Hannah Arendt and Antonio Gramsci.  All of your lessons 
about cinema, philosophy and Marxism have left an indelible mark on my thinking.  A book on 
film is on the way.  To Ronald, who has given me the most valuable gift a teacher can give a 
student: bravery.  You have proven to me that a human who acts and thinks heretically is living 
an ethical life.  Dennis, your presence on and off the court has enriched me in many ways.  Your 
seminar on Italian Renaissance Humanism transformed my thinking.  I owe you for the direction 
my dissertation took after I visited the Ellison archives.  To Jonathan, who was the reason I 
decided to come the University of Pittsburgh.  You showed me so much generosity from the 
moment I entered graduate school.  Your seminar on U.S. Culture, where we read Ellison, is 
written all over my work.   
Finally to Paul, il miglior fabbro.  You showed me faith when I did not have it in myself.  I hope 
the patience you showed me on that faithful day in your office, with the pages of my first chapter 
arranged on the floor, has paid off.  You are the intellectual I aspire to be: honest, daring and 
kind. 
ix 
 
Kinship is not necessarily biological.  It can also be willful.  Enslaved Angolans during the 
seventeenth century would call those who survived the Middle Passage “melungo”, which means 
“shipmate.”  Through usage melungo, or shipmate became synonymous with “countrymen”, 
“close friend” or “relative.”  There are a few people who have accompanied me through this 
journey that I am honored to call my melungeon: Henry, Kirsten, Mari, Jason, Stefan, Chris, Jim, 
Shawn, Lee, Phillip, Amy, Betsy, Tania, Jo’ie, Corey, Melissa and Barry.  To Molly:  I am so 
glad you are in my life.  Your love and insight helped me finish this arduous journey.  Mavi, I 
love you very much.  And finally to Christopher, my brother from another mother:  You were 
here from the beginning son.  We elbowed our way inside and got on.  I could not have handled 
these hot pots of oil without you. 
To my family:  Denese, Aunt Minnie, Aunt Essie, Aunt Lela, Aunt Martha, Aunt Mattie, Uncle 
Mathew, Uncle Amos, Uncle David, Uncle Steven, Aunt Bernice, Pam, Eric, Jonathan, David, 
William, Tasha, Kurt, Kirsten, and Lucy.  And to those who have passed away: Kizzie, Richard, 
Chief, Marjorie, Desmond, Bill and Major.    
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to Kenneth David Purcell and to the memory of Mary 
Lou Daniel Purcell.  Daddy, you are my polestar.  And Mommy, although you have perished you 
will never pass away.
1 
 
 
Introduction: “an oh-so-urgently-needed new American humanism” 
It was on the USS Missouri that World War II finally came to an end.  Her deck, once a 
theater of war, was the stage for World War II’s final act: the signing of the Japanese Instrument 
of Surrender.  Waving in the brisk winds that September day were two American flags.  One was 
a fresh set of stars and stripes from the many spare flags on board the ship.  The other was the 
same one waving from the mast of Admiral Matthew Perry’s ship, the USS Mississippi, when it 
entered Tokyo Bay in 1853.  Presiding over the signing in 1945 was General Douglas 
MacArthur.  As the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces and a direct descendent of Perry’s 
family, MacArthur was styled as the second “opener” of Japan.  On VJ Day MacArthur had this 
past in mind and it weighed heavily on his present.  But what sort of American past did Perry 
represent to MacArthur?  After the ceremony, MacArthur approached a microphone to address 
the Americans who had tuned in to listen to this event on the radio.  His comments give us some 
insight into how MacArthur understood Perry’s role in American history: 
We stand in Tokyo today reminiscent of our countryman, Commodore Perry, 
ninety-two years ago.  His purpose was to bring to Japan an era of enlightenment 
and progress, by lifting the veil of isolation to the friendship, trade, and commerce 
of the world.  But alas the knowledge thereby gained of Western science was 
forged into an instrument of oppression and human enslavement.  Freedom of 
expression, freedom of action, even freedom of thought was denied through 
appeal to superstition, and through the application of force.  We are committed by 
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the Potsdam Declaration of principles to see that Japanese people are liberated 
from this condition of slavery. (Douglas as quoted in Feifer). 
To MacArthur, Perry came to Japan as a liberator; an avatar and symbol of Western 
enlightenment.  Such rhetoric is not new and puts MacArthur in a long line of past and future 
American political figures to cast the United States as the sole grantor of liberty from slavery in 
the world.  Japanese imperialism was a consequence of modernity’s misuse, the same that Perry 
brought Promethean-like decades earlier.  But to suggest that Perry’s gift – like McArthur’s – is 
a benevolent is to ignore the profound paradoxes of the nineteenth century America, which that 
extend into the post-War present.  We can see this in the specter of slavery that haunts 
McArthur’s remarks, which he reduces to a mythological archetype of injustice; a rhetorical 
flourish that serves the purpose of transforming Perry into myth as well.     
Like all Americans during the nineteenth century Perry’s life was entangled in the 
materiality of modern chattel slavery.  Indeed, as Emerson writes in his address on the Fugitive 
Slave Law, slavery had turned every dinner table into a debating-club and every citizen into 
students of natural law.1
Even before these events American slavery informed Perry’s present in direct and 
indirect ways.  Perry’s flagship, USS Mississippi, could only be named because of two 
  Congress – through the Fugitive Slave Act – strengthened the right of 
American slave holders to claim their property a mere two years before appropriating 
government funds to send Perry into the Pacific.  The same Northern industrialists who would 
ultimately benefit from the Fugitive Slave Law desired more trade routes across the Pacific, 
which required the opening of Japan (Feifer).   
                                                            
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Fugitive Slave Law” (1854). 
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expansions of US territory.  First, the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and later, the Louisiana Purchase, 
America’s land grab deal with the French in 1803.  The events that followed the Louisiana 
Purchase: the opening of Key West, the Mexican American War and the later opening of Japan 
were outgrowths of this crucial land deal and all instances of what John O’ Sullivan would call 
“Manifest Destiny.”  Abel Upshur was the Secretary of the Navy during Perry’s service and 
believed in the right of Americans to hold human beings as property.  Rather ironically, Upshur 
also controlled the American Navy’s role in the African Squadron.  Not only was Perry ordered 
to patrol the coast of Sierra Leone and Liberia looking for slavers but he was eventually ordered 
to shell the port city of Veracruz from the USS Mississippi in America’s attempt to annex Texas.  
It was Upshur’s secret dealings with US senators and the political representatives of the Texas 
territory that led to its annexation in 1844.  And annexation was tied to expanding America’s 
slave empire and adding more pro-slavery senate seats in Congress; a feat the Louisiana 
Purchase already – although not immediately – accomplished.   
By the nineteenth century America thinkers and writers began to see the fate of the 
Pacific tied to America’s own.  As Wiley writes in Yankees in the Land of the Gods: 
Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan, Perry strongly advocated American imperial 
expansion against British, French and Russian forces in the Pacific Basin, which for Perry was 
part of a necessary extension of white, Saxon domination on a global scale (Wiley, Perry 490).  
Even though Alfred Mahan would not publish The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-
1783 until almost forty years later, the economic and military rationale behind opening up Japan 
echoed Mahan’s later conclusions about the power of the navy and the need for American global 
hegemony (Feifer 190).  Perry’s vision for American might in the world was fiscal, militaristic 
and also tied to the continued domination of the white race.  So when this same ship anchored in 
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Tokyo Bay, Perry literally as well as symbolically extended the Mississippi – the symbolic 
Maginot Line of the Civil War – into the Pacific Basin.  And with him came a foreshadowing of 
post-Civil War American imperial expansion and modernity; tied to the growth of state power as 
well as continued racial hegemony (Zakaria).          
Perry’s trips to Japan coincided with what literary critic F.O. Matthiessen would call the 
“American Renaissance.”  Matthiessen saw the literature written from 1850 through 1855 as a 
complex presentation of the country’s burgeoning democratic sensibilities.  Perry was not much 
of a writer but he published a three volume account of his travels to Japan: Narrative of the 
Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan (1856).  He is not mentioned 
in Matthiessen’s book yet Perry is as much an expression of our “first great age” as Emerson or 
Melville was.  In fact, he asked Nathaniel Hawthorne for help writing his grand narrative, a 
request Hawthorne turned down.  But Hawthorne did suggest another writer to Perry, Herman 
Melville.  Matthiessen tells us that the writers of this period wrote about democracy in a “double 
sense” (xv).  Perry and his ship were salient examples of this double sensed democracy.  Just 
think, Perry might have asked Melville – the one writer who captured this “double sense” best – 
to write his narrative about crossing the Pacific and opening Japan.  Melville, who had already 
written many novels about the Pacific and who was an ardent critic of autocratic power, in some 
ways had already written Perry’s and America’s narrative.  Two years before Perry would lead 
an armada of naval vessels across the Pacific Melville published Moby Dick (1851).  More than 
any other novel, Melville captured this double sense in the relationship between Ahab and 
Ishmael.  The year Perry returned from Japan and asked Hawthorne for authorial assistance, 
Melville published “Benito Cereno” in his collection The Piazza Tales (1856).  What Melville 
created in these works is a contiguous relationship between the slave, the ship and the sea. The 
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twin problems of race and power stand in the center of American modernity like “the Negro” did 
for Delano; Perry is a clear symbol of this inescapable fact.     
Almost a century separated Perry and MacArthur.  The two flags flying over the USS 
Missouri at end of World War II united them through this expanse of time.  Perry’s USS 
Mississippi ran through MacArthur’s USS Missouri like the mighty Missouri River runs into the 
Mississippi.  And at the end of World War II the shadow of the Mississippi has once again been 
cast into the Pacific.  These two men were also united through the biological alchemy of kinship.  
The continuum established by blood and land is reinforced with the continuum forged by 
MacArthur’s willful act of memorializing.  Waving in the winds high above the Missouri were 
not the wings of Walter Benjamin’s angel of history.  Instead, it was the empty time the German 
thinker had warned about, the eternal picture of the past.  Those two flags, fluttering high in the 
winds of Tokyo Bay in 1945 formed a bird of gold enameling fashioned into an artifice of 
American eternity.  MacArthur, microphone in hand, brought Perry into the American present as 
a pristine, triumphant augur of the twentieth century. On September 2nd, 1945 Perry became a 
symbolic monument of America’s unageing intellect.  Over the airways MacArthur sang to the 
men and women of America about the past, what is passing and what is to come. 
MacArthur saw no “double sense” and neither had Perry ninety-two years earlier.  That 
was left to Fredrick Douglass, Melville, Benjamin, Matthiessen and a merchant marine 
meaningfully named Ralph Waldo Ellison.  In the early 1940s, Ellison would write a handful of 
short stories, “Flying Home,” “In a Strange Country”, “A Storm of Blizzard Proportions”, and 
“The Red Cross At Morriston, S.W.”, that captured this double sense in the midst of World War 
II.  Ellison saw that America’s defense of democracy was not without its deep paradoxes.  “In a 
Strange Country” captures this through the story of an African-American sailor named Parker, 
6 
 
who on shore leave in Wales is assaulted by American G.I.’s.  The short story “Flying Home”, 
about an African-American pilot who crashes his plane on a training mission, was the original 
seedbed for what Ellison thought would be his first novel.  That book was to be the story of an 
African-American G.I., who by default becomes the commander of a group of white G.I.’s in a 
German prison camp. 
 Did the sea and his time in the Merchant Marines focus this double sense in Ellison?  
Beside Melville, who cast the sublime drama of American democracy on board the Pequod and 
the San Dominick, Mark Twain staged a similar drama on a body of water; this time on a raft 
floating along the mighty Mississippi.  And so did T.S. Eliot.  It was not on the Mississippi that 
we find in Eliot, although that river was just as important to him since he, like Twain, was born 
in Missouri.  At the end of “The Waste Land” it is a boatman on the River Styx, which functions 
in a double sense.  The potential rebirth of Eliot’s poetic consciousness occurs on the precipice 
of its symbolic death.  Ellison himself summons the most potent image of the sea and ship in his 
1949 essay “The Shadow and the Act”: the slave ship (304).  Indeed, it was the vast drama of 
war and sea, the journey of the ship of state and the centrality racism had in all of it that 
enthralled Ellison’s imagination after World War II.   
The paradoxes that existed during Perry’s time, which pushed the United States towards 
Civil War, still existed in Ellison’s present.   In the interim the institution of slavery had been 
dismantled but “the Negro Problem”, as Senator William Campbell Bruce termed it, emerged as 
the defining American conundrum.  A hostile critic to emancipation, Bruce argues in his 1891 
tract “The Negro Problem” for the continued, willful separation of the races despite equality in 
the face of the law.  Bruce concludes that the Negro problem is ultimately a cipher for a broader 
problematic.  He writes that: 
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…when the Republican party is in power, he [African-Americans] not only 
remains a Negro but becomes the supple instrument of centralizing 
encroachments upon local autonomy, and therefore, proportionally the more 
obnoxious to the white race; lamentable to the white race, because Republican 
rule plants a Dublin Castle in the South, elevates to the local federal offices the 
most ignorant and irresponsible members of her population, damps hope, 
disorders industry, involves every Southern State in anxiety and turmoil, and 
distills blistering dews upon every olive branch that one section holds out to the 
other (Bruce). 
 
Like Alexander H. Stephens and other post-Reconstruction senators Bruce viewed the Negro 
problem as testing the limits of governmental power. He invokes an interesting historical allusion 
in the Dublin Castle, which was the symbolic seat of Norman Conquest and British imperial rule 
in Ireland.  Like many southern senators Bruce felt like the Civil War and Reconstruction were 
examples of the federal government acting imperially.  By extension Bruce also suggests that the 
Negro simultaneously functions as an instrument of this imperialism since it is the cipher through 
which this power is expressed.   
As early as “Study of the Negro Problems” (1898), W.E.B. Dubois understood the 
instrumental use of the Negro problem as a legitimization of white domination after 
Reconstruction, an idea he would later refine in “Reconstruction and Its Benefits” (1901) and 
that would lead him to rethink the epistemological task of sociological inquiry in his 
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underappreciated essay “Sociology Hesitant” (1905).  As Ronald Judy tells us in “On W. E. B. 
Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking”, it is in “Sociology Hesitant” that Dubois sought to redirect 
contemporary inquires into the Negro Problem.  Instead of Positivism, Dubois sought to 
“describe, to make explicit and analyze, that which remains ‘unknowable,’” which for Dubois 
was the potentiality of human intelligence and imagination (Judy 35).             
The argument that “the Negro” was an instrument for “centralizing” the encroachments 
of the State was just as strong in 1945 as it was in 1891.  It would be only eight years later that 
this fact would be on display in Topeka, Kansas and Little Rock, Arkansas.  During the Cold 
War “the Negro Problem” presented another reason for governmental interest.  As Mary Dudziak 
explains in her book Cold War Civil Rights
As the Cold War set in, Dudziak tells us that there was significant federal interest in 
remedying racism, since the American government knew Soviet propaganda played upon this 
very paradox.  When the United States did use countermeasures against such propaganda it was 
most often done within the sphere of culture. Many recent books have highlighted these 
concerns: Frances Saunders’ 
, the “Negro Problem” gained international stature 
during the Cold War.  America’s involvement in World War II, which was against regimes built 
upon state sponsored racism, was seen as a paradox given the persistence of Jim Crow 
segregation and lynching in the United States.   
The Cultural Cold War: the CIA and the World of Arts and Letters 
(2003) and Gil Scott Smith’s The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, the CIA & Post-War American Hegemony (2001).  Peter Coleman’s The Liberal 
Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle of the Mind of Post War 
Europe (1989) was one of the first books to elaborate a history of this institution after the outrage 
(symbolized in Christopher Lasch’s The Agony of the American Left (1969)) accompanying the 
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CCF’s outing in the pages of The Saturday Evening Post and Ramparts
My study draws upon Ralph Ellison’s work to study the intricacies of American 
hegemony during the Cold War.  In particular I am interested in the relationship that literature 
and race within this hegemony.  The fundamental question I ask is: What role does Ellison’s 
“new American humanism” – and the Negro at its center – play in this hegemony?  If Ellison, 
like Dubois, was trying to move our understanding of the Negro away from the sociological and 
“bio-political”, then in what ways did Ellison’s imagination respond to this hegemony and what 
can it teach us now?  The funding of literary and academic periodicals, art festivals, fellowships 
and other institutions of knowledge by the CIA and State Department during the Cold War is a 
chapter of American intellectual life that shaped Ellison’s world as well as those of his 
contemporaries.  And through exhaustive research in Ralph Ellison’s Papers at the Library of 
Congress, I contextualize Ellison’s call for a “new American humanism” within this atmosphere.  
In particular I look at Cold War American debates over literary criticism, Modernism, 
sociological method, and finally United States political and cultural history in order to 
understand the Ellison elaborated this “new American humanism.”  My study begins in the at the 
end of World War II and ends in 1978, roughly ten years after the exposure of the Congress for 
 in 1967.  Saunders and 
Smith document how the CIA materially supported the creation of American literary and artistic 
culture during the Cold War.  Both suggest that the complex, seemingly “apolitical” nature of 
visual and literary modernism was used in the most thoroughly ideological ways.  Saunder’s 
book in particular highlights the role African-American artists – some consciously some not – 
had in this hegemony.  Ralph Ellison himself was a member of the Congress of Cultural 
Freedom and participated in many other institutions and journals later found to be funded by the 
CIA and the American State Department, including the Salzburg Seminar for American Studies. 
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Cultural Freedom and at the moment when Ellison’s works are on the cusp of academic 
canonization.       
Aside from Saunder’s and Smith’s books, which directly address the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom, the books written about American Cold War culture are legion.  In recent 
years studies focusing on specific authors and their relationship to the Cold War have emerged.  
Here D. Quentin Miller’s John Updike and the Cold War: Drawing the Iron Curtain (2002), 
Lawrence H. Schwartz’s Creating Faulkner’s Reputation: The Politics of Literary Criticism 
(1988) and Jon Lance Bacon’s Flannery O’ Connor and Cold War Culture 
Most of these works – as dazzling as they are – often ignore the fraught relationship 
African-American intellectuals and writers had to Cold War culture beyond the familiar binary 
of complicity or opposition.  In other words, the towering intellect of a F.O. Matthiessen, and 
Lionel Trilling or the works of a Mary McCarthy or Flannery O’ Connor seem to warrant 
subtlety but not their African-American counterparts like Zora Neale Hurston, Chester Himes, 
Ann Petry, George Schuyler and of course Ralph Ellison.  In the past eight years there has been 
scholarly interest in putting American civil rights and racial politics in a broader, global 
perspective.  Azza Salama Layton’s 
(1994) are important 
works to note.  Since the 1990s, scholarship written by “New Americanists” like Donald Pease, 
William Spanos, Robyn Wiegman, Gayle Wald and others have simultaneously exposed the 
Cold War ideological underpinnings of “American Studies” and suggested that we approach 
American literature and culture during that period in a more internationalist context.  
International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United 
States, 1941-1960 (2000), Carol Anderson’s Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the 
African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955 (2003), Thomas Borstelmann’s The 
Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (2003), and Mary 
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Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (2002) all 
explore the intersection of American Cold War foreign policy and the civil rights movement.   
The scholarly impulse to imbricate questions of race into broader understandings of 
American foreign policy and American projections of power has not been as strong in African-
American literary and cultural studies as it has in the social sciences, history and related 
humanities fields.  This is not to say that somehow the artists, scholars and intellectuals that 
contributed to African-American Studies were unconscious of their Cold War “consensus” 
environment.  Alan Nadel’s work is typical of the literary criticism and cultural studies work 
focused on race in the Cold War.  Nadel’s work is invested in the question of identity and culture 
as a site of struggle against racial hegemony.  The Cold War provides a backdrop for many of 
Nadel’s foray into these questions (Containment Culture: American Narrative, Postmodernism 
and the Atomic Age (1995) as well as his most recent book Television in Black-and-White 
America: Race and National Identity (2005)) since the impulse towards conformity during this 
era often times manifested itself in the guise of “whiteness” (Nadel).  Nadel’s work of literary 
criticism is mirrored in the field of history by Robin D.G. Kelly, whose many books – including 
his last one Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination
The scholarship surrounding Ralph Ellison’s work intersects within these overlapping 
areas.  And from the beginning 
 (2002) – gives a diasporic, albeit 
Marxist, vision to Cold War African-American struggles against racial hegemony. 
Invisible Man was read within the ideological crosscurrents of 
the Cold War, whether it was Irving Howe questioning Ellison’s “realism”, the condemnation of 
the novel by J. Saunders Redding and most other African-American literary critics or its 
immediate embrace by the New York literary establishment.  Yet because of the politics of 
discipline formation Ellison’s work was not always read within this complex historical 
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framework. Charting these politics means thinking about Ellison’s work and its relationship to 
the foundations of African-American and American literary criticism.  Critics like Ihab Hassan 
read Ellison within retellings of American literary tradition as well as within what Thomas 
Schaub called the “new Liberalism”, which repackaged Popular Front Modernism in the service 
of Cold War consensus.2
Larry Neal’s essay, “Ellison’s Zoot Suit” (1974) as well as Robert O Meally’s pioneering 
work 
  Both Redding’s and John Oliver Killen’s view of the novel in the 
1950s also persisted into 1960s and 1970s Black Nationalism.  Addison Gayle and Amiri Baraka 
viewed Ellison’s avant-garde experimentation as a rejection of the black populist expression, a 
view that Raymond Mazurek suggests owes to the continued modes of romantic modes of 
Marxism (Mazurek). 
The Craft of Ralph Ellison
                                                            
2 See Ihab Hassan’s Radical Innocence Studies in the Contemporary Novel (1961) and Richard Chase’s The 
American Novel and Its Tradition (1957).  Ellison does not appear in Chase’s work but the romantic tradition Chase 
traces is one Ellison is immersed in.    
 (1980) moved away from the strident rejections of Ellison’s 
works – especially his criticism – and instead focused on Ellison’s conscious use of “vernacular” 
modes of expression.  The emergence of African-American vernacular literary criticism in the 
1970s was in part a response to the heavily sociological and materialist readings by Black 
Studies scholars.  As Christen Thomsen writes in “Inventing and Controlling the Vernacular”, 
the vernacular turn shares its parallel with the foundations of American Studies and in particular 
Leo Marx’s foundational 1958 essay “The Vernacular Tradition in American Literature” as well 
as the work of critic Stanley Edgar Hyman (Thomsen).  Just as Marx’s essay was part of the vital 
center tradition of new liberalism and a certain anxiety about American “modernization”, Madhu 
Dubey suggests that the work of African-American critics like Robert Stepto, Henry Louis Gates 
Jr., Houston Baker and others expresses a parallel resistance rooted in a moral critique of the 
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urbanizing ethos of the 1970s (Dubey).  Where Marx staged the confrontation of black and white 
characters as the genesis of the vernacular in American literature, this new version of the 
vernacular posits a confrontation between blacks and their own folk past.  And it is out of this 
reintroduction to the jazz, blues and black idiomatic expression and dialect language that the 
origins of African-American literary expression are found.  As Ronald Judy demonstrates in 
(Dis) Forming the American Canon
Ralph Ellison’s work as a fiction writer and critic was crucial to this new, 
professionalized version of African-American literary criticism (Thomsen, Warren, Judy).  His 
celebration of the “vernacular” component of American culture was used strategically to 
celebrate an eclectic, non-essentialist version of African-American literary expression yet 
elaborate an authentic, autonomous African-American literary canon (Thomsen, Judy).  It also 
allowed the use of emergent Structuralist as well as Post-Structuralist methods of interpretation, 
which was crucial in legitimating African-American literary studies as a profession (Judy).  It is 
the former impulse – a celebration of an eclectic American modernism – that defines the work of 
Alan Nadel, John Callahan, Harold Bloom and others.
, this critical direction was rooted in the competing impulses 
constituting Black Studies as a field of knowledge (Judy 10, 61), which by the late 1970s was 
beginning to move towards professionalization (Judy 3).   
3
These two vectors of criticism have defined the field of Ellison Studies throughout the 
1980s and 90s.  In 1995, one year after Ralph Ellison’s death, the Modern Library published a 
complete edition of Ellison’s essays and other writings.  The insightful essays contained in this 
volume led New York Times book critic Richard Bernstein to say that Ellison had regrettably 
   
                                                            
3 See Alan Nadel’s Invisible Criticism: Ralph Ellison and the American Canon (1991), John Callahan’s 
“Introductions” to Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison (1995), Flying Home and Other Stories (1998), Juneteenth 
(1999), In The African-American Grain: Call and Response in Twentieth Century Black Fiction (2001) and Harold 
Bloom’s Ralph Ellison (1986). 
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“faded from the public mind, occupying what might be called a highly respected position on the 
sidelines of the general consciousness” (NY Times 1995).  Times have changed since Bernstein 
lamented Ellison’s irrelevance.  I think it is safe to say we are in the midst of an Ellison revival.  
In 1995, Bernstein thought Ellison had faded from the public mind because he was 
“integrationist in his very marrow and in these times of intense identity politics and 
multiculturalism that puts him outside the contemporary trendy mainstream” (Bernstein).   
Bernstein’s invocation of what is commonly known as the “Culture Wars” does weigh 
heavily in more recent receptions of Ellison.  The publication of his collected essays in 1995 
helped focus attention on the vast critical and intellectual work Ellison had published since the 
1940s.  This was followed by the publication of Flying Home and Other Stories (1998) and 
Juneteenth in 1999.  Ellison’s long awaited second novel stoked incredible interest.  But the 
handling of Ellison’s 2000 pages of manuscript by John Callahan, the executor of the author’s 
literary estate, was met mostly with disappointment.  Juneteenth
Despite the ideological punditry of Podhoretz’s review, his question is quite apt.  
Podhoretz sees Ellison, who appeared to have no literary antecedent in 
’s publication elicited groans 
from many.  The Trotskyite turned conservative Norman Podhoretz titled his review of the novel 
“What Happened to Ralph Ellison.”  
Invisible Man, as haunted 
by the overwhelming influence of William Faulkner in Juneteenth.  Given what Raymond 
Mazurek sees as Callahan’s purposeful sanitation of Ellison’s ties to the Popular Front, perhaps 
the Faulknerian spirit haunting Juneteenth is more than just stylistic.  Lawrence Schwartz has 
argued that Faulkner’s legacy was in part manufactured by Cold War political priorities and 
perhaps the same could be said about Ellison’s posthumous consumption?  If Ellison’s death 
happened during the height of “identity politics and multiculturalism”, Ellison’s reemergence has 
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happened during what Michael Milner calls the era of “post-post-Identity” politics in the 
academy, which he describes as a profession wide “sense of exhaustion around the whole project 
of identity” (Milner). This professional exhaustion – akin to Barth’s exhaustion with literature 
during the 1960s – has led to open skepticism of identity’s value for literary and cultural study.  
In the intellectual mainstream it has been characterized by contemporary attacks on Post-
Structuralist theory, African-American cultural studies and identitarian discourses by neo-
conservatives and others invested in dismantling certain American intellectual traditions of 
critique.   
We can see these post-post identity battles being fought around Ellison’s legacy.  For 
instance Houston Baker reversed his stance on Ellison since the 1980s.  In his 1999 essay “Failed 
Prophet and Falling Stock: Why Ralph Ellison Was Never Avant-Garde” Baker allies Ellison’s 
Invisible Man with the “end of ideology” thought of Daniel Bell and the conservatism of T.S. 
Eliot.  Jerry Gafio Watts’ Heroism and The Black Intellectual: Ralph Ellison, Politics and Afro-
American Intellectual Life (1994) was published the same year that Ellison died and to a large 
extent rehashes the reading of Ellison offered by Marxist critics of Ellison – that he was a 
mandarin, bourgeois intellectual.  Watts’ version of Ellison is severely restricted since he treats 
the author as a political philosopher not as a fiction writer or literary critic.  The most recent 
demythologizing effort was Arnold Rampersad’s recent biography Ralph Ellison: A Biography, 
by far the most comprehensive effort at assessing Ellison’s legacy since Lawrence Jackson’s 
Emergence of Genius (2002), In Rampersad’s book, Ellison is a failed race man in part because 
he was enamored by his own gilded status and willfully distanced himself from the political 
struggles of African-Americans. 
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 For a generation of African-American literary critics, particularly those who were so 
foundational to the field, the reassessment of Ellison’s life comes off as chastising a lost black 
genius.  They also stand in stark contrast to the other vector of recent, posthumous Ellison 
reassessment.  Ellison’s dogged resistance to categorical thought has led critics like Ross 
Posnock, Walter Benn Michaels and Kenneth Warren to use Ellison as a wedge against what 
they would read as the implicit identitarian politics found in the above critics.  While Posnock 
and Benn Michaels read Ellison (and Dubois) as heralds for pragmatic neo-liberal anti-racism, 
Warren reads him against the romantic modes of professionalized philology of Henry Louis 
Gates Jr. and Houston Baker.    
Warren’s monograph So Black and Blue: Ralph Ellison and the Occasion of Criticism 
furthers the argument he began in his 2000 essay “The End(s) of African-American Studies.”  In 
this earlier essay he calls the attempts of literary critics to diagnose social problems through 
literary analysis “hubris” (Warren 653).  Politics should be left to the institutions of civil society 
not critics or intellectuals.  In So Black and Blue Ellison becomes the figure through which 
Warren reads the “cultural turn” in African-American and American studies as a turn away from 
what he calls “direct political action.”  The very nature of African-American literary criticism, 
despite its altruism, does not nor cannot precipitate change in lived material circumstances.  
Despite the power of his argument what stand’s in for African-American literary criticism is a 
specious, antiquated version of it.  While Gates, Baker and others are the most important figures 
in African-American literary criticism they are presented as the only figures.  What Warren 
creates is the boogeyman of identitarian politics that spends its midnight hours sitting on the 
chest of every neo-conservative.  In his book, Warren – like Benn Michaels and Posnock – never 
asks broader questions about these traditions of criticism nor whether they are still the dominant. 
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More importantly, Warren ignores the question of power in favor of a return to logic, common 
sense and pragmatics within criticism and politics alike.   
Out of all of the posthumous assessments of Ellison’s work it was John Wright’s 
Shadowing Ralph Ellison (2006), the collection of essays edited by Jonathan Arac and Ronald 
Judy for Boundary 2 (2002), as well as the works of Lawrence Jackson, James Smethhurst and 
others that have attended to the long span and deep interchange Ellison had with writers and 
critics within the interwar and Cold War period.  Smethhurst’s work in particular has focused on 
African-American artists on the Left and Jackson’s work has been more akin to literary history 
and not criticism.4  Jonathan Arac’s discussion of Ralph Ellison in his book Huckleberry Finn as 
Idol and Target: The Functions of Criticism in Our Time is one of the places where African-
American intellectual production is contextualized within the complexities of the Cold War.  
And Ronald Judy’s opening remarks for the special issue of Boundary 2
Along with these above writers, recent books have sought to understand the nexus 
between race and the Cold War in new and innovative ways.  Penny M Von Eschen’s 
 suggest Ellison’s import 
for thinking the “formation of American intelligence in the post-war period” (Judy 1).   
Satchmo 
Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (2006), looks at the complex role 
Louis Armstrong played in Cold War American hegemony and represents recent work that takes 
a different approach to African-American artists, writers and intellectuals.  In Black Fascisms: 
African-American Literature and Culture Between the Wars
                                                            
4 Here I am thinking of James Smethhurst’s The Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s 
(2005) as well as his “Something Warmly, Infuriatingly Feminine': Gender, Sexuality, and The Work of Ralph 
Ellison” and of course Lawrence Jackson’s Ralph Ellison: Emergence of Genius (2002) as well as his “"Ralph 
Ellison's Integrationist Politics" (2003). 
 
 (2007) Mark Christian Thompson 
suggests that we have overvalued the presence of left progressivism in many African-American 
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writers and intellectuals.  Michael Soto's The Modernist Nation: Generation, Renaissance and 
American Literature (2004), Manuel Martinez's Countering the Counterculture: Rereading 
Postwar American Dissent from Jack Kerouac to Tomás Rivera (2003) and Brent Hayes 
Edwards’ The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black 
Internationalism (2004) force us to rethink the relationship between the interwar and Cold War 
period, especially when we put Black diasporic intellectuals into this context.  Oscar Williams’ 
biography George Schuyler: A Black Conservative
Ellison belongs to a generation of African-American artists and intellectuals who embody 
the complex ways Cold War anti-communist ideology mixed with an emergent post-war critique 
of categorical racialist thought.  Ralph Ellison was greatly influenced by the iconoclastic, 
internationalist nature of this interwar generation but it cannot be said that he took the way of 
Thompson’s “black fascism”, Schuyler’s conservatism or Wright’s socialism.  Instead, Ellison 
 can be counted in this category since much of 
the biography discusses Schulyer’s reactionary politics within the context of the Cold War.   
What these more recent works reveal is the dynamic nature of American power in the 
midst of Cold War civil rights discourses.  “The Negro Problem” poses much more than a moral 
conundrum or an academic exercise but – as Ronald Judy suggests – the problem of 
“governability” and the extension of state power into civil society.  This point was not lost on 
Antonio Gramsci who in his famous entry on “Intellectuals” ponders whether American Negroes 
will become eventual tools of twentieth century American hegemony on the African continent.  
As we have already seen this was already anticipated by both W.E.B. Dubois and William 
Campbell Bruce’s articulation of the Negro problem.  These works force us to think the “Negro 
Problem” in a much more dynamic way.  Each attempt at solving returns us to this problem of 
“governability.” 
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found great affinities to what would be called the “vital center” during Cold War; an affinity that 
would explain his close – if antagonistic – relationship to people like Stanley Edgar Hyman, 
Lionel Trilling, Hannah Arendt, Irving Howe, Robert Penn Warren and many others.   
Because of this it is safe to say that Ellison – more than Richard Wright or Langston 
Hughes – met with a level of public success very few African-American intellectuals enjoyed 
during the Cold War.  Despite his contrarian stance towards the majority of this “center” – 
Ellison enjoyed unprecedented access to the institutions of Cold War literary and academic 
culture; institutions that were closely watched and at times influenced by the American State.  In 
“The Ineluctability of American Empire” (2005), Paul Bove urges us to ruminate upon the 
logistical successes of American power as a way of accounting for what institutional and 
material forms this power takes (Bove).  I invoke Bove’s assertion in order to draw attention to 
the fact that Ellison’s version of solving this problematic, his “new American humanism” is 
greatly informed by the centrist liberal discourses of his moment.  By no means did Ellison’s 
humanism successfully solve “the Negro Problem” nor can his relationship to the center be easily 
translated into an example of such success.  But we should ask why Ellison achieved institutional 
success during his moment as well as in our own.  Since we understand the work of African-
American intellectuals, artists and writers as against racial discrimination, is their work 
necessarily oppositional with regard to American global hegemony?  How do we reconcile Ralph 
Ellison’s relationship to the State during the Cold War with the modernism lying behind his 
“new humanism?” What does it mean that Ellison’s modernism, which is intricately tied to his 
radically humanist, anti-racist, liberal politics, is also wrapped up in ideological battles waged by 
the American State during the Cold War?  Thinking to our own times, how do we account for the 
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foundational if contentious place Ellison occupies in the discipline of American and African-
American literary and cultural studies?   
One way to approach the literary nature of Ellison’s “new American humanism” is as 
another attempt to solve the “Negro Problem.” And given the Cold War context it also presents a 
way for us to think the operations of hegemony within the sphere of American literary culture.  I 
see Ellison's “new American humanism” as a revitalization of the Latin notion of litterae 
humaniores that draws heavily on post-Reconstruction American literature and philosophy.  For 
Ellison, post-Reconstruction American artists and intellectuals were grappling with the country’s 
primary quandary after the Civil War:  an inability to reconcile America’s progressive vision of 
humanism with the legacy left by chattel slavery and anti-black racism. 
Like General McArthur, Ellison too was haunted by the nineteenth century.  But were 
Ellison’s meditations about this past “timely” like McArthur’s monumentalizing approach to it?  
Or is his “new American humanism” an untimely endeavor, “critical” in Nietzsche’s sense of 
how we should approach history?  Either way, we should not be surprised that Ellison’s 
meditation appears only one month after General McArthur closed the curtain on World War II.  
If the shadow of the Mississippi still haunts the end of World War II then Ellison seems to sense 
this in his book review “Beating That Boy.”  Published in The Nation in October of 1945, it is a 
review of his friend Bucklin Moon’s anthology, Primer for White Folks (1945).  Moon’s 
anthology, Ellison tells us, “will be prized for the oblique light it throws upon an aspect of 
American writing which was not its immediate concern” (Ellison 147).  As a way of further 
introducing my study I would like to suggest that Ellison’s review also throws an oblique light 
on the roots of his new American humanism and the forces that influence it. 
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Perhaps there is no coincidence that Ellison, fresh from his duty as a Merchant Marine 
would refer to America’s racial situation as an “irrational sea” upon which “Americans flounder 
like convoyed ships in a gale” (Ellison 145).  As Ellison writes, his title, “Beating that Boy” is a 
euphemism for discussing what is commonly known as the “Negro problem” (145).   The phrase 
also seems to be Ellison’s indulgence in gallows humor.  While it suggests an engagement with 
the topic of race relations in America “beating that boy” simultaneously suggests that the 
engagement is often a symbolically – if not – physically violent.  Immediately Ellison’s short 
story “Battle Royal” comes to mind, especially since the author was most likely writing that 
story right around the time he was drafting this book review.   
Ellison’s phrase is accurate in more ways than one.  Moon’s book comes at a time when 
this boy has come in for a beating once again.  Returning black soldiers who had fought against 
fascism and black laborers who had contributed their labor force to wartime industry demanded 
an end to Jim Crow and equal rights as guaranteed by the constitution.  So in a very literal 
Americans have come back from the war and are forced to return to the question of civil rights 
for African-Americans.  Remedies for America’s race problem did not come swiftly, so instead 
of clarifying the terms and concepts of democracy or recognizing the humanism of African-
Americans, World War II has contributed to this tumult.  Democracy, Ellison writes “is still 
discussed on an infantile level” and the Negro “discussed in pre-adult terms” (Ellison 145).  
Moon’s book, like Ellison’s essay is aimed at addressing the continued paradoxes that racism 
presents in post-World War II America.  Ellison writes that the short stories, essays and other 
works in Moon’s anthology bear upon “the tense period we have just entered” (Ellison 146).  
They are “the most democratically informed discussions of the racial situation to appear in print 
since Pearl Harbor” (146).   
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Moon felt the same paradoxes of democracy as Ellison, something that we can see in 
Moon’s own novelistic endeavors.  His social realist novel, The Darker Brother (1943) 
chronicled the difficulties of Northern life for African-Americans who migrated from Southern 
Florida.  Like his acquaintance and sometime collaborator Zora Neale Hurston, Moon 
demythologized Northern migration and the idea that cities like New York were havens against 
racial prejudice.  Moon does not end his novel with the sort of resignation found in Hurston but 
instead Moon has his novel’s main character Ben vow to fight for America in WWII despite the 
injustices heaped upon him by his country: “We got tuh fight for what we got comin to us over 
here. We been waitin uh long time. We liable tuh get knots beat all over top uh our heads. We 
goin to get shoved around. But we got tuh keep fightin” (Moon 245).   
As Lawrence Jackson writes in “Bucklin Moon and Thomas Sancton in the 1940s: 
Crusaders for the Racial Left,” Moon – along with Sancton – predicted that African-American 
literature would go through a second renaissance after World War II (Jackson 83).  His work as 
an editor at Doubleday during the 1940s was motivated by his desire to see this happen.  Moon 
tells Negro Digest
It should be no surprise then that Moon’s anthology included many of these figures and 
that Moon asked Ellison to write a review for his book.   
 in 1946, “The unknown Negro writer has a better chance of book publication 
today than ever before, including the so-called Negro Renaissance of the twenties. Not only that, 
once his book is published the chances of it being successful are also better” (Moon 79).  To 
back up this statement, Moon befriended and tried to publish the work of the best black writers 
of the 30s and 40s.  Many of them he knew personally, including: Ralph Ellison, Richard Wright, 
Ann Petry, Chester Himes, James Baldwin, Owen Dodson, and Langston Hughes (Jackson 83). 
The New Republic gave Ellison his first 
exposure to a broad readership.  Despite the laudatory nature of Ellison’s opening remarks, he 
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did not like all that he read in Moon’s anthology.  Ellison felt that most of the fiction in the book 
- like American society itself - “cannot escape the blight of hypocrisy implicit in our social 
institutions” (Ellison 147).  Many of the stories “mix appeals for fair play with double talk….”   
Ellison never names names in his critique.  Whether they are tales about the South, like in 
Richard Wright’s autobiographical “The Ethics of Living Jim Crow” and Sara Hardt’s “Little 
White Girl” or the ironies and hypocrisy of the liberated north in Langston Hughes’ “Slave on 
the Block”, James T. Farrell’s “For White Men Only” or Dorothy Parker’s “Arrangement in 
Black and White” – many of the stories in Moon’s anthology chronicle, with very little subtlety, 
the hard and fast borders created by the color line.  In the introduction of Primer for White Folks
Perhaps it is the strong presence of social realism that Ellison is calling attention to when 
he suggests that most of the fiction in Moon’s anthology are representative of post-depression 
American writers.  James T. Farrell, who was part of the Trotskyite left, was a realist and one 
could see how Ellison’s complaints that contemporary fiction was obsessed with “mere physical 
violence and pain and overemphasized “understatement” could be directed towards Farrell’s 
contribution to Moon’s anthology.  That same complaint could be made about Richard Wright.  
It is important to recall Ellison’s long standing criticisms of Wright and in particular, Wright’s 
 
Moon suggests that the time for subtlety is over.  His book was written for the average American 
who “is disturbed by the rising racial tensions which he feels around him and by the paradox of 
white and Negro relationships in a democracy waging a war of liberation and equality” (Moon 
xi).  Just as Moon’s own fictional work is informed by social realist technique and proletariat 
naturalism, much of the fiction in his anthology reflects this, with the exception of writers like 
Dorothy Parker, whose witticism is in keeping with the traditions of satire stemming from 
Wodehouse and Menken. 
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adherence to proletariat naturalism.  The same cannot be said of Hughes, who clearly embraced 
modernist literary techniques but in “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain” grounds the 
responsibility of African-American artists in a racialized, folk sensibility and aesthetic.  While 
Hughes did not share Wright’s sense of art he certainly shared in his ideological politics – even 
splitting with the CPUSA during the 1940s.  By distancing himself from Hughes – the towering 
figure of the Harlem Renaissance – and Wright, one has to wonder what kind of relationship 
Ellison had to this aesthetic moment?    
It is “the absolute concept of “democracy” – the very one Moon thought imperiled during 
the 1940s – which Ellison says these authors are fearful of.  He describes them as “circl[ing] 
above it…like planes being forced to earth in a fog” (Ellison 147).5  But more importantly, 
democracy is tied to another concept Ellison sees missing but fundamental to the writing of 
American fiction: humanism.  Here, as Ellison writes, the boy comes in for a “bit of a beating.”  
He notes that these writers seem “concerned most often with patching up the merry-go-round-
that-broke-down than with the projection of that oh-so-urgently-needed new American 
humanism” in their fiction (147).  In a tongue-and-cheek, Demanian fashion Ellison suggests that 
the blindness these writers have towards this “new American humanism” is in fact an insight.  
Moon publishes Primer for White Folks
                                                            
5 This image is in keeping with the wartime metaphors throughout Ellison’s review.  And as I discuss in chapter two 
of my dissertation – the metaphor of war and in particular Civil War is something Ellison is continually fascinated 
by.  It is interesting to note that this aeronautical metaphor can also be found in two of Ellison’s earlier works of 
fiction “A Party Down at the Square” and “In a Strange Country.”  Both feature a very similar image – the downed 
aircraft – as a way to comment on the complexity of black/white relations in America.  In “In a Strange Country” the 
aircraft metaphor is much more explicit since the story is about an African-American airman training for WWII.  
Where as in “A Party Down at the Square” an aircraft is literally forced to land in the midst of a lynching.  Because 
of foggy conditions the pilot in Ellison’s story mistakes the fires of a lynch mob for a landing beacon.  In “Strange 
Country” it is after being forced to the earth that the pilot finds some sense of racial and national belonging.  “A 
Party” on the other hand presents this forced landing as a bit of irony since the lynching represents the most 
undemocratic spectacle of American national and racial sentiment.  
 at a time when the liberalism defined for some many 
decades by the Popular Front and championed under the banner of social realism or the dry wit 
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of writer like Dorothy Parker has to contend with the New York Intellectuals, their critique of 
liberalism and a move towards centrist anti-communism.  Judging from the list of authors Moon 
solicited for his anthology, Ellison’s critique has much to do this change in politics and the effect 
it had on his understanding of American literary tradition.  Many of Moon’s writers were central 
figures in New York’s literary scene as well as the leftist politics of the Popular Front era.  Upon 
his arrival in New York in 1936, it was Hughes and Wright that Ellison met.  Through them 
Ellison became tangentially involved with the Communist Party of the America.  Both 
encouraged his earliest experimentations with fiction writing through the CPA magazine The 
New Masses as well as the Federal Writers Project (Rampersad).  In fact it was Wright and 
Hughes who began introducing Ellison to the prefaces of Henry James, the works of Zola, 
Malraux, Dostoyevsky and other writers who were important to the CPA and shaped Ellison’s 
understanding of literary craft.  And ultimately Hughes and Wright put Ellison in the orbit of 
publishers like Moon. 
By the time he was commissioned to write a review for Moon’s book Ellison had already 
began to break from the techniques of proletariat naturalism and social realism marking his early 
stories.  In 1944 he wrote “King of the Bingo Game”, began writing “Invisible Man” (later 
renamed “Battle Royal”) a short story that would form the cornerstone of his untitled novel in 
progress.  Both of these stories demonstrated a shift in Ellison’s literary experimentation.  His 
Modernism was coming into the orbit of figures like Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Malraux, Kafka Steinbeck 
and Faulkner rather than Hemingway, Anderson and Wright.  Even before this turn in his writing 
Ellison’s letters to Wright during the late 1930s reveal that Ellison already detected a stagnating 
intellectual atmosphere within the CPUSA (Rampersad).   
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He was not alone in his dissatisfaction with the CPUSA.  Like many African-American 
writers and intellectuals a sense of disillusionment crept in because of party wide changes 
occurring between the Sixth and Seventh World Congresses.  In this ten year span, a more direct 
confrontation with the problem of anti-black racism in the United States was abandoned for 
coalition building against the rise of fascism in Europe.  During his exchanges with Wright in the 
1930s the CPA was splintering over Joseph Stalin’s rise to power and the signing of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  The onset of World War II also created tension between CPUSA 
support for the war – something many African-Americans agreed with – and continued African-
American dissatisfaction with Jim Crow segregation in American industry. 
Running parallel to African-American dissatisfaction with the CPUSA was the 
resuscitation of Partisan Review in 1937, an event that had an equally important effect on 
Ellison’s thinking. By breaking with the CPUSA, many of the writers involved with Partisan 
Review (including Alfred Kazin, Lionel Trilling, Mary McCarthy and others) embraced the 
stylistic and intellectual perspectives embodied in European modernism.  It also served as a 
counter narrative to the anti-Modernist “cultural patrioteering” that emerged during the 1930s 
(Hemingway 30).  As Alan Nadel, Ronald Judy, John S. Wright, Jonathan Arac and many others 
have shown we must understand Ellison’s thinking in the midst of these events. Trilling and 
others associated with the Partisan Review embraced European modernism, literary formalism 
and a strong critique of liberalism.  Even though Lionel Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination 
would not be published until 1950 his novel, The Middle of the Journey appeared in 1947 and it 
is clear that Trilling’s critical and aesthetic adherence to “negative capability” influenced 
Ellison’s thinking.  It could be said that in “Beating That Boy” Ellison agrees with Trilling that 
“not a single first-rate writer has emerged to deal with these ideas [liberalism], and the emotions 
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that are consonant with them, in a great literary way” (Trilling 94).  For Ellison, it was the 
“Negro Problem” that had not yet been adequately represented in fiction.  While Trilling stayed 
skeptical of politics behind the emergence of nationalist American literary criticism, Ellison was 
also attracted to the complex “patrioteering” of F.O. Matthiessen, Van Wyck Brooks and Lewis 
Mumford, drawing upon these figures despite the skepticism of this tradition he shared with the 
New York Intellectuals.   
As was the case with the party internationally, the ideological changes that critics like the 
New York Intellectuals went through – which often entailed a critique of liberal attitudes about 
the Negro problem – mirrored a transformation in how the “Negro problem” was understood.  
The changing relationship the CPUSA had to anti-black racism was echoed albeit in a different 
fashion within the field of American literary criticism.  The exclusion of black writers from 
Matthiessen’s American “renaissance” had as much to do with the conditions he set for inclusion 
as it did with a profound problem in American historicism of the time, as William Cain notes in 
F. O. Matthiessen and the Politics of Criticism (1988).  This observation in fact brings Cain to 
embrace Dubois as a critical and intellectual starting point (Cain).  Not only was there an 
absence of acknowledged African-Americans in the American canon, but the dominant 
historicism of the time understood black emancipation as the reason why Reconstruction failed.  
Hence what is identified as the “renaissance” was followed by a period of decay and tragedy.6
These twin coincidences in part created the intellectual and aesthetic conditions Ellison is 
responding to.  This historical period marks what Howard Brick in 
    
Daniel Bell and the Decline 
of Intellectual Radicalism: Social Theory and Political Reconciliation in the 1940s
                                                            
6 I elaborate this point extensively in the second chapter of my dissertation. 
 calls the 
defining ideological conundrum gripping the Left in America (Brick 22).  For Ellison critics and 
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writers alike are unable to properly express the imbrications of racism, politics and aesthetics in 
America.  While the attention New York Intellectuals gave to modernist European literature 
attended to the complex intertwining of alienation, experience and aesthetics, its attention to 
similar conditions in America for African-Americans – what Ellison called the “necessities of 
existence,” – are ignored.  Ellison’s review in part chastises contemporary American writers for 
failing to resolve the “conflict in keeping with [their] democratic ideals” (Ellison 149).   
Political failure finds its parallel in aesthetic ones.  Written all over Ellison’s review is his 
eloquent outrage over this state of affairs.  It would not be until the 1950s and 60s that Ellison 
would begin to critique the New York Intellectuals more forcefully.  In 1945, Ellison aimed his 
sights at social realism and proletariat naturalism.  Ellison’s sentiments echo Alfred Kazin’s 
thoughts at the conclusion of On Native Grounds
Ellison believed that American tradition could be reinvigorated and in fact he reclaims a 
new relationship to realism – a term he undoubtedly inherited from Hemingway.  The influence 
of the New York Intellectuals and in particular Trilling also means that the “realism” Ellison 
desired sat between his overt rejection of social realism and embrace of experimental literary 
modernism. This much can be gleaned from his reply to a letter from psychiatrist Karl 
Menninger in 1947, who asked Ellison to describe the origins of his short story “Battle Royal.”  
Ellison responded that “for all the detailed description of the prose, the aim is not naturalism but 
.  Before the 1940’s, Kazin detected a growing 
critique of the novel form, something Kazin felt sprung from social realism’s and proletariat 
naturalism’s inability to contend with the shifting nature of America’s social scene.  As Kazin 
writes, much of the period’s proletarian writing did a better job of “identifying” then 
“comprehending” the social forces creating the American scene – something these writers owe to 
the journalist impulse that gripped a lot of American fiction (Kazin 487).   
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realism – a realism dilated to deal with the almost surreal state of our everyday American life” 
(Ellison, Rampersad, emphasis mine).   
What is precisely meant by a dilated realism?  Does Ellison literally want to “open” up 
realism and wrestle it from its literary association with the traditions of Zola or the social realists 
of the left?  Perhaps this is why he separates it from “naturalism?”  Dilation also has its roots in 
mathematics and physics.  In both of these fields the term describes a feature of objects or laws 
that do not change if length scales (or energy scales) are multiplied by a common factor.  One 
can imagine that Ellison, who finds himself in the midst of what Moon called the new Negro 
Renaissance, still finds the paradoxes of American democratic life that push the Negro the 
bottom of American life – including the way that life is presented in literature.  It is no wonder 
then that the surreal for Ellison is the only way to describe African-American life.  The energy of 
democracy as well as the legal, social and intellectual concepts by which we think human life has 
increased yet thinking about the Negro has for Ellison remained invariant.     
Indeed, whoever can present this dilated realism and comprehend how the human can act 
in the midst of this “surreal state” is projecting a “new American humanism.”  Ellison’s Trilling-
like stance on the writers in Moon’s anthology tells us that he find no such writer in the pages of 
Primer for White Folks.  In fact, he tells us as much.  We are informed that the “most widely 
read authors of the between-wars period” are “conspicuously missing” from Moon’s anthology 
(147).  He never tells us who is missing but given the subject matter one can imagine that 
William Faulkner’s absence is the most conspicuous.  In “Twentieth Century Fiction and the 
Black Mask of Humanity”, an essay Ellison would write one year later, he suggests that Faulkner 
brings into focus the relationship: 
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Between the Negro and contemporary writing...the social and the personal, the 
moral and the technical, the nineteenth-century emphasis upon morality and the 
modern accent upon personal myth.  And on the strictly literary level Faulkner is 
prolific and complex enough to speak for those Southerners who are aggressively 
anti-Negro and for those younger writers who appear most sincerely interested in 
depicting the Negro as a rounded human being (97). 
To Ellison, Faulkner connects us to Melville and Twain; both of whom bring us close to the 
“moral implications of the Negro” (97).  Ellison draws the circle even tighter between Faulkner 
and Twain by comparing Malcolm Cowley’s advice to skip Lucas Beauchamp’s appearance in 
“The Bear” section of Go Down, Moses to Hemingway’s advice in The Green Hills of Africa 
that we skip the final section of Huckleberry Finn
...from 1776-1876 there was a conception of democracy current in this country 
that allowed the writer to identify himself with the Negro, and that had such an 
anthology been conceivable during the nineteenth century, it could have included 
 when Huck goes after Jim.  In both 
Hemingway and Cowley’s criticism Ellison sees a continuation of the “moral problem” that 
emerged at the end of the nineteenth-century in America: the suppression of African-American 
humanity as a consequence of the Hayes-Tilden Compromise, which effectively ended the 
experiment of Reconstruction and restored white hegemony to the Southern United States.   
For Ellison it is not Faulkner’s stature that would lend Moon’s anthology legitimacy but 
the kind of literary-historical continuity it would establish between the nineteenth century and 
post-World War II America.  In “Beating That Boy” he writes:  
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such writers as Whitman, Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville and Mark 
Twain.  For slavery (it was not termed a “Negro problem” then) was a vital issue 
in the American consciousness, symbolic of the condition of Man, and a valid 
aspect of the writer’s reality.  Only after Emancipation and the return of the 
Southern ruling class to power in the counterrevolution of 1876 was the Negro 
issue pushed into the underground of the American consciousness and ignored 
(148).        
This group of authors should be familiar.  Whitman, Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne and Melville 
are the five writers at the center of Matthiessen’s American Renaissance; a book published a 
mere four years before Ellison writes his review.  The one addition to Matthiessen’s group is 
Mark Twain, who has a small, elusive but anticipatory presence in Matthiessen’s study.  Twain’s 
appearance in this passage very much owes to the echoes of the Popular Front as it does with the 
oncoming realities of the Cold War.  As Jonathan Arac writes in Huckleberry Finn as Idol and 
Target: The Function of Criticism in Our Time, Twain’s most famous work was lauded for very 
different reasons after World War II.  During the 1930s, critics like Bernard DeVoto used 
Twain’s work in a “nationalist celebration of the empire of democracy” (Arac 112).  As the chill 
of the Cold War set in Huck became an “isolated, alienated individual” in the hand of critics like 
Trilling, Leo Marx and T.S. Eliot for whom Huck was a “vagabond” much like Eliot himself 
(ibid, Eliot).  Even Faulkner’s ghostly presence – one that becomes flesh in later Ellison reviews 
–suggests Ellison’s affinities to Trilling and the New York Intellectuals (Arac).  Tethering Twain 
and Faulkner (who is absent in “Beating That Boy”) to Matthiessen is a complex operation.  It 
joins the new liberalist realities of the emergent post-War period to a figure like Matthiessen, 
whose leftist political position and sexual orientation would be left outside the centrist and 
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masculine politics of the Cold War.  It also remarks on the absence of “the Negro” in 
Matthiessen’s work, something that would take more contemporary critics like Hortense Spillers, 
Eric Sundquist, Alan Nadel, Ronald Judy and the aforementioned William Cain to point out.7  
That Ellison would join Matthiessen to this new reality necessitates a question about motive.  Is 
Matthiessen a figure Ellison wants to channel?  Or does Ellison integrate him into a new state of 
affairs after World War II? 
It is Faulkner who Ellison tells us in “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of 
Humanity” was “seeking the nature of man.”  Faulkner’s act of recognizing Negro humanity has 
been so tabooed in the south “that the white Southerner is apt to associate any form of personal 
rebellion with the Negro.  So that for the Southern artist the Negro becomes a symbol of his 
personal rebellion, his guilt and his repression of it” (98).  In his private letters, Faulkner 
reiterates this but with a twist.  After winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in part for his novel 
Intruder in the Dust
Ellison reminds us we turn to Faulkner “for that continuity of moral purpose which made 
for the greatness of our classics”.  And while Ellison finds this purpose in Moon’s book project it 
is still lacking the proper historical continuity.  As I have suggested above, this continuity with 
“our classics” has as much to do with the “Negro problem” in the past as it does with a more 
lateral relationship with certain emergent Cold War liberal politics as well as the new field of 
 (1947) he suggests that his forays into black/white relationships in the south 
were an inclusive affair that had nothing to do with the North.  So despite what Ellison calls 
Faulkner’s rebellion it is one that is hyper regionalized and individualized.   
                                                            
7 Here I am thinking of Hortense Spiller’s “Changing the Letter: The Yokes, the Jokes of Discourse, or Mrs. Stowe, 
Mr. Reed” (1989), Eric Sunquist’s, To Wake the Nations: Race and the Making of American Literature. (1993), 
Alan Nadel’s aforementioned Invisible Criticism, Ronald Judy’s (Dis) forming the American Canon and William 
Cain’s F.O. Matthiessen and the Politics of Criticism (1988). 
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American studies.  Matthiessen’s politics might not overtly inform Ellison by 1944 but where 
Matthiessen’s influence can be felt it is in Ellison’s interest in literary language and form. 
At the beginning of American Renaissance, Matthiessen informs his readers that all of the 
themes he has developed in his book are approached: 
“through attention to the writers’ use of their own tools, their diction and rhetoric, 
and to what they could make with them.  An artist’s use of language is the most 
sensitive index to cultural history, since a man can articulate only what he is, and 
what he has been made by the society of which he is a willing or an unwilling 
part” (Matthiessen xv).    
Matthiessen’s scrupulous attention to the modern relationships among language, culture and 
history can be traced to his invocation of Francesco De Sanctis’ History of Italian Literature
 Perhaps it was with this complexity in mind that Matthiessen was attracted to De Sanctis’ 
concept of form, which was: “nothing else than the entire resolution of the intellectual, 
sentimental, and emotional material into the concrete reality of the poetic image and word, which 
alone has aesthetic value” (De Sanctis quoted in Matthiessen xii).  We see this sentiment in 
 
(1871).  Matthiessen’s own approach to American literature drew from the lessons he learned 
from De Sanctis; that criticism could be intimately tied to the process of creating a new political 
and cultural reality.  Indeed Sanctis, who was exiled after the first failed Neapolitan 
Risorgimento in 1848, is powerful if melancholic figure for Matthiessen to inaugurate his 
methodological approach to literary history.  It suggests Matthiessen’s own complicated 
relationship to doing nationalist literary study as well as the complex politics of the Interwar 
period.   
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Matthiessen’s aforementioned understanding of language as being “the most sensitive index to 
cultural history.”  If Dante is the father of Italian literature then so can Emerson be the progenitor 
of an American tradition.  But in the same way that Dante is just as much a figure of the 
inherently comparative, international conception of Italian literature Matthiessen uses America’s 
own “renaissance” to prove the precise same thing (Arac).  Matthiessen’s impulse towards the 
comparative and international aspect of literary language can be found in his 
“Acknowledgements” page where both H.L. Mencken’s The American Language (1919) and 
Constance Rourke’s American Humor: A Study of the National Character
My rather long excurses back to 
 (1931) appear as well 
as his other references to Andre Malraux, Balzac and Shakespeare.  
American Renaissance is to suggest that Ellison’s 
elusive reference to Matthiessen and Faulkner in “Beating That Boy” illuminates the stake and 
politics of Ellison’s “new American humanism” at the dawn of the Cold War.  Faulkner 
functions as Ellison’s “sensitive index.” The language his works speak provides a proper 
aesthetic model and conceptual model through which a roadmap of American literary tradition 
can be elaborated.  He reminds the reader of the continuity between ethics and literary technique; 
politics and history.  And with this Ellison situates Faulkner within the tradition of Twain and 
other writers of the nineteenth century.  The most radical element of Ellison’s feat is that he 
centralizes the “Negro” as the figural augur of a “new American humanism.” Sitting at the 
intersection between these traditions, Ellison’s humanism has the potential to shift the 
Eurocentric, Western construction of humanity.  At the same time that Ellison seems to be 
positing a kind of classical Renaissance ideal of humanitas, founded upon a critical mass of 
classical works (both visible and invisible in “Beating That Boy”) Ellison’s keen sense of 
historicity suggests that what is equally at stake is a history of thought and the way in which our 
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knowledge of the human is organized in the United States – and that key to understanding this 
organization is a reassessment of Reconstruction and its aftermath.  In its emphasis on historicity 
Ellison’s “new American humanism” breaks from the Christian sensibilities of the “New 
Humanism” of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More.  Knowing the political and ideological 
tensions already defining his present, the question I explore in the four chapters of my 
dissertation is: How does this “new American humanism” play itself out in Ellison’s subsequent 
work?              
In the first chapter,  “Ellison’s ‘Battle Royal’: An Allegory of Modernism’s Negro 
Problem?” I read Invisible Man as an imaginative anticipation of the intellectual crisis defining 
American Cold War literary criticism. That crisis arose from a critical blindness inherited from 
interwar anti-fascist literary criticism. Despite the roots of this criticism in "American 
Renaissance" and Popular Front idealism, neither properly theorized the "Negro Problem" as a 
substantial complication of America's own democratic sentiment.  I read Ralph Ellison’s early 
essays and eventually Invisible Man
To end this chapter I focus on the short story and novelistic portrayal of “The Battle 
Royal.”  Instead of political or social allegory, I argue that Ellison is invested in presenting what 
he calls "the complex ambiguity of the human" through a figura of the human, which in the story 
is contained in the narrator’s self-identification as a “nigger-boy.”  And here I will rely on Erich 
Auerbach’s discussion of the difference between allegory and figuration in 
 as anticipating critics like Irving Howe, who believed that 
African-American literature could not attain the proper aesthetic distance to engage in the anti-
fascist, democratic work of modernist literature.   
Scenes from the 
Drama of European Literature and Mimesis.  That Ellison chose to have this figure emerge in a 
nightmare is a symbolic testament to his investment in modernism.  Further it represents a 
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particular version of modernism that distinguishes him from contemporaries like Ernest 
Hemingway and Richard Wright. 
Coming on the heels of his declaration of a “new American Humanism”, it is apparent 
that “the Negro” and modernism have a central role in the humanism Ellison desires.  After 
winning the National Book Award for Invisible Man
These questions guide the second chapter of my dissertation, “Ellison in Exile: ‘Telling It 
Like It Is, Baby’ and The Problem of Renaissance.”  Here I traces the roots of Ralph Ellison’s 
“Tell It Like It Is, Baby” (1965) to the author’s participation in the American Seminar in 
Salzburg, which occurred under the auspices of the State Department in 1954. In this chapter, I 
read Ellison’s essay “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” as an allegorical staging of America’s historical 
and literary continuity with the “renaissance” past through the figure of Hamlet.  As my reading 
, Ellison would travel to Austria in 1954 and 
teach in the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies.  Established in 1947 by the Harvard 
University Council, its mission was to expose Central European students to American culture.  
At some point, the U.S. Army and the State Department, in its effort to create “ideological 
conformity,” exerted veto power over who could and could not be invited to teach at the Seminar 
(Wagnleitner).   
Once there, Ellison would revisit many of these concerns in a class called "The Role of 
the Novel in Creating the American Experience."  And while there is no doubt Ellison would 
present the American Negro in all its complexity, one wonders to what end Ellison’s ideas were 
becoming enmeshed in the complex ideological operations of America’s Cold War.  All of this 
raises the question: Is Ellison’s “Negro” an instance of the State’s logistical success within the 
realm of culture?  Does it evade it?  Or is the truth more uncertain than this binary allows? 
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of Ellison’s essay will show, placing America in this past proves as tenuous for post-Civil War 
America as it does of America in 1965. 
In Ellison’s version of Hamlet, Lincoln occupies the role of the King of Denmark and 
Ellison’s dream-self, a “literate-slave” is an orphaned Hamlet.  Lincoln and Hamlet represent 
America’s connection to what F.O. Matthiessen conceptualizes as the “rebirth” of democratic 
sentiment.  In “Tell It Like It Is, Baby,” Ellison expresses his pessimism about this figure’s 
capability to do such a thing.  Ellison’s pessimism makes “Tell It Like It Is, Baby,” a counter 
narrative to F.O. Matthiessen’s version of America’s literary continuity with the humanistic past.  
Matthiessen, like Emerson before him invokes Hamlet as a tragic figure to establish this 
continuity in American Renaissance
As the Cold War and Civil Rights era reached their crescendo, Ellison’s attachment to the 
Gilded Age ossified.  By the late 60s, it took the romantic form of aesthetic and political 
conservatism.  This process is part of his participation in what Francis Saunders called the 
.  Replacing Hamlet with a “literate slave,” the essay reveals 
Ellison’s attempt to infuse the “tortuous ambiguity” of the Civil War into Matthiessen’s version 
of American literary traditions and their historic relationship to Renaissance Humanism.   
Through archival research in Ralph Ellison’s Papers at the Library of Congress, I show 
that Ellison began writing this counter-narrative in 1954, a year before he began writing the 
essay at the American Academy in Rome and 10 years before “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” is 
published. By looking through the syllabi and lecture notes from a course he taught as part of the 
Salzburg Seminar in America Studies in Austria, we can see the continuity of thought linking 
Ellison’s revision of Matthiessen’s “American Renaissance” to the ideas about American literary 
tradition he takes up in “Tell It Like It Is Baby.” 
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“Cultural Cold War” against communism.  For many – including Ellison – this participation 
made their aesthetic investment in modernism commensurate with their anti-communist 
ideology.  I explore this nexus in the second half of my dissertation. 
Chapter Three “Arendt and Ellison Speak for the Negro” is where I read Ralph Ellison 
critique of Hannah Arendt in Who Speaks for the Negro (1965) and other writings as a broader 
indictment of Arendt’s reliance upon Kant’s sensus communis, especially as she applies Kant’s 
idea to understanding American political traditions.  I use “Reflections on Little Rock” as an 
occasion to discuss Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of American political traditions.  
Arendt’s “Reflections” was the beginning of a three year study of American political culture that 
culminated in On Revolution in 1961.  Her suggestion that desegregation is a deviation from 
America’s own political “common sense” at the beginning of “Reflections on Little Rock” 
reveals her nascent interpretations of America’s foundational political ideas.  As I will show, 
Arendt’s interpretation of American “common sense” is linked to her misreading of Thomas 
Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia.  This misreading began in The Origins of Totalitarianism and 
extends through “Reflections on Little Rock” and On Revolution
In the second part of this chapter I draw attention to Ellison’s description of the events at 
Little Rock, and it connection to Arendt’s misunderstanding of American “common sense”.  I 
read Ellison’s response as a critique of Arendt’s reliance upon Kant’s sensus communis to 
.  In both of these works Arendt 
suggests that racism in America is a social concern not one that suggest a problem with 
American political thought.  By mistaking anti-black racism as a social instead of a political 
problem, I suggest that Arendt cannot properly interpret the “common sense” of America’s 
political traditions.   
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conceptualize political speech.  Instead of the rational “common sense” speech of Kant, Ellison 
suggests that American literary and vernacular traditions should be the origin for any 
conceptualization of political and social belonging.  Ellison gives an example of these literary 
origins in two ways:  First through his sublime, modernist description of the black children at 
Little Rock and secondly through his aesthetic representation of Martin Luther King and 
African-American protesters during his interview with Robert Penn Warren.  I argue that his use 
of the concept of the sublime and other literary allusions to describe black protest are 
conscientious invocations of his version of litterae humaniores.  I conclude this chapter by 
suggesting that Ellison’s concerns about the emergence of Black Nationalism in the 1960s begins 
to politicize his artful conception of human life. 
  In my final chapter, “An Integrative Vernacular” I read the “vernacular” turn Ellison’s 
work took in the late 1970s as his attempt to think the problem of race and American social 
cohesion in the post-Civil Rights era.  Focusing on his famous essay “The Little Man at Chehaw 
Station” as well as other published writings and materials from Ellison’s archived papers; I 
suggest Ellison was trying to articulate a poetic understanding of what he calls the “integrative, 
vernacular note” of American experience.  More specifically, these writings show that Ellison’s 
understanding was focused though his use of William Graham Sumner’s notion of “antagonistic 
cooperation.”  Ellison’s adaptation of Sumner’s sociological term into an aesthetic one allows 
Ellison to expose the racialized metaphysics underlying most visions of American social 
cohesion, including the benign categorical thought guiding federally mandated integration 
policies.  But as I show, Ellison’s “little man” and his use of Sumner also symbolize a broader 
political and aesthetic anxiety over the relationship contemporary African-American culture had 
to American life in the post-Civil Rights era.  
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To close this chapter I will read his melancholic optimism about the present into the 
Dantesque coal-heavers vignette that ends the essay.  Instead of being the moment of 
transcendence found in Canto XXXIV, I will read it through Canto X of the Inferno
 
.  Drawing 
parallels to Gramsci’s reading of Canto X in “Canto X of Dante’s Inferno”, I argue that Ellison is 
making a similar non-metaphysical, material claim to language and expression through the “little 
man” and coal heavers.  For Ellison, the question is not about the problem of “leadership” as 
Paul Bove reads into Gramsci’s interpretation.  Instead it is an attempt to displace the 
epistemological assumptions behind the question Farinata asks Dante and Virgil: “What is your 
name and race?”  Ellison’s “heretical” portrayal of the little man and coal heaver’s challenges the 
dogmatic political meanings these questions had during the time Ellison wrote his essay.   
By casting this “little man” amidst the chaos of the 1970s, Ellison reveals the forces 
threatening the literary and historical significance of his little man.  Just as the Gilded Age roots 
of Ellison’s little man suggest a profoundly radical version of the human, at the same time, 
Ellison’s “little man” reminds us of his own complex political stance.  Ellison’s feelings about 
Black Nationalism are tinged with remnant, Cold War, anti-communist sentiments.  At the same 
time Ellison “little man” rescues a crucial element of America’s humanist past and suggests its 
necessity for the future I read him as also indicative of the author’s own exile and inability to 
properly see his present.             
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Chapter 1: Ellison’s “Battle Royal”: An Allegory of Modernism’s Negro Problem? 
In interviews after the publication of Invisible Man
The battle royal’s place in the novel definitely supports these readings.  Structurally, the 
nameless protagonist chooses to open and close his framed narrative with the image of racial 
chaos and riot.  Like many of the novel’s opening moments, the battle royal is a portent for later 
narrative events.   So this episode functions as an augur for the race riot that closes the novel.  
Both events, as Nicole Waligora-Davis argues in her reading of the battle royal “Riotous 
 in 1952, Ralph Ellison attested to the 
historical reality of the Southern smoker on which he based his famous 1947 story “Battle 
Royal.”  In an address at West Point in 1969, Ellison tells a group of cadets that he came to 
realize that real battle royals were used to “project certain racial divisions into the society and 
reinforce the idea of white racial superiority” (Ellison 529).  Later in his address Ellison says that 
his fictional representation of the battle royal had to mean “something more than a group of 
white man having sadistic fun with a group of Negro boys” (529).  It came to represent a 
symbolic “ritual through which important social values are projected and reinforced” (529). 
It is upon his claims of “realism” and social commentary that critics ranging from Irving 
Howe and Robert Bone to Hortense Spillers, Houston Baker Jr. and Lucas Morel have 
allegorically interpreted this episode.  This is not to say that these critics or others do not 
appreciate the highly imaginative and symbolic portray of racial violence in the Ellison’s 
episode.  But the consensus on Ellison’s story is its meditation upon the surreal but 
fundamentally brutal nature of racism in America.  Ellison himself says that the metaphorical 
value of “The Battle Royal” rests in its presentation of the absurd nature of racism in America. 
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Discontent: Ellison’s “Birth of a Nation”, mirror a particular aspect of American inter-
colonialism (Davis 388).   
But what if we were to read Ellison’s story as another kind of allegory?  Instead of 
dealing solely with the problem of racism within modernity, is it possible to read this episode as 
an imaginative presentation of the problem of race within modernism?  Such a suggestion would 
not neutralize the power of Ellison’s overtly social and political critique of American racism.  
Instead, it shifts focus to Ellison’s profound investment in thinking the problem of racism as an 
aesthetic one as well.  Throughout Ellison’s work racism is understood as a failure of the 
imagination, whether that imagination is employed in the conceptualization of American 
democracy, the writing of fiction, or in the task of literary criticism. 
“Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity”, one of Ellison’s earliest 
critiques of American letters was published in 1953 but was written in 1946, a year before 
“Battle Royal” was published.  Seven years later, when he approached a podium in New York to 
accept the National Book Award, Ellison gave another version of the same polemic found in 
“Twentieth Century”.  Invoking Henry James, Ernest Hemingway, John Steinbeck and William 
Faulkner, the reigning modern novelists of his time, Ellison gives an homage to his aesthetic 
forbearers by suggesting their failure as fiction writers and – perhaps this is where the invocation 
of James is relevant – critics of American literature.   Even into the 1960s, a version of this 
polemic can be read into his exchange with Irving Howe on the pages of The New Leader.  The 
questions that open up Ellison’s 1963 essay “The World and the Jug” could have been just as 
easily asked in 1947.   
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Ellison was interested in recuperating an American literary tradition that presented forms 
of irony and cynicism akin to the avant-garde literary modernism he was exposed to during the 
1930s and 40s.  But this tradition is one Ellison thought should portray the “complex” humanity 
and ambiguity of the Negro that certain versions of literary modernism seem to have abandoned.  
It is here that Ellison’s reading of Mark Twain against Hemingway in “Twentieth Century” is 
crucial.  Hemingway’s famous advice to readers of Huckleberry Finn
Ellison’s investment in “the Negro” is his investment in literary humanism.  And it is this 
investment that I see demonstrated in the 1947 version of “Battle Royal.”  These humanistic and 
literary concerns from the interwar period take on a more profound meaning when “Battle 
Royal” is thought of as the “threshold” to Ellison novel, 
 is to stop reading Twain’s 
masterpiece when Nigger Jim is stolen from the boys since he calls the rest of the narrative after 
that “cheating” (Hemingway 22).   
For Ellison, Hemingway’s advice is a moment when the failure of the Naturalist’s art also 
becomes a moral and ethical failure on the level of the imagination.  Twain’s conscientious use 
of idiomatic and folkloric traces of African-American culture are connected to what Ellison calls 
Twain’s desire to “Americanize” his style.  Denying this source, which Jim symbolizes in the 
novel, is to evade certain moral and ethical responsibilities that Ellison reads into Twain’s art.  
Just as and if not even more important is the connection Ellison makes between Twain’s 
investment in Jim and the necessary presence of skepticism in American literature; a presence 
that Ellison finds absent in the interwar period and beyond.  For Ellison, the disappearance of the 
“human Negro from our fiction coincides with the disappearance of the deep-probing doubt and 
a sense of evil;” both of which lead to an understanding of the “nature of man” (Ellison 91). 
Invisible Man.  I take the term 
“threshold” from Saundra Morris’s work on Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Morris argues in “Through 
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a Thousand Voices: Emerson’s Poetry and ‘The Sphinx’” that Emerson’s “The Sphinx,” which 
introduces his collection Poems
My appropriation of Morris’s term is not an attempt to make a facile connection between 
Ellison and Emerson (although, it is interesting that Ellison’s grandfather, whose bewildering 
riddle at the beginning haunts the entire novel, functions as a sphinx-like figure at the threshold 
of Ellison’s book.)
 (1846) occupies a genre she calls the “threshold poem” (Morris 
778).  This “genre” functions as an “overture to the material that follows them” and as Morris 
further suggests “ask for a distinctive and heightened attention by virtue of their liminal position” 
(Morris 778).   
In “The Sphinx” Morris sees Emerson making a self-conscious decision to open his book 
of poetry with one that is itself conscientious about the difficulties of poetic expression.  
Particularly in the case of Emerson’s “The Sphinx”, Morris reads the “threshold” genre as one 
that is both ironic and paradoxical since they are often poems about the inability to write poems. 
Further accentuating this theme of difficulty is Emerson’s appropriation of a commonplace 
nineteenth century American literary figure, the enigmatic Sphinx itself, which also held an 
important place in the work of Melville and Poe (Morris 779).   
8  As important as the “Battle Royal” is to the thematic concerns of Invisible 
Man
                                                            
8 It is productive to think whether Ellison had Emerson and his poem “The Sphinx” in mind when he decided to 
place “Battle Royal” at the beginning of Invisible Man.  The other and more provocative connection to explore 
would be between Ellison’s “sphinx” like grandfather and Melville’s invocation of the sphinx in both Moby Dick 
(1852) and his epic poem Clarel (1876), which along with Battle Pieces and Aspects of the War compose Melville’s 
post-Civil War work and reflections.  With Ellison’s grandfather functioning as a figural presentation of 
reconstruction I wonder if his sphinx-like presence can be read as Ellison’s own understanding of Reconstruction as 
a riddle America has yet to solve.    
, it is just as important when understood outside of its novelistic context.  The story 
obviously comes at a crucial moment in Ellison’s transformation as a critic and fiction writer.  
Reading the battle royal episode as a “threshold” allows us to think how Ellison’s novelistic 
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battle royal is the author’s self-conscious treatise on the necessity of thinking the Negro problem 
within both humanism and modernism.   
Given “Battle Royal’s” place in Ellison’s post-War reassessment of interwar modernism 
as well as its place in Invisible Man’s Cold War reception, we can see that the threshold Ellison 
pulls us through as a complex one.  As critics and writers simultaneously questioned the 
conventions of proletariat realism and their politics, Ellison found that their attitude about the 
representation of “the Negro” in literature had fossilized.  Either the “Negro problem” was 
absent for Hemingway and other modernists or in the case of Irving Howe’s review of Invisible 
Man
We should also read this essay as Ellison’s self-conscious declaration of an alternative 
“beginning” to American modernist literary tradition, one in which Ellison boldly interprets and 
centralizes the “Negro problem” within the traditions of western literature.  In many ways it is a 
more fleshed out companion to Ellison’s review of Bucklin Moon’s 
 in 1952, the Negro could be neither modernist nor literary but only representative of pure 
experience.  
Through “Battle Royal” the threshold Ellison pulls us through resonates as a Said-like 
“beginnings,” rooted in Ellison’s criticism during the late 1940s.  As I will show in this chapter, 
much should be read into the profound ambivalence Ellison expresses towards Ernest 
Hemingway in “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity.”  In taking 
Hemingway to task Ellison signals his own complicated break with his self-identified “ancestor” 
and the dominant modes of modernist American fiction during his time (Ellison 185).  
Primer for White Folks 
where Ellison surveys America’s post-War intellectual landscape and declares that we need a 
“new American Humanism” (Ellison 147).    I will show that this critical “beginning” echoes 
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throughout much of Ellison’s criticism and informs his debate in the 1960s with Irving Howe in 
the The New Leader.  Ellison’s debate with Howe, which is about the relationship between 
politics and aesthetics, allows us to look back at Ellison’s self-fashioned beginning in 1947 as 
pivotal for the direction the author would take during the Cold War.          
To end this chapter I focus on the short story “The Battle Royal.”  Not only does this 
story rearticulate Ellison’s ideas in “Twentieth Century” but more importantly it foreshadows 
Ellison’s aesthetic direction in Invisible Man by demonstrating the “complex ambiguity” of the 
human he sought to represent in American fiction.  Replying to a letter about his story from the 
famous psychiatrist Karl Menninger, Ellison tells Menninger that “Battle Royal” was a “near-
allegory” and “for all the detailed description of the prose, the aim is not naturalism but realism – 
a realism dilated to deal with the almost surreal state of our everyday American life” (Ellison, 
Rampersad, emphasis mine). 
If his sentiments to Menninger are taken to heart, it appears that Ellison’s evasion of pure 
allegory is somehow tied to a notion of realism that was unlike the Naturalism that Ellison 
critiques in “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity.”  To explicate how 
this plays out in “Battle Royal” I will rely on Erich Auerbach’s discussion of the difference 
between allegory and figuration in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature and Mimesis.  
Ellison’s investment in presenting what he calls "the complex ambiguity of the human" appears 
in a figura of the human, which in the story is found in the narrator’s self-identification as a 
“nigger-boy.”  Ellison’s choice to have this figure emerge in a nightmare is a symbolic testament 
to his investment in modernism.  Further it represents a particular version of modernism that 
distinguishes him from contemporaries like Ernest Hemingway and Richard Wright. 
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Ellison’s critique of Naturalism in “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of 
Humanity” begins on a statistical note.  Between Earnest Hemingway and John Steinbeck, 
Ellison counted no more than “five American Negroes” in their novels.  For Ellison the problem 
is clearly more than statistical.  From this observation Ellison eventually identifies the roots of 
this literary problem in a tradition of “intellectual” evasion rooted in post-Civil War America.  In 
Henry James and particularly Earnest Hemingway, Ellison notices that American writers were 
distancing themselves from writing about African-American characters in literature, a problem 
that rests on a rather complex paradox.9  American fiction, according to Ellison, either ignored or 
misrepresented African-American characters he also felt that the stereotypes that do exist are not 
forcefully engage with enough.  Despite his stylistic indebtedness to Earnest Hemingway it is 
through him that Ellison elaborates the history of this literary problem. 
Ellison begins his critique of Hemingway by pointing to an absence of what he calls the 
“American scene” in Hemingway’s fiction (Ellison 93).  This is rather ironic since Hemingway 
sees himself within the lineage of post-Civil War American authors, specifically Mark Twain.  It 
is to Twain that Hemingway owed the sardonic stance and meticulous attention to language 
evident in his minimalist, vernacular style.  But this technique, as Ellison observes, was applied 
to the treatment of non-American subject matter in Death in the Afternoon as well as The Sun 
Also Rises
Twain’s satire, irony and language were not the product of a detached, disinterested 
stoicism as Hemingway reads it. As Ellison writes in “Twentieth Century Fiction and The Black 
.   
                                                            
9 Ellison’s point here is fascinating.  It is obvious that Ellison’s comments in “Twentieth Century Fiction” is directed 
at a specific style of modernist writing that came about at the turn of the century.  Having said that, what is so 
incredibly fascinating is his silence on the Harlem Renaissance and its literary forbearers like James Weldon 
Johnson, Paul Dunbar, Charles Chesnutt, George Washington Cable and others.  I do not think Ellison is ignorant of 
them but his silence, which continues throughout much of his career, is loud in a moment like this.    
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Mask of Humanity,” it was the product of a celebratory yet tragic attitude.  The pivotal moment 
in Huckleberry Finn (as well as American fiction) to Ellison is when Huck decides to go to hell 
and rescue Jim.  This scene, which Hemingway called the moment Twain cheated, is for Ellison 
“a reversal as well as a recognition scene (like that in which Oedipus discovers his true identity), 
wherein a new definition of necessity is being formulated” (Ellison 87).  This recognition or 
what Aristotle calls anagnorisis is the moment of “intelligent recognition” in classical tragedy.  
Huck’s recognition is not just a moral insight.  Aristotle defines anagnorisis in the Poetics
Jim is a figure through which Twain can hear American speech and modes of expression 
and at the same time contemplate the way slavery and racism determines his Gilded Age present.  
By describing Hemingway’s craft as “an end in itself,” Ellison understands Naturalist prose as an 
 as a 
character’s transformation from ignorance to knowledge, which ultimately leads to self-
knowledge as well as knowledge of one’s true situation.  Recognition then is two-fold for Huck: 
his desire to free Jim reveals to Huck who he is and simultaneously it allows Huck insight into 
the fundamental paradox defining American society.  And as is the case in Twain’s novel, this 
moment is Huck’s recognition of the paradox lying between “property rights and human rights” 
(Ellison 87). 
Huck’s “low down business” is his recognition that acting morally, which is recognizing 
Jim’s as well as the humanity of African-Americans, is an act of hubris against American de jure 
and de facto racism.  Ellison’s point is that Hemingway’s use of Twain does not acknowledge 
the relationship between Twain’s poetics and the author’s historical situation.  Huck’s “low 
down business” has its analogue in Twain’s literary technique.  Twain’s style metaphorically 
depended on a “free” Jim.  Not only does he function as a dramatic necessity to Twain’s novel 
but he is also one of many vernacular muses for Twain.   
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instrument without this knowledge and intelligence behind it.  Doing away with the ending of 
Huckleberry Finn
One of the most crucial moments in “Twentieth Century Fiction” is Ellison’s use of 
Daniel Defoe’s 
 misses the stylistic and intellectual import of Twain’s work.  Between his 
mention of Henry James and Hemingway in “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of 
Humanity” and his later debate with Irving Howe, Ellison reveals a stylistic crisis as well as a 
crisis in American literary criticism.  After the Civil War, Ellison accuses both James and 
Hemingway of evading the American scene.  Twain’s use of vernacular and dialect language, 
which was crucial to late nineteenth century concepts of realism in America, was the technical 
basis of Hemingway’s hard-boiled style.  Hemingway’s technique did capture the tragic element 
of life.  But for Ellison it also symbolized the abandonment of Twain’s critique of Gilded Age 
America.  Hemingway was right to detect Twain’s irony and satire as a repudiation of Gilded 
Age materialism.  What Hemingway missed was the crucial link between Twain’s irony and the 
fundamental paradox of American post-bellum culture – America’s new found sense of freedom 
and the simultaneous denial of African-American humanity.  Similarly, after World War II, 
Ellison’s sees in Howe and many other American literary critics an analogous evasion.  While 
critics from Irving Howe, Lionel Trilling, Hannah Arendt, Arthur Schlesinger and later Mary 
McCarthy saw the United States as the world’s moral and ethical center, they all located 
literature’s contemplative sensibility in Europe rather in the United States.   
Robinson Crusoe as a way to begin his discussion of American literary craft and 
criticism.  For Ellison, a problematic feature of nineteenth century American literature is the way 
writers “disguised” the conflict between “democratic beliefs” and “anti-democratic practices” by 
ignoring African-American characters or relying on stereotypical representations of them.  
Ellison traces the roots of this problematic back to the eighteenth century and the absence of an 
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American version of Defoe’s Friday.  In this context, his identification of Robinson Crusoe as a 
Romantic novel becomes a curious misreading.  Defoe’s novel was published over 60 years 
before Romanticism begins.  As Ian Watt suggests in The Rise of the Novel, however, Defoe and 
other British novelists anticipate the concerns that would be picked up by the Romantics in the 
late Eighteenth Century (Watt 309).  Ellison’s misreading is made more peculiar by his use of 
Defoe in order to begin a discussion of race and humanism in Western literature.  By reading 
Robinson Crusoe
Ellison makes his case that from their first appearance African-American characters 
suggested the existence of a “tragic sense” at the heart of modern Western literature.  By reading 
Defoe as a “romantic” Ellison reveals that “Friday,” who dwells in the nexus between racial 
slavery, Protestantism and mercantile individualism is a beginning point for America’s literary 
responsibility to African-American characters.  The connection between Friday and America 
occurs in “Twentieth Century Fiction” through Ellison’s “misidentification” of Friday as a 
“Negro” (Ellison 88).  As Roxanne Wheeler writes in “‘My Savage,’ ‘My Man': Racial 
Multiplicity in Robinson Crusoe,” race as a category was in transition between the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  The specificities of racial identification as we understand them now do 
not come into play until later in the eighteenth century.  This makes racial identification in early 
British novels a complicated enterprise.  As Wheeler points out, Friday’s racial identification 
shifts throughout Crusoe’s account, never settling on one signifier (Wheeler 840).  Despite 
 as a Romantic novel Ellison presents the conundrum of where does one locates 
the novel’s expression of individualism, in its Protestantism or in Crusoe’s mercantilism?  
Ellison’s emphasis on racism and chattel slavery in Defoe allows us to see the complex nature in 
which the theological and commercial articulations of individualism are yoked to racism and 
coerced labor.   
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Ellison’s erroneous identification of Friday as a “Negro,” there is much that can be made from 
this misreading.  
By reimagining Friday as a “Negro” Ellison performs a powerful revision of Western 
literature and the problem of humanism within it.  Ellison uses Friday to represent the founding 
literary moment in the literature’s contemplation of modernity’s “Negro problem.”  At the same 
time, Crusoe’s (and Defoe’s) actions also represent the countervailing actions taken to deny 
Friday’s humanity.  Seen in this way, Robinson Crusoe unearths an archetypal literary example 
of the “Negro’s” importance in Western literary traditions.  Crusoe makes Friday both a worker 
and Christian.  Through his attempts to humanize the savage Friday, Ellison sees Defoe’s 
attempts to lessen his own guilt for breaking with what Ellison calls “the institutions and 
authorities of the past,” (Ellison 89).  As a fictional representative of the change toward 
bourgeois mercantile capitalism and propriety rights, Crusoe’s domination of Friday straddles the 
line between the managerial and sovereign, the secular and the providential.  Ellison’s analysis of 
Robinson Crusoe
When Ellison states that Crusoe takes to the desert isle “certain techniques, certain 
values, from whence he came…,” he is referring to both Crusoe’s complex relationship to the 
past and how he tells his story (Ellison 759.)  This later fact is borne out stylistically in Defoe’s 
novel.  Crusoe’s account is both providential narrative yet cast in the confessional mode.  It also 
contains a mix of prose forms from “dialogue” to Crusoe’s “Journal.”  Along with these more 
 reveals the conundrum Friday poses to Crusoe’s freedom.  The question is how 
does Crusoe exercise his freedom yet hold dominion over Friday?  Tied to this process of change 
in Defoe’s novel are the swift changes occurring during the eighteenth century.  It is in this 
period that the meaning of citizenship is connected to labor, the industrial revolution and the 
nation-state.  Not only are these changes historical and social, but they are also poetic.   
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traditional prose and narrative styles is Crusoe’s literal accounting of his and Friday’s labor 
through extended bookkeeping sections in the novel.  The combination of providential and 
propriety account is emblematic of the conundrum appearing in Defoe and the Romantic 
tradition.10  Crusoe’s Christian and propriety relationship to Friday is not that of equals.  Friday, 
both pagan savage and slave laborer, is still Crusoe’s inferior.  As Robert Marzec argues in 
“Enclosures, Colonization, and the Robinson Crusoe
Ellison’s analysis of 
 Syndrome: A Genealogy of Land in a 
Global Context,” these very literary techniques become a synecdoche for Crusoe’s collapsing of 
Friday with the island’s raw materials (Marzec 131).  In spite of all this, Ellison concentrates on 
Crusoe’s figurative place on an uncharted island and separation from “whence he came” as 
presenting a tabula rasa upon which Crusoe can remake himself.  Ellison interprets Defoe’s 
Romanticism in Crusoe’s relationship with Friday, which he reads as a similar tabula rasa 
moment.  The same way Crusoe can remake himself Ellison suggests that Friday can too.  
Ellison identifies in Defoe a crucial liminal place in Romanticism.  Despite the very real 
presence of oppression and inequality it does not yet express the rigid hierarchy of racial 
categorization.      
Robinson Crusoe shows his attempt to adapt the trans-historical 
problem of the “Negro” to the humanistic concerns it raises in American literature.  The question 
of Crusoe’s displaced guilt and the Robinson Crusoe
                                                            
10 Here I am referring to Daniel Headrick’s book When Information Came of Age: Technologies of Knowledge in 
the Age of Reason and Revolution 1700-1850 (Oxford University Press, New York 2000.)  During the 18th Century 
with the rise of statistical analysis “natural” theologians in Britain and Germany began to use mathematics and 
population rates to argue for the existence of Divine Providence.  Christians during the 18th century were encouraged 
in Church to look toward mortality rates and other population rates in order to reflect on their own morality and 
commitment to Christianity.  I do not think it is a far stretch to see Defoe’s Crusoe as doing such a thing in the novel 
except applying such an accounting to labor and production.    
’s source of concern over Friday’s humanity 
is tied to social revolutions and transformations in the Europe that begin during the late 
eighteenth century.  This revolutionary and romantic impulse is something simultaneously 
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played out during the American Revolution.  Curiously, in “Twentieth Century Fiction and the 
Black Mask of Humanity,” the American eighteenth century has no historical or literary presence 
in Ellison’s thinking.  To account for the “Negro” Ellison begins with Defoe and does not 
introduce American literature until the nineteenth century and the “renaissance” authors of 
Emerson and Hawthorne.  In both, Ellison identifies the Romantic impulse to probe the clash 
between “democratic beliefs” and “anti-democratic practices,” but it is only Melville that 
adequately deals with the central problematic of racism.11   
Defoe illuminates links among literary Romanticism, Christianity, propertied bourgeois 
individualism and the problem of racism.  Romanticism’s value for Ellison is that it marks the 
literary moment when the modern human predicament is intimately tied to the “figure of the 
Negro” around which the “human implications” of modernity can truly be thought.  The “break” 
that Crusoe makes, while having its double in the American Revolution, does not draw a proper 
historical parallel.  This is where Ellison mistaking Friday for a “Negro” is important.  America’s 
and Haiti’s late eighteenth century revolutions occur when the discourse of race and slavery had 
calcified around ridged racialized categories.  There is a transformation from the varied 
articulation of race in Robinson Crusoe or Defoe’s “The True Born Englishman” (1701) to 
Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on The State of Virginia
By the nineteenth century thinkers expressed a more scientific and anthropological 
articulation of race and humanity.  The effect of this is to further blur the lines between Romantic 
ideas of freedom and these new concepts of racism and slave labor in America.  When Ellison 
insinuates that there is no American “Friday” to bring up the “human implications,” of literature, 
it does not necessarily mean that African-Americans do not appear in American literature.  It 
 (1801).   
                                                            
11 This is a point I explore in the second chapter of my dissertation. 
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does signify that Friday’s ambiguous status lends him the sort of “turgid” possibilities Ellison 
saw missing in American literary representations of African-American characters until Mark 
Twain.  When contextualized in the shifting concepts of race between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, the disappearance of Friday’s potential in American literature makes sense.  
It is not as if these characters do not exist, but they are the literary equivalent of rigid empirical 
and scientific fact.  The “turgid possibilities” that come from Friday’s ambiguity are lost in the 
United States because African-American characters are not literary symbols but petrified objects 
of empirical fact.       
Ellison’s rumination on Friday’s absence reveals his concerns about American post-Civil 
War literature.  While Ellison wants to affirm the principles underlying the North’s victory 
during the Civil War, he cannot help but detect the traces of slavery’s recalcitrant feudal 
arrangements of labor and power in America.  Unlike Defoe who wrote in a historical situation 
where Friday’s humanity was in flux, American post-Civil War literature – while building upon 
the triumph of individualism and democratic feeling – simultaneously calcified all that was anti-
modern, inhuman in the scientific discourses of anti-black racism.  Instead of seizing upon the 
“tragic sense” this paradox created in Defoe and later in America’s own Romantics, Ellison sees 
a willful turning away from the question of the Negro in all but a few American novels.   
Straddling the line between oppression and freedom Friday’s symbolic function in 
literature is analogous to the “irrational nature” of symbolic action that Kenneth Burke discusses 
in The Philosophy of Literary Form, a book that greatly informs Ellison’s thoughts in “Twentieth 
Century Fiction.”12
                                                            
12 Burke is careful in The Philosophy of Literary Form to draw a distinction between the philological study of 
language and language as a poetic act.  Philology for Burke approaches language from an accretion model of its use.  
  Burke views this irrationality as directly linked to the complex resonance of 
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poetic language.  Like Burke, Ellison draws a vast web of “interrelations” around “the Negro” 
and initiates them in “active membership” with the beginnings of modern fictional prose – 
something we see in his use of Defoe (Burke 38).  Donald Pease describes Ellison’s use of Burke 
as a way for the author to explain the “shadow acts” of American civil society.  As Pease writes, 
racist logic represents the “socially unacknowledged activities that took the place of officially 
motivated symbolic actions” (Pease 73).  To Pease, Ellison’s rumination on the stereotype in 
“Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” revises Burke’s notion of the 
scapegoat.  In Pease’s eyes, Ellison found Burke’s definition inadequate since the problem of 
race lay outside the “symbolizable” terrain of Burke’s method (Pease 74).   
The “shadow” that Pease identifies can be read throughout “Twentieth Century Fiction 
and the Black Mask of Humanity.”  Friday can be very clearly seen as Crusoe’s “shadow”.  
When discussing the absence of African-Americans in American literature, it clear that Ellison’s 
thinking is influenced by Burke’s “scapegoat,” which provides the shadowy synecdoche to the 
real, material problem of anti-black racism.  The poetic potential of the Burke’s scapegoat can be 
read into Ellison’s thoughts about Friday’s and Crusoe’s “turgid possibilities” of freedom.  Burke 
begins his discussion of the scapegoat by referencing the Romantics, who put forth a “neo-
primitive” self as their insignia in opposition to poetic insignias of “social status” (Burke 37).  
The insignia is as a figure of group identification and is representative of putting forth a “new 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
There is an original mimetic moment where words and language originates but then each subsequent use obscures 
this original intent.  But by emphasizing the spoken, phonetic use of language, Burke sees language used in a 
different way than this evolutionary, philological model. The “nonsensical” usage of tonalities and syllables in 
poetry for example reveals the situational nature of language use.  These phonetic acts become an allegory for the 
way writers deploy particular “acts and images…personalities and situations” through their works (Burke, 20).  
Burke understands poetic motives and meaning created within the structure of a work by the “associational clusters” 
these “acts and images” create.   
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self;” one that is “sloughs off (the) ingredients that are irrelevant to this purpose” (Burke 38).  It 
would be interesting to know whether Ellison’s had Burke explicitly in mind in his “Romantic” 
reading of Defoe and the Negro; especially since he reads Crusoe as involved in a similar sort of 
“neo-primitive” identification with Friday.  Like Burke, Ellison clearly sees Crusoe’s 
identification as part of his break from the institutions of the past.  If there is any moment when 
Ellison corrects Burke it is here where Ellison casts the “shadow” of race upon Defoe and the 
Romantics.   
Burke’s scapegoat serves another relevant function to Ellison’s thoughts about the Negro 
and its relationship to literary humanism.  As Burke writes, the scapegoat is also a symbol of 
deep-seeded moral ambiguity.  The transgressions and sacrifices visited upon the scapegoat 
reveal the complex interweaving of two essentialisms, good and evil.  Regardless of the morality 
of its act, the scapegoat always breaks the law and is punished for it.  The danger and sublimity 
of this moment is precisely what poetic language allows us to confront.  More importantly, 
Burke suggests that the moral ambiguities contained within the scapegoat tell us more about the 
“ambivalence of power,” that creates such moral certitudes than their actual existence.  Literary 
works are strategies through which the ambiguities and irrationality of these symbolic acts are 
both approached and contained.  Ellison’s rumination upon Friday and the roots of the Negro 
problem” reveals a similar understanding of the stereotype.  The “shadow” Ellison casts upon 
Western literature overlaps with the ambivalent nature of freedom and democracy emerging out 
of the Enlightenment and represented in Romanticism.  What “the Negro” (or its absence) reveal 
are authorial attempts to probe this ambivalence.  So for Ellison there is equivalence between 
America’s evasion of the Negro in its literature and its inattentiveness to the complex nature of 
democracy, racism and power in America. 
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Ellison’s rumination on Hemingway and American literature in “Twentieth Century 
Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” proves to be a moment of profound transformation for 
the author.  This essay seems as much a declaration of Ellison’s distance from Marxism as are 
the more forceful repudiations he would make in private letters to Richard Wright.  It is hard to 
say that Ellison kills his father in critiquing Hemingway, especially since later on he would 
wholly embrace him as an “ancestor.”  However, his critique of Naturalism in “Twentieth 
Century” is part of a move away from Naturalism and proletariat realism by many of his 
contemporaries.   
Written almost a decade after Ellison’s appears to split with the Popular Front and six 
years before the publication of Invisible Man, Ellison’s critique reveals his understanding that as 
a poetic “strategy,” Naturalism could not fully express the ambivalence and irrationality nature 
of power in America before and after World War II.  Not only do Burke’s own comments on 
Naturalism in The Philosophy of Literary Form bear this out, but Ellison’s ideas returns us back 
to Kazin’s comments at the end of On Native Grounds.  Like Kazin, Ellison was wondering 
whether naturalism could “comprehend” the social forces in American and not just describe 
them. As Daniel Brick writes in Daniel Bell and the Decline of Intellectual Radicalism: Social 
Theory and Political Reconciliation in the 1940s
The crisis Brick identifies occurs simultaneously with the abandonment of the “Negro 
problem” as the central political principle in American Socialism and Communism.  Ellison felt 
that these methods of critique never took seriously enough the crisis anti-black racism posed to 
the possibilities of democracy and freedom.  Where this lack of seriousness seemed most glaring 
for Ellison was in both the craft and criticism of American literature.  Ellison’s retelling of 
, this period before and after WWII brought 
about a crisis in the radical socialism at the root of American liberal critique.   
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American literary history shows that he feels the reverberation of Reconstruction’s failure 
echoed in his own moment.  Its synecdoche is in the collapse of the Popular Front in America.  
The Negro, which is produced out of this ambivalent “shadow act,” represents for Ellison the 
survival of an “intelligence” within American literary traditions.  Twain’s Jim reveals a paradox 
within our ideas of human freedom.  The complex literary associations around “the Negro” that 
Ellison elaborates in his essay force us to think the effect slavery and anti-black racism have had 
upon American ideas concerning literature, democracy and freedom.  While not a “Negro” in any 
biological sense, Ellison suggests that Friday becomes a fabricated, imaginary beginning of the 
Negro problem and the way racism subsumes the “turgid possibilities” of his humanity.  And for 
Ellison the critic Friday becomes Ellison’s own threshold and beginnings.  Through him Ellison 
legitimates his own interpretation of literary humanism and its relationship to his understanding 
of modernism. 
Ellison’s ambivalence towards Hemingway in the 1940s was part of his attempt to 
elaborate an American humanist tradition centered on the Negro and yet connected it to 
modernist skepticism.  The publication of “Battle Royal” and Invisible Man after “Twentieth 
Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” are his stylistic response.  To a certain extent 
Ellison’s ambivalence also signaled a political transformation.  Both of these changes inform his 
post-Invisible Man
In his 1952 review of 
 criticism and in particular his interactions with Irving Howe.  By turning to 
Ellison’s subsequent engagements with Howe we can see the connection between Ellison’s 
assessments of the interwar period and how they relate to his emergence as a critic during the 
Cold War.     
Invisible Man, Irving Howe suggests that African-American writers 
should approach modernist aesthetic and intellectual conventions cautiously.  While Howe lauds 
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the verisimilitude of Ellison’s work he is disturbed by “Ellison’s wish to be intellectually up to 
date” (Howe).  This is something Ellison should not aspire to since in Howe’s estimation 
Ellison’s character is “a victim of passive experience” (Howe).  When it comes to presenting 
race in literature, experience is the rub for Howe.  African-American novels should be mimetic 
and literally represent experience by “persuading or suggesting or simply telling” (Howe).   
In a strange, rather ironic turn Howe condemns the novel precisely because the book is 
not ironic enough.  As Howe writes, “Ellison cannot establish ironic distance between his hero 
and himself or between the matured ‘I’ telling the story and the ‘I’ who is its victim. And 
because the experience is so apocalyptic and magnified, it absorbs and then dissolves the hero; 
every minor character comes through brilliantly, but the seeing ‘I’ is seldom seen” (Howe).  The 
problem for Howe is with Ellison’s politics as much as with Ellison’s stylistic presentation of his 
protagonist.  In his review it appears that he cannot make up his mind about what to do with 
Ellison’s style, which he calls too “feverish,” or his politics, which makes caricatures out of the 
“Harlem Stalinists” (Howe).  Five years after his review Howe would give a series of lectures 
about the confluence of politics and literature at Princeton’s Gauss seminar.  But Howe’s view of 
Invisible Man
Ellison’s skepticism of Howe and others is well known and rooted in his experiences with 
the Federal Writers Project and the American Communist Party during the Thirties.  In his mind, 
the close connection critics made between Naturalism, Proletariat Literature and American 
Communism stifled the imaginative possibilities of African-American writers.  Politics and 
poetics held too strong an acquaintance for Ellison’s taste.  It is not until Ellison’s attack on the 
relationship between ideology and fiction in his exchange with Irving Howe in 
 shows the problem he – like many other critics – would have placing African-
American literature in any discussion of politics and literature. 
The New Leader 
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during 1963-4 that we get a more specific picture of Ellison’s critique.  Ellison’s first response, 
“The World and the Jug” was a rebuttal to Howe’s essay “Black Boys and Native Sons,” initially 
published in The New Leader
In “Black Boys and Native Sons’” Howe values Wright’s literary works as a more 
authentic portrayal of African-American experience.  He charges both Ellison and James 
Baldwin with being “literary to a fault.”  As Howe writes, the novel is “inherently (an) 
ambiguous genre; it strains toward formal autonomy and can seldom avoid being public gesture.”  
Formal autonomy is synonymous with the “literary” nature of writing for Howe.  Placing Wright 
in a more privileged position than either Ellison or Baldwin means Howe’s perception of 
African-American “public” experience is a particular one.  And it is here – where public 
experience meets literature’s gesture toward formal autonomy – that we will find Howe’s own 
intellectual predilections when it comes to the works of African-American authors.  Before 
“Black Boys and Native Son’s” or his exchanges with Ellison, Howe’s position towards the 
novel and the relationship between literature and ideology was in flux.  
 in 1963.  In his second response titled “A Rejoinder,” Ellison 
elaborates his concerns about ideology’s relationship to literature even further.  “The World and 
the Jug,” recalls Ellison’s position on the problem of literary criticism as it confronts African-
American Literature.   
Politics and the Novel, 
the published version of his 1956 Gauss Seminar at Princeton, represents Howe’s most fully 
fleshed out statement on literature and politics.  As Alan Wald writes in The New York 
Intellectuals, during the Forties, Howe was already in a feud with many writers associated with 
the CPA over this very problem.  Beginning in the summer of 1945, Howe’s debate over the 
works of Arthur Koestler showed his growing understanding of literature’s unique way of 
communicating politics and ideology (Wald 311).   
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As with so many debates over literature from the Thirties onward, the central issue was 
the problem of “realism.” Howe saw the concept of “realism” stagnating into a code word for 
ideological doctrinism in critical discussions of literature.  Howe’s papers at the Gauss seminar 
are the fruition of an ongoing problematic Howe and other New York Intellectuals were working 
through.  In the first chapters of Politics and the Novel
Howe’s ideas about literature are very sympathetic to Ellison’s own perspectives concerning 
ideology, politics and the novel.  Having said this, we must take seriously one crucial omission 
from Howe’s discussions in 
, Howe defines the “political novel” and 
ideology’s presence in it in the following terms: 
In the political novel, then, writer and reader enter an uneasy compact: to expose 
their opinions to a furious action, and as these melt into the movement of the 
novel, to find some common recognition, some supervening human bond above 
and beyond ideas.  It is not surprising that the political novelist, even as he 
remains fascinated by politics, urges his claim for a moral order beyond ideology; 
nor that does the receptive reader, even as he perseveres in his own commitment, 
assent to the novelist’s ultimate order (Howe 24). 
Politics and the Novel.  As Lawrence Jackson’s observes in “Ralph 
Ellison’s Politics of Integration” Ellison, who might have been in the audience when Howe was 
delivering these lectures, had to have noticed Howe’s neglect of African-American writers and 
the problem of race during his lectures (Lawrence 194).  Coming on the heels of Invisible Man, 
Ellison’s acceptance speech for the National Book Award and his intellectual transformation in 
the late 1940s, Ellison’s objections would have ran much deeper than what Alan Nadel sees as 
Ellison’s attempt to democratically “integrate” the canon; especially given Ellison’s own 
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ambivalence towards African-American writers and their work.13  Ellison would have been 
strongly attracted to Howe’s use of Dostoyevsky, Stendhal, Conrad and others, since these are 
the very pool of “ancestors” Ellison refers to in his own writing.   
Howe’s exclusion of African-American authors from Politics and the Novel is a problem 
that he corrects in “Black Boys and Native Sons.”  When comparing his analysis of literature and 
ideology in “Black Boys” to that of Politics and the Novel we can see Howe’s ideas in sharper 
focus.  Concerning the “political” nature of novels, Howe sees a historical and geographic break 
between Anglo-Romanticism and literature written in a continental European context.  
According to Howe, Anglo-Romanticism represented social structures as “gradations” whereas 
the author’s of Howe’s “political novel” can identify the unpredictable state of society.  Further, 
these “political” novelists are concerned with the “fate of society itself” (Howe 19).  Society’s 
“fate” is what permeates the consciousness of writers and the characters populating mid and late 
nineteenth century European novels.  As he states, the characters in Dostoyevsky, Stendhal and 
others are now contentiously thinking in terms of “supporting or opposing society.”  Whether in 
The Red and the Black or Demons
Implicit in Howe’s categorization of these writers is the historical conundrum Napoleon 
posed.  The French Revolution and its brutal transformation of the continent tore the assumed 
relationship between Enlightenment, reason and freedom asunder.  Therefore a heightened sense 
of “contradiction” permeates many nineteenth century European novels (Howe 19).  Napoleon is 
used by Howe to illustrate the blindness of Anglo-Romanticism since he was rarely mentioned in 
, Howe sees both Stendhal and Dostoyevsky positioning their 
characters at the ideological ramparts of their respective fictional world.   
                                                            
13 Alan Nadel has written most extensively about this in his book Invisible Criticism: Ralph Ellison and the 
American Canon and his recent essay “The Integrated Literary Tradition”. 
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nineteenth century British fiction.  Juxtaposed to this, Howe saw the effect of the French 
Revolution generating tremendous stylistic self awareness in European authors.  It is hard not to 
take this identification as somehow an allegory of the political crisis and disillusionment 
enveloping American and European intellectual since the late Thirties and into the post-World 
War II period.  In this sense, Howe’s lecture can be seen as staging the problem of aesthetics and 
politics in late-nineteenth century as a lesson about similar, contemporary concerns with 
Communism and American liberalism.  The debates pitting “realism” versus high modernism 
that defined the aesthetic divide is the contemporary equivalent of the late nineteenth century 
problem Howe identifies. 
Besides Howe’s exclusion of the problem of race, Howe neglects a similar historical and 
political crisis in the United States:  American slavery.  Slavery was the defining philosophical 
and political conundrum to the democratic experiment.  The failure of Reconstruction in the late 
nineteenth century created a similar “anxiety” that Howe locates in Europe.  What of Howe’s 
similar concern of societies “fate” in American literature?  Making all of this worse is what 
Howe does with African-Americans as a literary and social phenomenon in “Black Boys and 
Native Sons.”  Caught up in perpetual “plight and protest,” African-American writers are not in 
line with the aesthetic or literary project Howe sees Dostoyevsky and others involved in.  In 
describing Dostoyevsky, Howe makes some critical points that become common places 
throughout his book.   
Dostoyevsky’s books, particularly Demons and The Idiot reveal that ideology “can 
cripple human impulses, blind men to simple fact, make them monsters by tempting them into 
that fatal habit which anthropologists call ‘reifying’ ideas” (Howe 17).  More importantly, Howe 
sees Dostoyevsky along with the other authors as examples of how “intelligent men survive,” 
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amidst hostile political, aesthetic and material conditions.  When Howe does attend to America it 
is to reinforce a point that Americans abhorred “political and public life,” and that our political 
ideas never “crystallized as in Europe” (Howe 177).  Howe does not go so far to say that 
American writers are not concerned with these things, but when we turn back to “Black Boys 
and Native Sons” he clearly sees African-American experience as outside of America’s and the 
West’s “fate.”14
Of the three writers Howe discusses, he singles Ellison out for attempting to gain the 
“aesthetic distance” that defined mid-twentieth century American writing (Howe 112).  
However, Howe states that gaining this distance is impossible since “plight and protest” are the 
phenomenological facts of “the experience of a man with black skin…in this country,” (Howe 
100).  Howe continues by asking “…how could he so much as think or breathe without the 
impulse to ‘protest?’” (Howe 100).  The rhetoric of Howe’s language, which collapses 
phenotypical traits (“black skin,”) biological functions (“breathing”) and the activities of reason 
and art (“thinking” and “writing”) constructs the “idea” of blacks as pure sensation.  Aesthetic 
distance for Howe is synonymous with the capability of literature and its authors to achieve the 
possibility of understanding the social conditions that inform poetic creation.  Any other way of 
  More to the point, Howe does not identify the works of Wright, Baldwin or 
Ellison as positing a similar preservation of “intelligence,” which for him is the central concern 
from Stendhal through Dostoyevsky and into twentieth century writers like Orwell and Koestler.  
This is not surprising given the frame Howe puts African-American literature into.  In “Black 
Boys and Native Sons”, Ellison becomes the boundary towards which African-American  
literature should approach but not cross since to cross it means the failure of literature’s “public 
gesture.”   
                                                            
14 Howe cites Henry Adams’ Democracy alone in this enterprise.  And while he says Adams prophetically 
anticipated the “age of ideology,” he also says that Adams lacked “insight.” 
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writing and understanding is impossible for African-American literature since there is nothing 
more to see within African-American experience than “plight and protest.”   
African-Americans are objects to be documented rather than human beings out of which 
understanding or literature can emerge.  This last statement does not mean Howe believed 
African-Americans could not think nor write.  It does suggest that Howe could not see African-
American experience and expression as a literary perspective from which a deeper intelligence 
about society could be achieved.  Instead, this experience becomes the realm of what Hegel 
called “sensuous experience;” unable to generate understanding of itself or anything around it.  
Despite Howe’s own understanding that “realism” put complicated ideological burdens on 
Marxist and neoliberal critics, it was still the stylistic bounds he read African-American literature 
within.  African-American literature was more of a “public gesture,” meaning, an empirically 
documented phenomenon, than a space for “autonomous” literary reflection.  Howe asserts that 
the novel’s “inherent ambiguity” make its indulgences into sociology (which, it seems is a 
codeword for realism,) necessary since it is this sociological impulse that makes the novel a 
“public” form of expression.  These comments enter into the long standing debates concerning 
the novel since the eighteenth century.  At the same time that the novel has been seen as an 
unstable and what Lukacs calls a “hazardous”15
                                                            
15 This is Lukacs’ description of it in The Theory of the Novel (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1996.)  As 
Lukacs argues, the novels indeterminate status is reflective of a larger problem concerning modernity.  The world, 
since the Greeks, has lost its sense of a shared communal association so there can no longer be stories that can tell a 
tale and have it be about everything and everyone (like the Iliad for instance.)  Neither the teller nor the hero of 
stories can stand for us all, a condition that Lukacs sees reflected in the transformation of literary language from that 
of poetry to modern prose.  The pneumonic function of poetic and lyrical language found in ballads for instance 
changes in the modern era where the description of things is dominated by prose, which, unlike the lyric remarks 
upon man’s profoundly estranged and therefore human relationship to the world.  The hero is never estranged and 
therefore do not have the human capacity for longing or desire; instead it is representative of its community and 
Gods.  For Lukacs the novel remarks on this separation but attempts nonetheless to recreate this community.  
Ellison, who I do not believe read Lukacs (since I am certain no translation of Lukacs’ Theory of the Novel appears 
in the U.S. until the Seventies) sees the novel functioning in a similar way.                              
 form, Erich Auerbach suggests that the European 
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novel began to aspire towards these more grounded “public” gestures in the nineteenth century.16
This is the idea of the “Negro” Ellison rejects in both “The World and the Jug” and, “A 
Rejoinder.”  This later essay extends his polemic into a more specific critique of ideology.  The 
most important characteristic of Ellison’s rebuttal is its negative invocation of the word “idea,” a 
term not as important to “The World and the Jug.”  In the most powerful moments of his 
argument, Ellison suggests that he finds it far less painful to experience segregation than to avoid 
reduction “imposed by ideas…,” (Ellison, 169).  Not only is Southern anti-black racism cast into 
the realm of ideology, but Ellison also suggests that Howe’s reduction of “the Negro” into 
abstraction is on a continuum with this form of power.  Ellison’s thinking here suggests that the 
material institutions of segregation and racism are not as powerful as the ideologies that inspire 
their existence.
  
African-American literature fails when it is not reducible to such public gestures for Howe.   
17
                                                            
16 In Mimesis Auerbach’s discusses the French novel and writes that many late Nineteenth Century French novelists 
saw the novel as the proper medium to depict the masses.  Beginning with an extended quotation by Gaucourt from 
the preface of Germinie Lacerteux, Auerbach looks at many of the French naturalists and argues that there is a 
stylistic generation gap between the later naturalists and earlier novelists like Proust and Stendhal.  That Ellison 
singles out writers like Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and other Russian novelists is interesting since Auerbach similarly 
sees the Russian novel and its influence on French writing in the late nineteenth century as something unique.  Both 
Ellison and Auerbach see it as simultaneously rejecting the dominating modes of romance in European literature yet 
offering something quite different than the naturalist aesthetic which held up a mirror to the world.  Auerbach 
explains the lack of certain techniques in Russian novelists as the lack a realist tradition until the middle Nineteenth 
Century, which is symptomatic of the absence of an “enlightened, active bourgeoisie, with its assumption of 
economic and intellectual leadership, which everywhere else underlay modern culture in general and modern realism 
in particular….”                                
17 Ellison makes this allusion on pg 169 and more explicitly states this on pg. 181 where he says “I fear the 
implication of Howe’s ideas concerning the Negro writer’s role as actionist more than I do the State of Mississippi.” 
  When Ellison rebuffs Howe’s comment that he is caught up with the “idea of 
the Negro,” Ellison states “I have never said that I could or wished to [be caught up in the idea of 
the Negro],” (Ellison 177).  The wording of Ellison’s rejection is important: it is not “Negroes,” 
he rejects, but the “ideas” (or ideology) surrounding them.  By connecting the problem of 
Richard Wright’s literary craft, Howe’s myopia concerning the aesthetic possibilities of African-
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American writing and Southern segregation, we can extend Ellison’s concern over ideology 
critique into a deeper consideration of literature as a vital sphere of human action.   
His “fear of Howe’s ideas” provides a crucial moment to reflect on this connection.  The 
power of Southern segregation is exerted simultaneously through two forces of law: the juridical 
and biological, both of which determine the horizon of what is or is not human.  Such laws, to 
use Howe’s language, are the “public gestures” that determine the social as well as imaginative 
relationships between humans in civil society.  And indeed, Howe is right to see such a state of 
affairs as hellish for African-Americans, since African-Americans are seen as the exception to 
the apparent equality of these laws.  The point however, is that the enforcement of aesthetic law 
(in the form of “protest” literature) blurs the lines between the public and the poetic in a way that 
allows the obvious failures of the public sphere to discipline the actions of the imagination.  This 
does not mean that the poetic realm is lawless, but that the deterministic laws expressed in racial 
segregation are radically different than those found in the crafting of a novel.  As mentioned 
earlier, Ellison agrees with Howe on the question of literature’s problematic relationship to 
politics.  But clearly, African-American literature for Howe is answerable to the laws that are 
closer to the social sphere (what Howe means by the “public gesture”) than those related to the 
“formal autonomy” of novel writing.  Ellison is not seeking to sever the relationship between the 
public and the poetic, but he is attempting to reverse the priority Howe assigns them.  This 
reversal is where the stakes of Ellison’s dogged defense of his right as a writer reveals itself.  
Being “literary to a fault” is where Ellison sees the laws governing poetics as the necessary 
corrective to the failures of the “public gesture.”  Secondly, it is through this “literary” realm that 
the survival of the human “intelligence” Ellison found in Friday and Mark Twain’s Mark Jim 
becomes crucial in understanding America.                
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Comparing segregation to Howe’s observations on literature reveals the way in which an 
ill mixture of politics and literature truncates the possibility of the literary imagination.  As 
Ellison would say in a 1961 interview, “in the realm of the imagination all people and their 
ambitions and interests could meet” (Ellison 71).  Political critique for Ellison is more absolute 
compared to the “crudeness” of segregation’s social repression (Ellison 177). 18
We can see connections between Ellison’s critique of Hemingway in “Twenty Century 
Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” and his later critique of Irving Howe during the Cold 
War.   Just as Howe sought some continuity between Stendhal, Dostoyevsky and Orwell that 
suggested the survival of “intelligence men” within modernity so has Ellison.  And while Ellison 
appears to have written himself within this tradition he does this by seeing himself in the 
tradition of nineteenth century American writers such as Herman Melville, Stephan Crane and 
  Howe’s on the 
other had leaves little room for African-American writers to create themselves between “his 
racial predicament, his individual will and…broader American culture” (Ellison, 160).  This self-
fashioning, or what Ellison calls the “willed affirmation” of being a “Negro,” is already negated 
by the “idea of the Negro” Howe discusses in his essay.  If, as Ellison suggests, words can 
“suggest and foreshadow overt action,” Howe’s brand of racial politics disguises “the moral 
consequences of that action.”  
                                                            
18 The difference is that material segregation still allows for the possibility of human action, which he understands as 
the Negroes making a “cultural heritage…shaped by the American experience.”  Ellison’s use of the term “cultural 
heritage,” might strike one as being oxymoronic since he spends so much of this essay and disabusing Howe of 
assuming such generalizations about African-Americans.  However, as one reads down the list of things composing 
what he calls the “concord of sensibilities” constituting the “Negro experience,” he ends it saying that this condition 
is a “willed” one. Being a “Negro” stands for an “affirmation of self as against all outsides pressures – an 
identification with the group as extended through the individual self which rejects all possibilities of escape that do 
not involve a basic resuscitation of the original American ideals of social and political justice.  And those white 
Negroes (and I do not mean Norman Mailer’s dream creatures) are Negroes too – if they wish to be.” (pg.179)  In 
other words, for Ellison, it is a universal condition created by the forces of modernity, but is also one that comes as a 
product of thinking since it is “willed” into being.  So it appears that Ellison is stating that it is possible to be 
African-American and not a “Negro” as whites can be “if they wish…..”       
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most importantly Mark Twain.  For all of them, “the Negro” suggests an expression of 
intelligence about the human that Howe’s criticism did not see.    
In “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” and “The World and 
the Jug,” Ellison creates a threshold though which a line of post-Civil War authors – Herman 
Melville, Stephan Crane, Mark Twain, and William Faulkner – can become the touchstone for a 
humanistic literary tradition centered on “the Negro.”  These authors form a countervailing 
tradition to the stylistic and philosophical problems Realism presented for Ellison in the Thirties.  
As a writer caught between the elitist, Modernism of the New York Intellectuals and the nascent 
American canon exemplified in F.O. Matthiessen, Ellison’s feat as a critic is to make the case 
that Melville and Twain spoke to Dostoyevsky and Stendhal, Joyce and Malraux.  As an 
inheritor of European and American literary traditions, Ellison, like many of his Modernist peers, 
sought to create some form of continuity between traditions.  The concern in Ellison is how this 
continuity is established and how can Western literary humanism accommodate the humanistic 
quandary of “the Negro.”  Irving Howe, Mary McCarthy and others make it clear that American 
literature at the turn of the twentieth century (with few exceptions) breaks with the speculative 
energy of Europe.   Ellison saw otherwise and it was around the fallout of the Civil War and the 
American problem of racism that he saw this speculation occurring in American literary 
traditions.   
Just as important as his critical response to Hemingway and Howe is his poetic response.  
Along with opening up a “threshold” through criticism Ellison also used his fiction to make a 
similar point.  In the final section of my chapter, I will read “Battle Royal” as Ellison’s own 
“Sphinx.”  Like the complex beginnings Ellison created through “Twentieth Century Fiction and 
the Black Mask of Humanity” I see “The Battle Royal” as Ellison’s literary presentation of a 
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similar beginning.  “Battle Royal” is sandwiched between his break from Hemingway in 
“Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” and Ellison’s reiteration of this 
break in “Brave Words for a Startling Occasion,” the speech he gave upon winning the National 
Book Award.  As the self-acknowledged dramatic centerpiece of Ellison’s then novel in progress 
this episode functions as more than a metaphorical broadside on the complexities of American 
racism.  Taken in the above context, it can also be read as Ellison’s imaginative intervention into 
the aesthetic debates about interwar literary modernism, a debate that constructed a very 
particular place for the fiction written by African-Americans of the 1930s and 40s.  The change 
in Ellison’s fiction after World War II coincides with his questioning the efficacy of naturalism 
and realism as an aesthetic in representing certain post-war American realities.  The “crisis” 
Ellison would point out in the American novel during his 1953 acceptance speech had already 
happened and “Twentieth Century Criticism…” is Ellison’s initial testament to its existence. 
And so is “Battle Royal.”  In “Twentieth Century”, Ellison laments the absence of 
African-American characters in Naturalist fiction.  As Ellison writes Naturalist fiction writers 
“seldom conceive Negro characters possessing the full, complex ambiguity of the human.  Too 
often what is presented as the American Negro (a most complex example of Western man) 
emerges as an oversimplified clown, a beast or an angel” (Ellison 82).  Ellison’s move away 
from naturalism in “Battle Royal” is shown in his clear embrace of the kind of ironic distance, 
dense literary allusiveness and brutal cynicism that marked the figures championed by the 
literary left at the end of the 1930s: Dostoyevsky, Joyce, Kafka, Malraux, and Koestler.  Not 
only does Ellison’s embrace of these authors denote a change in his politics – as well as those of 
the left – but more importantly they allude to the aesthetic transformation Ellison had gone 
through.   
71 
 
“Battle Royal,” was America’s first taste of the direction Ellison’s aesthetic education 
took after the 1930s.  But it is not a complete break since there are some elements in it that 
harkens back to Ellison’s earlier fiction.  “Battle Royal’s” powerful juxtaposition of the common 
place with the surreal reads very much like “A Party Down at the Square,” which was written 
about ten years earlier (Callahan xxii).  The “party” at the center of his story is in fact a lynching 
that occurs during a coming cyclone.  Similar to the naïve narrator of “Battle Royal,” Ellison 
chose as his narrator a small nameless white child from Cincinnati who was visiting an uncle in 
Alabama and bears witness to his first and last “party.”  The absurdist center piece of “A Party” 
comes when a commercial airliner, mistaking the fires of lynching for landing flares, attempts to 
land and eventually crashes in the town square.  Ellison’s juxtaposition of the coming storm and 
the brutal lynching is very similar to Richard Wright’s story “Down By the Riverside,” where 
Wright uses the moody backdrop of a natural catastrophe to comment on the persistence social 
and racial violence. The matter of fact vernacular reportage of his nameless, naïve child narrator 
becomes a device for the story to build tension between the sublime horror of the events and the 
rigid restraint of the child’s language.  Such a technique is very much keeping with Ellison’s 
stylistic relationship to Hemingway.  
But “Party Down at the Square” like “Boy on a Train” and “I Didn’t Learn Their 
Names,” clearly bears the trace of Ellison’s early allegiance to the tropes of proletariat fiction 
found in Wright, Frank Norris and others.  Symbolically, the coming storm says as much about 
the irrationality of Alabama’s racial violence as it does the possible political changes coming to 
this fictional town.  Images of disenfranchised, disenchanted and “hungry white folks” whose 
mouths “won’t keep shut for long” close this story along with the suggestion of an investigation 
into the plane crash and lynching.  The absurd and sublime scene of racial violence is linked to 
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the material conditions of hunger and scarcity.  “Battle Royal” similarly displayed Ellison’s 
mastery over the key tropes of proletariat realism and Hemingway’s naturalism.  Battle Royal 
also seems to push beyond the aesthetic horizons set before him in the 1930s.  His self-styled 
tutelage in the techniques of avant-garde modernism is just as apparent as these earlier styles.  
The mimetic power of place found in “A Party”, “Boy on a Train”, which are connected to 
Wright, Hemingway and Anderson is absent in “Battle Royal.”  Ellison’s “south” in “Battle 
Royal” is not a place but a mood.   
His emphasis on atmosphere and mood as opposed to realism of place can also be seen in 
“King of the Bingo Game”, published in 1944.  If Ellison is practicing a form of realism in the 
“Battle Royal” it is realism akin to Franz Kafka’s, who in writing his novella Amerika (1919) 
saw himself as a realist in the vein of Charles Dickens (Kafka xxvii).19
                                                            
19 It is also important to note that Kafka’s unfinished novella bears great similarity to Ellison’s Invisible Man.  The 
German title of Amerika was Der Verschollene or the “The Man Who Disappeared.”  Karl Rossmann, the 
protagonist of Kafka’s novel is a similarly aged and equally naïve character as Ellison’s narrator; both of whom 
quest through the American landscape.  There are two narrative points of particular interest.  First, Karl ends his 
travels in Oklahoma, which had barely been a state by the time Kafka had conceived and written his unfinished 
novel.  Kafka himself had said that he wanted to end his novel on a note of reconciliation and it is interesting that he 
chose to do so in one that was barely formed and perhaps the most ethnically diverse in the union.  The second is 
also one of the most puzzling moments in Kafka’s book.  Rossmann, after ending up at the Nature Theater in 
Oklahoma as a day laborer, signs his employment documents with the name “Negro.”  Whether the “Negro” held 
some symbolic meaning in Kafka’s works before or after Amerika I do not know.  But it is incredibly fascinating 
that Karl’s Americanization in the novel is for Kafka thought analogous to being a “Negro.”       
  Kafka’s America is 
thoroughly symbolic, especially since he never set foot in America but fabricated it out of 
travelogues and accounts from friends.  Ellison, who spent an extended period of time in the 
south at Tuskegee, is not a southerner either.  Like the battle royal itself, the south and the 
smoker are symbolic of something American.  Two key elements of his story express the 
“complex ambiguity” Ellison sought in modernist presentations of “the Negro.”  First is the self-
conscious, yet anxious aspect of the narrator’s storytelling.  The naiveté of his earlier narrators 
was a way for Ellison to deploy a Hemingway-esque matter of fact reportage.  In the battle royal, 
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Ellison creates a narrative consciousness that has a profound if uncertain mastery over the 
efficacy of storytelling itself.  His narrator’s mastery is reflected in Ellison’s own self-conscious 
allusions to the confessional and the bildungsroman genres at the beginning of his novel.  Instead 
of using them to give an unmediated sense of the narrative self, Ellison uses them to heighten the 
skeptical and ironic tone of the novel.  The other is the narrator’s nightmare self-recognition as a 
“nigger-boy.”  One part dark comedy and one part brutal observation, I read this figure in the 
context of Ellison’s attempts to insert the Negro problem within the traditions literary 
modernism.  The “Nigger-boy,” like Friday and Jim is a crucial self-reflective beginnings, the 
threshold through which Ellison’s narrator understands himself and Ellison the author can think 
the complex ambiguity of “the Negro” in America.  
There are no radical changes to note between Ellison’s short story and the episode as it 
appears in Invisible Man
Like Dostoyevsky’s narrator in 
.  However, the addition of a prologue to the novel significantly changes 
how we understand the narrator of Ellison’s short story.  The prologue foregrounds the narrator’s 
naiveté through juxtaposing his “present” and “past” consciousness.  This clash is best seen in 
the narrator’s determination to give his valedictorian speech despite the dehumanizing context of 
the Battle Royal (Ellison 18, 25, 29).  The praise that the narrator received after his speech, 
despite his simultaneous dehumanization affirms for him that the Booker T. Washington inspired 
ideas of progress and humility are not “traitorous” ones as his grandfather intuits on his 
deathbed.  In fact, the narrator feels like his conforming to the idea of “progress and humility” 
wards off his grandfather’s dying curse since he is rewarded with a college scholarship for his 
actions (Ellison 32).   
Notes From Underground, Ellison’s use of the 
confessional mode foregrounds the narrator’s attempt to convey the event as he experienced it at 
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the time, but also to conscientiously saturate this retelling with his past naiveté.  This has the 
effect of make the process of storytelling an active reflection on the past.  Compared to a stories 
like “A Party”, “A Boy on a Train” or Ellison’s Buster and Reilly tales, Ellison has created a 
level of self-consciousness about the act of storytelling itself.  Confession produces one 
particular frame for his narrative.  It emphasizes the distinction between the narrator’s present, 
albeit uncertain knowledge, the act of storytelling and the “tale” itself.  With the use of the 
confessional mode, Ellison makes use of the performative aspect of enunciation.  The narrator 
makes himself a protagonist in a story that, as he suggests in the “Epilogue”, he has told many 
times and in many different ways.  Ellison presents him as an active consciousness attempting to 
infuse significance into these past events by using multiple devices to infuse the narrator’s 
present into the story’s “past.”  For instance, there are multiple parenthetical interjections of his 
present observations – which are often derisive – on his past actions (like his dogged 
determination to give his speech at the beginning of the novel).   
Despite the narrator’s constant self criticism, it is not a narrative consciousness that ever 
arrives at a final judgment about his own actions.  Not only is this expressed in the ambivalence 
of the novel’s famous final lines (“Who knows but that, on lower frequencies I speak for you?”) 
but also the narrator’s own skepticism about his own decision to frame his story in the 
confessional mode. At the beginning of the epilogue, we are told that “Well, now I’ve been 
trying to look through myself, and there’s a risk in it.  I was never more hated then when I tried 
to be honest.  Or when, even as just now I’ve tried to articulate exactly what I felt to be the truth.  
No one was satisfied – not even I,” (Ellison 573).  The lack of satisfaction Ellison’s narrator feels 
with the “truth” or “the absurd” leads us to believe that what we have been privy to throughout 
this story is not the mimetic revealing of narrative events through a confessional mode, but 
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instead a contrived, often told tale that has yet to satisfy any sense of meaning in and of the 
world, (Ellison 573).20
Further, as Ellison the critic is attempting to write himself into the traditions of literary 
humanism, Ellison the author is clearly playing with these same literary tradition and 
conventions in this story.  The irony Ellison produces from the beginning of the novel 
emphasizes his protagonist’s present insights as much as its confessional mode emphasizes his 
past ignorance.  But the narrator’s “present” mode of storytelling, which reveals his development 
of a consciousness different than the one he formally had also suggests the novel’s relationship 
to the bildungsroman.  As a modernist writer attempting to meld Marx and Freud’s observations 
about the past’s uneasy coexistence with the present, 
  As the narrator tells us, part of the risk in telling his story has been 
related to “trying to look through myself.”  If anything, the story (and the novel) just reveals 
more absurdity concerning Ellison’s narrator, his world and consequently the kind of world that 
the novel makes known to us.  The narrator’s uncertainty at the end of the novel points to two 
things: both his failure to fully understand the events he has been involved in but more 
importantly, whether his story is coherent at all.   
Invisible Man transforms common place 
understandings of the bildungsroman.  Traditionally, development in the bildungsroman is 
accomplished from the “outside” and in order to create harmony between the actions of the 
private individual and larger civil and state institutions as Todd Kotje states in 
                                                            
20 Directly preceding the above quotation, Ellison’s narrator tells us that “On the other hand, I’ve never been so 
loved and appreciated as when I tried to ‘justify’ and affirm someone’s mistaken beliefs; or when I’ve tried to give 
my friends the incorrect, absurd answers they wished to hear.  In my presence they could talk and agree with 
themselves, the world was nailed down and they loved it.”  Absurdity is mobilized in a very different and in fact 
celebratory way near the end of the novel as well.  During the riot scene in Harlem, the narrator upon seeing Ras 
upon his horse states that through this image, he recognized the “absurdity of the whole night.”  This absurdity 
however is linked with “the simple yet complex arrangement of hope and desire, fear and hate, that had brought me 
here still running, and knowing now how I was and where I was and knowing too that I had no longer to run for or 
from the Jacks and the Emersons and the Bledsoes and Nortons, but only from their confusion and impatience, and 
refusal to recognize the beautiful absurdity of their American identity and mine” (559).   
The German 
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Bildungsroman: History of a Genre (Kotje 5). Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship 
farcically presents this process throughout his novel.  Wilhelm painfully realizes that the life he 
thought was the product of his own willful actions was in fact “directed” by a secret society who 
engineered many of his experiences throughout the novel.  The third person narrator in Goethe’s 
novel allows the reader to see this farce since Wilhelm remains clueless to the end.   
A similar trajectory of development is used in Invisible Man.  Unlike Goethe’s novel, the 
narrator’s self-conscious enunciation constantly foregrounds the forces that aid or hinder his 
ability to think and act.  Through this technique, bildung is constantly undermined by the 
narrator who is attempting to highlight the clash between his own individual understanding and 
those civil institutions seeking to shape him.  The effect of this is another instance of Ellison’s 
employment of irony through his use of traditional narrative form.  Despite the narrator’s early 
acceptance of the ideology of “progress,” Ellison situates the narrator in a way to offer up his 
story to reveal the fraught nature of forward movement.  Through his allusions to the 
confessional mode and the bildungsroman, Ellison constructs the narrative of Invisible Man
Traditionally the novel’s confessional and bildungsroman modes are associated with 
positivistic, Enlightenment ideals since, as narrative modes, they are associated with the 
 in a 
way that situates the narrator’s story as one always up for speculation.  Instead of hiding the 
machinery of narrative production, the novel foregrounds the narrator’s conscientious intentions 
to narrate and create meaning.   By focusing on the narrator’s self-conscious attempts to narrate, 
Ellison’s novel creates a connection between the how of storytelling and the kind of knowledge 
that could be produced out of it.  From the beginning Ellison’s novel is in fact attempting to 
solve the riddle of humanity his grandfather set before him.  But as we know from both the 
prologue and epilogue, the narrator has not quite figured this puzzle out.   
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emergence of reason and the individual human consciousness (Kotje 9 and Watt 15). But 
Ellison’s use of these conventions in Invisible Man calls these positive humanistic values into 
question and illuminates the discursive way the self is constructed.  Despite the “complete 
anarchy,” the narrator describes during the Battle Royal, the actions of the burlesque dancer 
(“flung herself about with a detached expression on her face”,) the narrator (“I spoke 
automatically and with such fervor…,”) and all the boys involved (“fighting automatically”) are 
described as “automatic” and “impersonal” (Ellison 19, 24, 30).  All of these descriptions and in 
particular the narrator’s “automatic” speech highlight a lack of agency on the part of the narrator 
and those around him.  Ellison’s emphasis on “unwilled” actions shows how Ellison turns both 
the idea of individual progress (bildung) and self-revelation (confession) on their heads.  
 The content and form of the narrator’s speech at the end of the Battle Royal gives us 
insight into how Ellison’s novel portrays this reversal.  What has been given the most critical 
attention is the ideological content of the narrator’s speech.  There are snatches of Booker T. 
Washington’s infamous phrase, “cast your bucket where you are”, which clash with Dubois’ 
radical call for equality at the end of the nineteenth century.  In “Failed Prophet and Falling 
Stock: Why Ralph Ellison Was Never Avant Garde,” Houston Baker reads the narrator’s speech 
as emblematic of Ellison’s own fear of “White” disciplinary power.  The narrator’s speech in 
Invisible Man
Baker is right in the sense that the narrator’s value to the men assembled at the Battle 
Royal is in his ability to “automatically” reproduce this power (Baker 9).  The narrator’s 
supposed “intelligence” and self-styled sense of being a “potential Booker T. Washington” is 
 and its violent setting mark a paranoid fictional mind unaware that this power can 
be escaped.  For Baker, the play of ideologies in the speech is a red herring for stasis and the 
status quo (Baker 8).       
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ironically the product of this very discipline.  He is literally bloodied and beaten by the south’s 
racialized system of caste as the White townsmen cryptically tell him to progress by “developing 
as you are,” (Klein 113 and Ellison 32).  This violent disciplinary force “encourages him in the 
right direction,” yet also calls into question the inherent value of the narrator’s own “past ” 
revelations and desires, something Ellison’s persistent mode of irony foregrounds.   
Further lending to this anarchic situation is the narrator’s accidental slip replacing the 
phrase “social responsibility” with “social equality.”  His mistaken utterance of a “phrase I had 
often seen denounced in newspaper editorials, heard debated in private” introduces an idea 
(“equality”) that goes against the ideology of social responsibility enforced by white men of his 
town (Ellison 31).  Social responsibility in the novel is a paradox since responsibility is not to the 
self but to the racial hierarchies of power in the South.  “Equality”, which the narrator states he 
read in a newspaper, also stands for what I see as Ellison’s self-conscious insertion of 
contemporary events into the beginning of the novel.  Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 study An American 
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy attacks the juridical and philosophical 
pillar of Southern life: the absence of social equality for African-Americans (Myrdal). 21  
Ellison’s review of An American Dilemma
                                                            
21 While not the intent of this chapter, it would not be hard to read Ellison’s scene at the Battle Royal as a profound 
engagement with Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy.  Myrdal, 
who bases the argument of his book on the problem of “social equality”, says the following about the source of 
inequality: "The kernel of the popular theory of ‘no social equality’ will, when pursued be presented as a firm 
determination on the part of the whites to block amalgamation and preserve ‘the purity of the white race’" (Myrdal 
956).  Gunnar Myrdal expands on this by stating that: “The fixation on the purity of white womanhood, and also part 
of the intensity of emotion surrounding the whole sphere of segregation and discrimination, are to be understood as 
the backwashes of the sore conscience on the part of white men for their own ore their compeers' relations with, or 
desires for, Negro women” (958).   
 
 critiqued Myrdal’s sterile “scientific” approach as 
inadequate to capture the mercurial forces of myth and history that under-gird power and race in 
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America (Ellison 338).  So while “equality” creates a powerful disturbance during the battle 
royal it also becomes another duplicitous idea within its chaos.   
All of this lends some credence to Houston Baker’s ultimate reading of the battle royal as 
Ellison’s cynical and quietist vision of the “public sphere” (Baker 11).  But I wonder if we 
cannot see the vision of chaos Ellison presents is his attempt to represent the mercurial discursive 
forces of myth and history that also constitute the public sphere.    The plastic nature of 
“progress”, “equality” and the “self” in this scene echoes Ellison’s critique of Myrdal’s 
American Dilemma, where he states Myrdal “avoids the question of power” and the functioning 
force of history in his analysis (Ellison 338).  What Ellison shows in the Battle Royal are the 
ambiguous, shadowy operations of power on these very concepts.  So instead of their assumed 
positive humanistic value they are also used for repression.   
In Mimesis
Dostoyevsky’s 
 Erich Auerbach writes that enlightenment ideas of progress and modernity 
were met with profound skepticism by Dostoyevsky and many of his Russian contemporaries.  
Auerbach describes these continental European ideas as coming into “shocking,” and violent 
collision with Russia’s culture during the nineteenth century (Auerbach 523).  The violence of 
this collision is important in understanding how Dostoyevsky and other Russian novelists 
represent their characters.  In Dostoyevsky, Auerbach sees characters acting “almost without 
transition”, displaying “tremendous and unpredictable oscillations” or in “words and acts,” 
revealing “chaotic instinctive depths…” (523).   
Notes from Underground demonstrates Auerbach’s observation.  The 
narrator in Notes from Underground consistently describes his attempts to show affection and 
“sentimentality” as “artificial” and “bookish”, (Dostoyevsky 81).  Even at the very end, when 
Liza returns to the narrator he describes his rejection as “not an impulse from the heart,” but one 
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that came “from my evil brain.  This cruelty was so affected, so purposely made up, so 
completely a product of the brain, of books, that I could not keep it up for a minute…,” 
(Dostoyevsky 81).  The narrator realizes that his abstract ideas concerning human emotions and 
affection come out of sentimental French literature.  As I have suggested through the use of 
Auerbach, Ellison’s battle royal scene is staging a similar violent collision.  Along with the use 
of novel genres, the very content of the royal itself suggests this clash.  The general description 
of the scene is peppered with circus imagery (Ellison 33).  The burlesque dancer is described as 
having hair “like that of a kewpie doll,” a face formed into “an abstract mask,” eyes “the color of 
a baboon’s butt,” breasts “firm and round as the domes of East Indian temples,” (Ellison 19).   
And so is Tatlock, whom the narrator describes as a “stupid clown” (Ellison 25).  The controlled 
anarchy of a circus is a fitting metaphor for the battle royal.  We are not given an actual location 
since the locale of the smoker and the town it occurs in goes nameless. The battle royal and for 
that matter the south we see in the first parts of Ellison’s novel is a thoroughly symbolic 
presentation of American life.  It is a surreal “collision” of progressive democratic idealism, 
social uplift and their connection to the powerful violence of anti-black racism.   
As Ellison himself remarks in “Going to the Territory”, the battle royal serves as a 
metaphor for the workings of history and politics itself which “appear to be basic to our 
conception of freedom, and the drama of democracy proceeds through a warfare of words and 
symbolic actions….Since the Civil War this form of symbolic action has served as a moral 
substitute for armed warfare…” (Ellison 595).  The battle royal, the South and America are 
presented to us as a deep eddy where a multitude of historical and ideological forces have pooled 
together – not placidly, but in open contestation, violence and organized anarchy, which Ellison 
crystallizes in the nightmare that ends the story.  Baker’s “quietist” reading is also hard to see if 
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the battle royal is taken in the context of Ellison’s intellectual protest of both Myrdal’s sociology 
and the unimaginative sociology of Naturalist prose.  To use Auerbach’s terms, the nightmare 
reveals the “chaotic depths” that rest underneath the battle royal’s surface. That Ellison frames 
these depths as nightmarish is a common place in his writing.  It is part of the way Ellison 
expresses the “complex ambiguity” of racism in America and I would also say his modernism.  
Throughout his essays Ellison uses the nightmare to comment on what he sees as America’s 
irrational and unconscious “preoccupation” with race.   
Sleep, dreams and the unconscious are a powerful trope in Modernist literature in part 
because of the influence of both Freud and Jung.  Freud’s influence upon Ellison is written all 
over Invisible Man, most explicitly in the Trueblood incident as well as the narrator’s encounter 
with Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1913) later on in the novel.  The “mixed character of nightmare 
and of dream” is what Ellison saw in Oklahoma City as well as America.  And hence in the 
introduction of Shadow and Act Ellison takes this mixed character and transfigures it a “shadow” 
from which Ellison the critic emerged.  But as Robert Abrams acknowledges in “The 
Ambiguities of Dreaming in Ellison’s Invisible Man” the self [and author for that matter] that 
emerges from Ellison’s interest in the unconscious is quite un-Freud like.  Abrams continues and 
writes that Ellison’s hallucinatory fantasies defy the Freudian perspective of the dream as an 
“equivocating yet decipherable idiom” (Abrams 593).  Freud’s “Metapsychological Supplement 
to the Theory of Dreams,” bears this out.  In the same way human beings “lay aside the garments 
they pull over their skin…” Freud writes that dreams are a similar “dismantling” of our minds 
(Freud 151).  Most striking about Freud’s description of this dismantling is the linguistic terms 
he frames it in.  “As the work of interpretation traces the course taken by the dream work,” Freud 
explains, it: 
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 follows the paths which lead from the latent thoughts to the dream-elements, exhausts 
the possible meanings of verbal ambiguities and points out the words that act as bridges 
between groups of materials, we receive an impression now of a joke, now of 
schizophrenia, and are apt to forget that for a dream all operations with words are merely 
preparatory to regression to concrete ideas (Freud 157-8). 
Where Freud sees language (“words”) bearing the marks of the unconscious yet ultimately 
leading to the “concrete idea” Ellison saw the operation of language as leading towards what he 
calls in the “Introduction” of Shadow and Act
As a literary trope though, we could see that the nightmare’s influence on Ellison is also 
related to what William Maxwell calls Ellison’s “radical education” (Maxwell 59).  As Maxwell 
states, despite the novel’s strong anti-communism, Ellison’ “Harlem” education is retained in 
 as “the surreal incongruity” of American life.  The 
chaos of the dream brought us to an origins while for Ellison, the ambiguity of the shadow for a 
writer, the “incongruities” that emerged from it must defy the concrete ideas of “social hierarchy 
and order” in his world (Ellison 53).  Ellison’s defiance fits the modernist use of the dream.  The 
dream’s power of revelation is also the sign of something pernicious in Modernism.  The 
“unconscious,” As Stephan Thompson writes in “Sleepwalking into Modernity: Bourdieu and the 
Case of Ernest Dowson” also appears in images “of unwilled action, representations that 
scramble the usual distribution of ideas of sleeping and waking.”  Hypnotism, somnambulism, 
hysteria”, Thompson continues, “are dominant preoccupations of the psychological and medio-
legal and other literature,” in Modernism (Thompson 502).  As Merle Curti explains in “The 
American Exploration of Dreams and Dreamers,” these figures had a “powerful hold” on 
American literary and intellectual traditions in the twentieth-century (Curti 401-5, 426).   
Invisible Man’s commitment to the “folk” and folk cultural forms (Maxwell 82).  Particularly in 
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Ellison’s early Buster and Riley stories you can see his experimentation with folk forms.  In 
“Battle Royal” and Invisible Man’s use of the “nightmare” we can also see the influence of Karl 
Marx and in particular Marx’s opening of The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in which the 
problem of bourgeois ideology and France’s imperial past is “…a nightmare on the brain of the 
living” (Marx, 15).  Marx’s opening to The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte brings to mind 
Thompson’s observations about the nineteenth century’s obsession with figures of “unwilled 
action.”  Besides Ellison’s early “radical” training – which also bears the marks of Kenneth 
Burke’s influence – more direct, figural representations of the unconscious and nightmares can 
be culled from Ellison’s immediate literary influences and circumstances.  From the beginning of 
Andre Malraux’s 1931 novel Man’s Fate to Arthur Koestler’s 1941 novel Darkness at Noon and 
also Langston Hughes’ two books of political poetry The Dream Keeper and Other Poems (1932) 
and Montage of a Dream Deferred
Ellison’s intellectual context suggests that his interest in dreams, nightmares and the 
unconscious is not purely a psychoanalytic enterprise interested in the “self.”  In his constant 
ruminations on identity Ellison’s criticism does allow any easy revelation of the “self” at all.  
Dreams and nightmares lead not to the concrete but a “complex ambiguity” about the human.  In 
many ways Ellison’s thinking anticipates Edward Said’s use of Freud in 
 (1951). 
Beginnings over 20 
years later.  Said reads Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams as revealing the “traces of the 
unconscious in language” (Said, 179).  But these traces are “substitutions” which, according to 
Said, point away from definitive “origins” within the unconscious.  Instead it is the human effort 
at “interpretation” that is crucial for Said in Freud.  Literary language in other words is a way for 
humans to imaginatively reconstruct a beginning.  For both Ellison and Said the novel is one 
prime example of this attempt.  According to Said it tells the “biography” of our human and 
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literary attempts to create meaning in relationship to those forces “beyond the bounds of human 
biography” (Said 182).   
The nightmare at the end of battle royal – just like Ellison’s novel – is the moment where 
this “beyond” is presented.  It is not the beyond of Freud’s concrete idea but presents to us a 
thoroughly symbolic catachresis: the narrator’s self-identification as a “Nigger-boy.” Instead of 
exhausting the existence of verbal ambiguities, this figure crackles with the “complex 
ambiguity” of the human Ellison desired in American modernist traditions.  Not only is the 
“nigger-boy” the narrator’s first scene of self-recognition but also the novel’s opening aesthetic 
salvo.  Unlike the narrator’s participation in the circus-like atmosphere of the battle royal, he sits 
in attendance with his recently past grandfather “who refused to laugh” no matter what these 
clowns did (Ellison 33).  Standing in the place of the school superintendent, the Grandfather 
turns the briefcase and the scholarship he wins during the fight into objects of ambiguous 
portent.  Unlike the envelope containing his scholarship, the empty envelopes in his nightmare 
repeat themselves, revealing envelopes that seemingly have no end (33).  The last engraved 
document found in the briefcase eloquently captures the complexity of the Battle Royal and the 
character at the center of it. 
Its message, “To Whom It May Concern…Keep this Nigger-Boy Running” anticipates 
future events in Ellison’s novel to be.  We can see this in the letter the narrator receives from 
Bledsoe, his work documents at Liberty Paints and the slip of paper with his new Brotherhood 
name.  Most often, this message is interpreted as a metaphor for the perpetual oppression of 
African-Americans in a white world.  But at this point I think it is important to recall Ellison’s 
concern over the “Negroes” disappearance in American literature and the absence of a necessary 
“deep probing” skepticism.  With Ellison’s concern in mind, we should take the phrase as 
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something else. “To Whom It May Concern: Keep this Nigger-Boy Running” is Ellison’s 
parodic yet ethically informed advice for the American writer and critic.  In a very direct way I 
see Ellison addressing what he saw as the absence of the stylistic and intellectual concerns about 
the Negro that produced Mark Twain’s “Jim.”  The nameless narrator, like “Jim” is Ellison’s 
contribution to America’s aesthetic concern with “the Negro problem.”  And Ellison has kept 
Jim “running” but puts him through the imaginative mill of his modernist literary education.  
Robert Abrams has read the nightmarish aesthetics of Invisible Man as Ellison’s recognition that 
“the modern American artist…is bereft of iconography in a problematic, dissonant world” 
(Abrams 603).  I think Ellison is aware of this and what we see in “Battle Royal” as well as his 
post-War criticism is his creation of such an iconography for the Negro beginning with Twain.  
Instead of the “icon” I want to suggest another idea to describe Ellison’s “nigger-boy”, which is 
indeed a strange avatar for the human.  Erich Auerbach’s understanding of figura seems apropos 
in light of Ellison’s own aesthetic and intellectual concerns.  In his reading of Dante’s Divine 
Comedy
Ellison’s “nigger-boy” is in fact such a figure.  Exploring the catachresis created by the 
phrase will allow us some insight into its value as figura.  As Ronald Judy has shown the word 
“nigger” became synonymous with “work” and “labor” during the nineteenth-century.  “The 
value of the nigger is not in the physical body itself but in the energy, the potential 
 Auerbach suggests that Dante strove not towards allegory but a figural and thoroughly 
historical interpretation of reality.  Figura captures concrete historical reality by presenting a 
figure simultaneously with its potential or what Auerbach calls “fulfillment.”  As Auerbach 
writes “For Dante the literal meaning or historical reality of a figure stands in no contradiction to 
its profounder meaning, but precisely ‘figures’ it; the historical reality is not annulled but 
confirmed by the deeper meaning” (Auerbach 73).   
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force…standing-in-reserve” (Judy 321).    With this definition in mind, Judy – invoking Dubois 
– explores the meaning of the nineteenth-century term “bad nigger; which he describes as “an 
oxymoron” since it suggests “rebellious property.”  Judy writes that “In rebellion, the bad nigger 
exhibits an autonomous will, which a nigger as commodity is not allowed to exhibit.  There is 
little more dangerous than a willful thing, since it reveals the impossibility of completely 
subjecting the will (321).  According to the OED, “Boy’s” derogatory use in the U.S. – as a 
reference to slaves and servants of the aristocracy – derives from a similar historical moment.  
While reinforcing the derogatory nature of the word nigger, the word is also etymologically 
associated with “youth.”  And it is this association that is germane to some of the formal aspects 
of Ellison’s novel.  Here Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Apprenticeship becomes an important 
touchstone since Invisible Man
“Boy’s” juxtaposition with “nigger” therefore conjoins a thoroughly historical modern 
figure of oppression and potential with a modern literary and biological figure of human 
possibility.  Perhaps it is now important to return to Ellison’s reading of Twain against 
Hemingway.  For Ellison, Jim and Huck, nigger and boy – together – become the figura through 
which Ellison identifies a thoroughly literary and historical example of the human condition in 
modernity.  Within the context of his nightmare, the narrator simultaneously signals his 
condition as a dehumanized potential force – a nigger – and limitless human potential – boy.  
Like Auerbach’s figura, the narrator’s profounder meaning stands in no contradiction to his 
 formally invokes the bildungsroman.  By the end of the 
eighteenth century youth becomes symbolic of the transformations in European society brought 
on by the Enlightenment and the disintegration of “status society.”  The bildungsroman 
flourishes within these transformations as a since as a literary genre it privileges youth as the 
most meaningful stage of life (Moretti 3).    
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oppressive present.  We can also see how Ellison the writer is able to marshal together his 
modernism and romanticism, Freud and Marx, Twain and Goethe to summon this figura, which 
indicates his limitless potential as an African-American artist.  In contradistinction to interwar 
American modernist writers Ellison marshals the “open-ended possibilities” of literary tradition, 
form and history to produce the “nigger-boy.”  So the open address of his letter, which doubles 
as an appeal to all, through all time suggests that we must keep this figura of the human running. 
Reading “The Battle Royal as purely social allegory is hard to do when taking Ellison’s story in 
the context of his protests against modernism.  So to answer the question I posed at the beginning 
of this chapter, the Battle Royal cannot be best understood as merely allegorical or purely within 
contemporary traditions of realism but as Ellison’s attempt at presenting the human.  The 
“beginnings” Ellison produced for himself in “Twentieth Century Fiction” is echoed in “Battle 
Royal”, Invisible Man
In retrospect, Ellison’s rumination on Hemingway and American literature proves to be a 
moment of profound transformation for him.  It is hard to say that Ellison kills his father in 
critiquing Hemingway, especially since later on he would wholly embrace him as an “ancestor.”  
However, his critique of modernism in “Twentieth Century” is part of a larger move away from 
realism and proletarian naturalism.  Coming on the heels of his declaration of a “new American 
Humanism”, it is apparent that “the Negro” and modernism have a central role in the humanism 
Ellison desires.  After winning the National Book Award Ellison would travel to Austria in 1954 
and teach in the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies.  Established in 1947 by the Harvard 
University Council, its mission was to expose Central European students to American culture.  
At some point, the U.S. Army and the State Department, in its effort to create “ideological 
 and many of his other writings.  
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conformity,” took over the seminar and exerted veto power over who could and could not be 
invited to teach there.   
Once he arrived there, Ellison would revisit many of these concerns in a class called "The 
Role of the Novel in Creating the American Experience."  And while there is no doubt Ellison 
would present the American Negro in all its complexity, one wonders to what end Ellison’s ideas 
were enmeshed in the complex ideological operations of America’s Cold War.  While published 
in 1965, one of his most famous essays “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” was conceived out of his 
experiences in Austria.  Just like “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity” 
Ellison returns to the problem of literary humanism, the absence of the “Negro” and its 
relationship to American literary traditions.  It is the humanist concept of “renaissance” that will 
concern Ellison in Rome, Austria and later in “Tell It Like It Is, Baby.”  And just like in “Battle 
Royal” it is both the “nightmare” and a version of his “nigger-boy” that Ellison returns to in 
order to contemplate the efficacy of America’s literary humanism.     
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Chapter 2: Ellison in Exile: “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” and the Problem of Renaissance 
 
 “It is not simply the birth of the nation we now commemorate but its regeneration…We have 
little hesitation in predicting that the effects of the revolution though which we are now passing 
upon European politics will be still more marked than the effects of the revolution of 1776,”  The 
Nation
The use of birth and rebirth as a trope to represent historical change or historical periods 
is not new.  But it is something that has held America in a particularly tight grasp since the late 
nineteenth century.  At the end of Reconstruction in 1877, the fires that forged America’s present 
sense of modernity burned hottest. The country’s identity as a modern place with modern people 
is partially bound with the ascendant value of rational, scientific modes of inquiry and industrial 
capitalism.  Alongside this industrial modernity, American scholars and industrialists also bound 
the country’s identity to newly forged intellectual ties to classical Renaissance antiquity. It is in 
the late Nineteenth Century historiography of Jacob Burckhardt and his 
 (1865). 
The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy (1867) that we first find the identification of the Italian Medieval Period as a 
“renaissance.”  And as Jonathan Arac writes in “F.O. Matthiessen: Authorizing an American 
Renaissance,” (1985,) Burckhardt’s intellectual influence had an effect on the way Americans 
undertook classical studies as well as the way Americans saw themselves connected to the 
ancient past, (Arac 94).   The American Academy at Rome, where Ralph Ellison would begin 
writing “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” in 1955 has a history leading back to American Reconstruction 
and America’s renaissance sentiment.  In 1894, Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan, John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr., William K. Vanderbilt and Henry Clay Frick, founded the new American School 
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of Architecture in Rome. Then one year later the American School of Classical Studies in Rome 
was formed by the Archaeological Institute of America.  The American Academy in Rome, 
officially created a year before the beginning of World War I, is the combination of these two 
separate institutions.  The end of Reconstruction was also the period that many of our modern 
professional academic institutions are founded.  While the American Philological Association, 
American Social Science Association and American Association for the Advancement of 
Science were already in existence by the 1880s, by the turn of the century the American 
Historical Association, the Modern Language Association and many other institutions dedicated 
to specialized form of Humanist knowledge are established.   
Besides these concrete institutions, America has always invoked such “renaissance” 
sentiments to those writing about it.  America was at once John Winthrop’s Puritan “city on the 
hill” and Hegel’s land of the future.  In his 1964 address describing the Great Society, Lyndon 
Johnson called America a “challenge constantly renewed,” not a “safe harbor.”  Even now, 
America’s post-9/11 sentiment sees its contemporary generation as a rebirth of World War II’s 
“greatest generation.”  This is in much the same way Americans during World War II looked 
back to its own Civil War past for meaning.  If 1776 was America’s revolt against tyranny and 
Emerson’s time was the birth of America’s “renaissance feeling,” then the Civil War is where 
this “renaissance” was consecrated and institutionalized.  America’s post-Civil War “rebirth” 
also meant a separation from Europe.  The South’s defeat at the end of the Civil War becomes a 
defeat of all that was associated with European backwardness: aristocracy, feudalism, tyrannical 
monarchy and human bondage.  In the months after Lincoln’s assassination, James Russell 
Lowell’s “Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration” included a line proclaiming that in 
America “nothing of Europe here, or then, of Europe fronting mornward still/Ere any names of 
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Serf and Peer” (Lowell 3).  Speaking at Harvard, Oliver Wendell Holmes linked Lincoln and 
Northern victory to the death of European monarchy:  “For on the pillar raised by martyr 
hands/burns the rekindled beacon of the right/sowing its seeds of fire o’er all the lands – thrones 
look a century older in its light” (Holmes, 8).  Not be forgotten are the profound evangelical 
Christian sentiments contained in the North’s triumph also.  Lowell sentiments also called 
America “the promised land/that flows with freedom’s milk and honey” (Lowell 5).  As much as 
Northern Abolitionism alluded to the discourse of secular and Enlightenment strains of 
humanism, it was also based on instrumental Puritan and evangelical Christian understandings of 
America’s mission.   
Among “literary” minded Nineteenth Century thinkers, this renaissance sensibility 
centered on a reoccurring figure.  Shakespeare and particularly “Hamlet” became the 
quintessential figure of American’s youth, innocence and infinite potential.  When Ralph Waldo 
Emerson penned Representative Men (1850) he saw Shakespeare’s Hamlet as a prototype for the 
Nineteenth Century’s “speculative genius.” Emerson also saw Shakespeare’s mind as the 
intellectual horizon beyond which we do not see.  In fact, Emerson saw Hamlet as too modern 
for its Seventeenth century audience and only understood with the settling of the United States.  
After his death, President Abraham Lincoln and by insinuation America became amongst other 
things, a materialization of Hamlet’s infinite potential.  Edwin Lawrence Godkin, The Nation’s 
first chief editor characterized Louis Napoleon’s reaction to a medal bestowed upon Abraham 
Lincoln’s widow as an “offering of republicans to a republic” that had a “Hamlet-like miching 
malecho (of) esoteric as well as exoteric significance,” (Nation 33).  Even in America’s first 
popular cultural form – Blackface Minstrelsy – Shakespeare’s Hamlet was often the vehicle 
blackface performers used to lampoon American high cultural pretensions and celebrate the 
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“people’s” new authority and power.  Much of this investment in Hamlet owes to the role 
Shakespeare played as the principal link between the moral traditions of the classics and more 
modern humanist sensibilities.   
In The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture (2000) Franco 
Moretti sees the multitude of allusions to Hamlet’s dramatic dilemma as representative of the 
problem of modernity in late eighteenth-century European culture.  Moretti attributes Hamlet’s 
contemplative restlessness to his youth, which explains his conflicted relationship to tradition 
and duty.  While applicable to the United States and its own historic problem of generational 
continuity to Europe, there is a critical difference between Moretti’s European “Hamlet” and 
America’s Emersonian one.  Moretti’s use of Hamlet stems from a Nietzschean impulse to see 
tragedy as the place of modern pessimism and doubt.  It is at this point that we can find the fork 
in the road between this European Hamlet and the American one.  The tragic Hamlet of 
modernity’s restlessness, skepticism and change in Europe appears in Emerson’s portrait.  But 
the “Hamlet” of Emerson’s writing is a rather light traveler through history and the experiences.  
Hamlet the regicide, the expounder of Montaigne and Machiavelli, the incarnation of Terence’s 
crafty slave does not exist for Emerson.  However, for a man who feels that “grief can teach him 
nothing,” and as Yeats puts it, lacks a “vision of evil,” Emerson did see slavery presenting this 
grief and evil.  Emerson’s version of Hamlet, which begins as a figure lacking a tragic sense of 
history does become the bearer of history’s burden when he confronts the evils of American 
chattel slavery.  When F.O. Matthiessen published the foundational American Renaissance: Art 
and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1941) on the eve of America’s entry into 
World War II, it was to Hamlet he went to capture the tragic sense of duty he found in America’s 
own “renaissance” of Western Literary Humanism. 
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Through Hamlet, the imaginative lens of a nightmare, President Abraham Lincoln’s 
assassination and allusions to Western classicism, Ralph Ellison wrote, “Tell It Like It Is, Baby,” 
for the centennial issue of The Nation in 1965.  Many of the contributors to this issue hesitated to 
approach the question of American progress since the magazine inception at the Civil War’s end 
in 1865.  Ralph Ellison’s contribution is no exception.  Regardless of how they expressed their 
hesitance, a collective uncertainty over America’s direction made sense.  America was reeling 
from two politically motivated assassinations and was once again attempting to travel down the 
road of political Reconstruction in the South.  Both of these events lent to a national mood that 
was apprehensive at best.  Only ten years out of détente with North Korea, the U.S. was 
accelerating towards another in Southeast Asia, one whose rationale swam hazily beneath a stew 
of conflicting counter-purposes.  Already, the first of many long hot summers troubled Lyndon 
B. Johnson’s promise to fashion America into the Great Society.  And the year before, the 
country watched the gathering forces of neo-conservatism represented by Barry Goldwater.  All 
of this lent urgency to many of the writings.  There was no time to sift through the minute, 
broken fragments hidden within the sands of time to figure out our present social and political 
problems.   However, this is precisely how Ellison decides to solve the complicated riddle of 
America’s present.  Whether Ellison, like the mandate stated in The Nation’s inaugural issue, 
saw the possibilities of “regeneration” in American literature is uncertain in his essay.  Ellison’s 
pessimism in “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” makes 1965 seem a long way from the ethos of rebirth 
Americans felt in 1865.  The epigraph this chapter begins with clearly conveys this sense of 
promise.  As the editors wrote in 1865, “it is not the birth of the nation we now commemorate 
but its regeneration.”   
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In this chapter, I will read Ellison’s essay “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” as an allegorical 
staging of America’s historical and literary continuity with the “renaissance” past through the 
figure of Hamlet.  As my reading of Ellison’s essay will show, placing America in this past 
proves as tenuous for post-Civil War America as it does of America in 1965.  In Ellison’s 
version of Hamlet, Lincoln occupies the role of the King of Denmark and Ellison’s dream-self, a 
“literate-slave” is an orphaned Hamlet.  Lincoln and Hamlet represent America’s connection to 
what F.O. Matthiessen conceptualizes as the “rebirth” of democratic sentiment.  In “Tell It Like 
It Is, Baby,” Ellison expresses his pessimism about this figure’s capability to be reborn.  
Ellison’s pessimism makes “Tell It Like It Is, Baby,” a counter narrative to F.O. Matthiessen’s 
version of America’s literary continuity with the humanistic past.  Matthiessen, like Emerson 
before him invokes Hamlet as a tragic figure to establish this continuity in American 
Renaissance
A little over 600 years after Petrarch received his crown of laurels on Easter Sunday and 
within the very same city which symbolically cradled the renaissance, Ellison began a novel 
.  Replacing Hamlet with a “literate slave,” the essay reveals Ellison’s attempt to 
infuse the “tortuous ambiguity” of the Civil War into Matthiessen’s version of American literary 
traditions and their historic relationship to Renaissance Humanism.  Through archival research in 
Ralph Ellison’s Papers at the Library of Congress, I show that Ellison began writing this counter-
narrative in 1954, a year before he began writing the essay at the American Academy in Rome 
and 10 years before “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” is published. By looking through the syllabi and 
lecture notes from a course he taught as part of the Salzburg Seminar in America Studies in 
Austria, we can see the continuity of thought linking Ellison’s revision of Matthiessen’s 
“American Renaissance” to the ideas about American literary tradition he takes up in “Tell It 
Like It Is Baby.” 
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about assassination and contemplated the contemporary problem of racial segregation.  And even 
the scene Ellison would have been gazing upon in 1955 would have been reminiscent of 
Petrarch’s own.  Perched on Janiculum Hill where the American Academy was located, Ellison 
was immersed in the most complex, intertwining of historical events.  Rome, the origin of a past 
Renaissance and where Petrarch attempted to revive his aging city through summoning ancient 
republican spirits was the center of the most anti-humanist and death-dealing movements of the 
Twentieth century, Fascism.  Ten years removed from the war, the city, in a scene repeated 
throughout Eastern and Western Europe was emerging out of ruins, both physical and 
metaphorical.   
Petrarch, who in 1341 stood over ruins of another sort in a cow pasture checkered with 
the fragments of Rome’s republican past, used the words of Virgil, the oratory of Cicero and the 
stanzas of Ovid to begin his poetic rebirth of Rome.  In 1955, much of Rome and Italy’s rebirth 
out of more recent ruins was under the watchful eyes of the Marshall Plan, the CIA and the US 
State Department.  America’s presence in Rome created what historian Paul Ginsborg in A 
History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988 called Italy’s uneasy mix of 
“Catholicism, Americanism and anti-communism,” (Ginsborg 182).  Ellison was at the American 
Academy on a grant to continue writing a novel that would eventually become Juneteenth.  
Ellison’s fictional interest in a holiday marking the day enslaved blacks in Galveston, Texas 
were told – albeit two years late – that they were free might seem out of place in Rome.  
However, at the beginning and end of the Civil War America has similarly given and taken of the 
pool of “renaissance” ideas and figures in Italy.  Giuseppe Garibaldi’s Brigades who fought for 
freedom on the Italian Peninsula also fought at Gettysburg during the American Civil War.  
Mazzini, rather graciously, wrote of the United States that “Your triumph is our triumph; the 
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triumph of all, I hope, who are struggling for the advent of a republican era…The abolition of 
slavery binds you to the onward march of mankind; and the admiration of all Europe calls you to 
take your rank – leading one- in that onward march”.  An emblematic event in Rome 
encapsulates the complex web woven by these things.  Three years after the end of the 
Risorgimento in 1870, the capstone for the first official Episcopalian Church within the walls of 
Rome was laid.  On a road whose name commemorated the founding of the new nation itself, the 
pastors of St. Paul’s Church commissioned Edward Burne-Jones, a member of the Pre-
Raphaelite Brotherhood, to complete a mosaic cycle in the apse.  Among the many mosaics in 
the cycle, the one entitled “The Church on Earth” is the most interesting.  In a mixture of styles 
owing to both pre-Raphaelite and renaissance characteristics, the mosaic is divided into five 
groups of persons representing the hierarchical classes comprising Christendom.  For the lowest 
register – made up of those Christian soldiers who provide the bulwark of peace and stable 
government – Burne-Jones utilized the Renaissance tradition and borrowed the visages of 
contemporaries in order to represent the patron saints/soldiers of Western countries.  The saints 
and soldiers joining one another in the defense of the Christendom on earth were, amongst others 
Garibaldi, J.P. Morgan, Ulysses S. Grant (then President) and Abraham Lincoln. 
Whether Ellison visited St. Paul’s – which was mere blocks from The American 
Academy in Rome – is unknown.  But it would have undoubtedly whetted his interest since it 
represented what he – like Walter Benjamin – called the spiral of history.  J.P. Morgan, chief 
architect of U.S. government financing during reconstruction, slave owner and philanthropist 
mingled with Garibaldi, the twice exiled Italian nationalist, who once repulsed a French attack on 
Janiculum Hill.  Grant – the war-time general turned President – joined Lincoln the Great 
Emancipator.  In the mosaic, Protestantism and the free-market, military might, anti-papist 
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radicalism, slavery and claims of African-American suffrage all conjoin to unite the secular 
plane with the sacred.  This mingling of ideas, the use of renaissance styles of visual 
representation, and the identification of Christendom with the architects of our modern nation-
state reveals the complicated present American slavery created.  Generating the centrifugal force 
to draw these far-flung men together is a dense, yet invisible center not represented in the 
mosaic.  That center, which would be understood as the “Negro problem” in the Twentieth 
century contained the newly created concerns of U.S. state power, its legitimacy as a democratic 
global force and what Manzzini above called “the onward march of mankind.” 
Since Manzzini’s comments in 1865 there is no question that America had taken the lead 
as a global power by 1955.  However, whether or not this lead had signified the “onward march 
of mankind” is uncertain.  Despite America’s military and political presence at the symbolic 
place of the West’s first “renaissance” and its participation in a global post-WWII democratic 
renaissance, Ellison begins “Tell It Like It Is Baby” wondering how far this “onward march” has 
traveled.  As he cites in the preface to that essay, the problem continues to emanate from the very 
moment Manzzini and others saw ushering in our “republican era,” the Civil War.  For Ellison, 
the end of the war and the failure of Reconstruction were political tragedies whose effects have 
“foreshadowed the tenor of the ninety years to follow,” (Ellison 30).   And as such, puts in doubt 
the applicability of such linear and anthropomorphic adjectives (“onward march”) to describe the 
movement of American ideas and history after the Civil War.  The most enduring example of 
this tragedy and how it has affected the direction of history was the persistence of segregation.  
Segregation represents what Ellison calls the “psychic forces” left over from the nineteenth 
century that need to be “dispersed or humanized,” (Ellison 30).  But he saw these “forces” as a 
problem the south specifically posed to the Union.  The “South,” represented more to Ellison 
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than a political problem or geographical space.  It was also where Ellison attempts to think the 
enigmatic aspect of what defines America’s modern identity after the Civil War.   
Ellison’s description of the American south as a “force,” shows how that region 
represents such an enigmatic power.  The political, material and social inequalities encapsulated 
in the “south,” during the 1960s define for Ellison realms “in so practical and…so far removed 
an area as that of foreign policy,” (Ellison 31).  The coincidence between modern racial 
segregation and America’s dubious foreign policy during the 1960s created what Ellison called a 
“great clashing,” which when regarding “Asia and Africa makes for an atmosphere of dream-like 
irrationality” (31).  Collapsing these national and international spaces, the effect of this force 
presents a fundamental political problem in America’s democratic actions at home and abroad.  
As Ellison notes, his interest in this force and the state of affairs it creates is aesthetic.  The 
movement beginning with slavery’s end to African-American freedom cannot be attributed to a 
progressive re-imagining of the social or political terms of humanism; and perhaps for this 
reason Ellison describes it as both a “force” and “tenor” in the first couple of pages of his essay.  
The use of these non-material terms, both of which belong to the realm of physics and music 
respectively, is as much an attempt to describe how democratic power works domestically 
(segregation) as a description of how America’s democratic power has assumed this “southern” 
aspect globally.  In other words, what about United States “democracy” simultaneously 
expresses this “southern” force and tenor?  Without question there is a historical and political 
record.  As Ellison has often argued, this begins with the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877.  In 
exchange for a Republican presidential victory, the Compromise effectively cemented Southern 
legislative power in US State.  Further, it ended Radical Reconstruction, ushered in the 
segregation of Jim Crow/the Black Codes and combined the terroristic violence of lynching with 
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predatory economic violence.  These acts have created the conscious architecture to the modern 
problems of “inequality” Ellison identifies in the essay.   
The aesthetic question Ellison asks at the beginning of “Tell It Like It Is Baby,” is how 
one incorporates the “tortuous ambiguity” attributed to the South’s historical legacy into an 
adequate representation of America (Ellison 31).  Ellison saw this poetic conundrum as another 
“great clashing,” between romantic images of the South.  On the one hand the Confederacy saw 
its fight for “states rights” as the purest expression of American freedom.  Yet, its defense of 
slavery, which rested at the heart of its declaration of rights, was the purest expression of human 
domination.  In an extended passage worth quoting in its entirety, Ellison goes on to describe the 
effect of this “tortuous ambiguity”:  
If we honestly say ‘Southerner,’ then we must, since most Negroes are also 
Southerners, immediately add white Southerners.  If we say ‘white South’ our 
recognition that the ‘white south’ is far from solid compels us to specify which 
white South we mean.  And so on for the North and for the Negro until even the 
word ‘democracy’ – the ground-term for our concept of justice, the basis of our 
scheme of social rationality, the rock upon which our society was built – changes 
into its opposite, depending upon who is using it, upon his color, racial identity, 
the section of the country in which he happened to have been born, or where and 
with whom he happens to be at the moment of utterance.  These circumstances 
have, for me at least, all of the elements of a social nightmare, a state of civil war, 
an impersonal and dreamlike chaos.  To what then, and in his own terms, does a 
Negro writer turn when confronting such chaos – to politics, history, sociology 
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anthropology, art?  War it has been said, is a hellish state; so, too is equivocation, 
that state in which we live…,” (31-2, emphasis Ellison’s).         
We could read especially the start of this paragraph as merely Ellison’s oft-expressed anxiety 
about categorical thought, especially when it comes to determining human identity.  His interest 
in the problem of identity is clearly symptomatic of something deeper and more profound.  What 
is most striking about his description of this “tortuous ambiguity,” is the language of war and 
particularly “civil War” that Ellison uses to describe this “ambiguous” state.   This is not the first 
time Ellison has had recourse to the language of war and civil war in order to articulate his 
understanding of America’s “state.”  In the introduction to a reprint of Stephan Crane’s The Red 
Badge of Courage titled “Stephen Crane and the Mainstream of Fiction,” (1960) Ellison further 
explicates this idea of America as constituted by the Civil War and as being a “state” of civil 
war.  He describes it as the “great shaping event” of America’s political and economic life, but 
he also remarks that unlike the antebellum period when the nation could “pretend to a unity of 
values,” the post-bellum period for Ellison finds America “consciously divided” (Ellison 119).  
The character of the United States from the post-bellum period until 1960 leads Ellison to remark 
that “if war, as Clausewitz insisted, is the continuation of politics by other means,” then 
American life has been defined by an “abrupt reversal of that formula” so that the Civil War has 
been continued by “means other than arms” (119).  Within such a state, Ellison further remarks, 
“the line between civil war and civil peace has become so blurred as to require of the sensitive 
man a questioning attitude toward every aspect of the nation’s self image,” (119).  Throughout 
his description of what this reversal of Clausewitz’s maxim means, Ellison utilizes the language 
of war to describe the dynamics of American politics after Reconstruction.  The South carries on 
its “aggression” towards the North in the form of “guerrilla politics,” the North “retreats swiftly” 
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into the “vast expanse of its new industrial development,” (119). Judging from these two essays, 
from 1955 and 1965 respectively, Ellison’s writings were preoccupied with understanding two 
fundamental characteristics of modern American life.  The first is recognizing the “state” of 
American political and social life as a reversal of Clausewitz’s formulation so that political life 
became war by means other than arms.  Second, is the civil nature of that war, which sees the 
conflict as composed of politicized combatants whose actions of war seems like acts of peace.   
By using the language of war to understand statecraft, Ellison joins a long genealogy of 
thought concerned with how power and sovereignty manifest themselves in the modern nation 
state.  Recently published works by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben attest to the history 
and current interest in such questions.22
                                                            
22 In Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended Lectures at the College de France 1975-76, (2004) the use of “war” as a 
model to assess the workings of power is his attempt to develop a way to analyze politics in civil society that shies 
away from non-economic, “repressive” and materialist conceptions of power relations, (Foucault, 13-17.)  In all 
three of these things, Foucault argues, there is a tendency to see power relations mimicking the commodity form, 
and something to be owned or eliminated.  The viability of this model has been eclipsed by the challenge modernity 
presented to traditional sovereign modes of power.  Presenting Hobbes’ figure of the “leviathan” as the ideal model 
for the modern sovereign state, Foucault wants to move away from Hobbes’ idea that sovereignty and the legalistic 
claims to “right” contained within it exist in an attempt to end the battle of “every man against every man”, 
(Foucault, 89-90.)  The State’s foundation no longer guarantees the end of hostilities through an exercise of 
sovereign “reason.”  Its foundation is out of the circumstance of and institutions of war so that politics in civil 
society constitute war’s continuation by other forms of domination and violence.  Even more pertinent to what 
Ellison was thinking during the 1950’s is Foucault’s similar observation that it is the discourse of race and the “race 
war,” which is key to understanding the modern states formation and its new model of sovereignty based on a war of 
forces.  Race and the bellicose relations between subjects it necessitates most clearly shows the “irrational” tangle of 
forces that make claims to political power and right on the basis of transcendental juridical right (the discourse of 
natural rights for example) while simultaneously revealing the emergence of disciplinary forms of bio-power that 
clash and contend with these claims (Foucault, 81.)  In the Nineteenth and Twentieth century “race” is a discourse 
sanctioned by the state to re-introduces a mythic element into the battle between groups of people.  The idea of race 
is used to overturn natural rights based upon traditional forms of sovereignty.  What this racial discourse does 
however is simultaneously re-inscribes the sovereign states impulse to repress the revolutionary sentiment and 
protect the purity of both the state and its racial pure make up (Foucault, 82-4.) 
  Both Agamben and Foucault’s assessments are 
Giorgio Agamben’s monograph State of Exception, (2005) also looks toward the modern problem of sovereignty 
through the figure of war and its institutions.  Agamben argues that recent conceptions of state formation, beginning 
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explicitly philosophical meditations on these concerns.  They also bring us to the problem of 
modern sovereignty from European historical traditions that both illuminate but come short of 
explaining America’s own relationship to them.  As in many European assessments of the 
problem of power in the United States, the missing element is a nuanced confrontation with 
America’s “peculiar institution.”  Neither Agamben nor Schmitt are the first writers to 
understand Lincoln’s usurpation of sovereign and juridical powers in such a way.  A 
Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States
                                                                                                                                                                                               
with the French Revolution and stretching through the 20th century, have tended to institutionalize the “emergency 
powers” of rule that are often utilized during moments of war.  Two characteristics of Agamben’s “state of 
exception” resemble Ellison’s description of the “state” of America from the Gilded Age onward.  First is its 
ambiguity, which Agamben calls a “no-man’s-land between public law and political fact and between the juridical 
order and life…” (Agamben, 1.)  Second is the resemblance the “state of exception” has to a legal “civil war, 
insurrection and resistance”, (Agamben, 2.) This later fact is relevant to Agamben’s elaboration of the “state of 
exception’s” history in America, whose precedent was established during the Civil War.  The “sovereign decision” 
making President Lincoln assumed in raising an army and suspending Habeas Corpus called into question the proper 
delegation of powers in Articles One and Two of the Constitution.  According to Agamben, this act set a precedent 
which stretches from Lincoln’s essentially dictatorial act at the onset of the Civil War, through Woodrow Wilson, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to our current presidential administration.   
 
, written by the former Vice President of 
the Confederate States of America, Senator Alexander H. Stephens ponders this very problem at 
the root of Lincoln’s revolutionary act.  What is remarkable about Stephen’s work is what is 
most reprehensible about it; its account of the Civil War’s illegality as an argument to defend 
slavery’s legitimacy.  Not surprisingly, this later point is played down in Stephen’s book.  
Besides the military forces at war, Stephens sees Northern belligerence as the symbolic 
belligerence of consolidated state power and centralized government to individual states rights.  
At a very fundamental level Stephens goes back to a problem resting at the founding of the 
republic, the conflict between strong centralized state powers (Federalists) versus a post-bellum 
form of anti-Federalism contingent seeking a structure of government amenable to more popular 
forms of sovereignty.  By the time Stephens work rehashes this conflict, the original nature of 
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this conflict has changed radically.  This change makes the Southern cries of individual “states 
rights” ironic in fact.  The Southern position of secession, which expressed populist sentiments 
of individual freedom, also expressed the aristocratic and royalist tendencies of Hamilton’s 
Federalism.  In other words, Southern populism hated the very masses that it claimed to speak 
for.23
Stephen’s ideological and political position exemplifies the origins of that tortuous 
ambiguity created out of the Civil War Ellison speaks of.  His one-dimensional but perfectly 
legitimate juridical argument for the illegality of Lincoln’s actions to begin the Civil War is also 
symbolic of the “abrupt reversal” of Clausewitz’s formula in a very literal way.  Lastly and 
perhaps most importantly Stephens, like many Northern and Southern architects of post-
Reconstruction America, reveals how the institutionalization of the “civil war”/Civil War over 
sovereignty and state power was also founded on the management of black populations.  The 
violence and disenfranchisement founded on the category of race becomes the most declarative 
expression of modern sovereignty.  It is also the perilous state upon which America’s glorious 
democratic era was founded.  More profoundly, it suggests that the “Negro,” is the first modern 
figure of the exception.  It is the product of bio-powers’ clash with new forms of sovereign 
power.  Blacks in the post-Civil War era found themselves in what Agamben in the 
   Even more relevant was its foundation upon the most violent form of bio-power, anti-
black racism and modern slavery.  Stephens like Lincoln was a staunch unionist and in fact 
argued against Southern succession from the Union but became a secessionist by default when 
Georgia voted out of the Union in 1861.   
State of 
Exception
                                                            
23 John Calhoun, George Fitzhugh and many other Southern intellectuals looked upon European events in the mid-
nineteenth century with more distain than fear.  In fact, keeping with the founding dilemma of the constitution’s 
framers, Senator Calhoun often questioned the idea that liberty and equality were the key foundations to a “sound 
republic,” calling these ideas the “false conceptions” upon which Europe revolted. 
 called the “no-man’s-land between public law and political fact, and between the 
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juridical order and life…” (Agamben). Here, the line has been blurred between civil war and 
civil peace.   
Judging from these two essays, from 1955 or so to 1965, Ellison’s writings were 
preoccupied with understanding two fundamental characteristics of modern American life.  The 
first is recognizing the “state” of American political and social life as a reversal of Clausewitz’s 
formulation so that political life became war by means other than arms.  Second, is the civil 
nature of that war, which sees the conflict as composed of politicized combatants whose actions 
of war seems like acts of peace.  As we return to the long passage quoted above and the concern 
over democracy defining its center we can now understand the full ramification of what Ellison 
suggests in it. Simply put, Ellison’s concern is what does “democracy” looks like if it too is 
weapon used in America’s “unceasing civil war?”  How are we to come to an understanding of 
“the ground-term for our concept of justice, the basis of our scheme of social rationality,” if the 
essential characteristic of democracy, its promise of equality is capable of changing “into its 
opposite, depending upon who is using it?”  Such is the ambiguity that the south, the Civil War’s 
aftermath and America’s rush to retreat into the Gilded Age represented to Ellison; it became a 
place where the everyday exercise of freedom for blacks and white mirrored acts of a war.  
Because both “Stephen Crane and the Mainstream of American Fiction,” and “Tell It like It Is 
Baby,” are neither political treatise nor works that contemplate the epistemological genealogy of 
such a state of things, there is only the suggestion of what the “opposite” of “democracy” is.  For 
Ellison, segregation’s existence hints at what this opposite looks like.   As he explicitly writes in 
both essays, his concern with this state of civil war in America is concern with what resources 
fictional writer’s have in representing such an ephemeral reality.     
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To be clear, these are the realms where Ellison’s thinking has the potential of taking us, 
but it is not where he necessarily takes himself.  In fact, his approach is emblematic of his 
apprehension of how these concerns of humanism, racism, democracy and Western history 
should be approached in the first place.  And as we look more closely at Ellison’s essay in the 
next section we will see that he comes to precipice of these insights but hesitates.  If we return to 
where we began this section, we can get a clearer sense of how Ellison articulates this problem 
through a meditation on the literary traditions that emerge from these contexts.  In the beginning 
of his essay, segregation, the ambiguity of the south and the consequential “state of civil war,” it 
leaves America is most pertinently a problem of fictional representation for Ellison. In the long 
passage I quoted earlier, Ellison wonders where writers should turn in order to confront the chaos 
that segregation puts us; is it “to politics, history, sociology anthropology, (or) art?” (Ellison 32).  
Here we can see that the political aspect of America’s torturous ambiguity confound Ellison and 
his uncertainty extends into how to represent the truth of this ambiguity.  For this reason, 
Ellison’s use of the adjectives “force” and “tenor,” leads us to belief that positivistic modes of 
representation are important, but not adequate to this task.  Ellison does reference politics, 
history, sociology and anthropology in his essay, but it is ultimately the last of these, “art” that he 
turns to in order to frame his representation of this problem.  As he makes clear, even art and its 
subtitles are challenged by America’s tortuous ambiguity.  Relying on the poetic traditions of the 
past is not a guarantee either since so many of them do not explain, or free us from this torturous 
ambiguity but are its poetic agents.  This uncertainty about art and its traditions leads me back to 
Petrarch.   
Petrarch’s “Oration” was a pivotal moment in the intertwined history of modern 
sovereignty, race and literary humanism.  It is to the Italian Quartocento that the term 
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“renaissance” is first applied and this same period revives – via Cicero – the words humanist and 
humanism to describe the project of resurrecting ancient liberal arts learning and rhetoric.  The 
project of renaissance and humanism are symbolically begun with Francesco Petrarch’s 
coronation as poet laureate amongst the ruins of ancient Rome on Easter Sunday 1341.  By 
reviving, yet democratizing the Latin of Cicero, Virgil and Ovid, Petrarch’s aim was to chart a 
new rhetorical learning, breaking from scholastic dialectical traditions and the “Arab science” of 
the Averroes.  Petrarch’s “Coronation Oration,” while incessantly referential, uses one figure and 
one text consistently, Virgil and the Georgics
As Petrarch’s poetic guide, Virgil also summons a clear allusion to Dante’s use of him in 
.  Virgil’s “sweet longing upwards over the lonely 
slopes…” becomes a metaphor Petrarch uses to describe the Renaissance poets’ task at arduous 
study, (Petrarch).  Petrarch’s Virgil represents both an homage and figure of transition.  In Virgil, 
Christian and medieval ontology concerning God, knowledge and sovereignty are subtlety 
melded with Petrarch’s new learning based on pagan Roman sources and concepts of poetry.  
This was Petrarch’s and the Renaissances most powerful contribution and critique of the Arab 
Averroes.  Since Ibn Mahommed Ibn Roschd’s commentaries analyzed Neo-Platonism and 
sought to keep the divide between philosophy and theology separate, the Renaissance’s break 
with Averroes’ influence during the thirteenth-century was vital to the emergence of Renaissance 
humanism.  Petrarch’s emphasis on Virgil’s “sweet longing” is his way of casting a Christian 
veneer to the secular project of new humanist learning he wants to rescue in fourteenth century 
classicism.   
The Divine Comedy.  With this, Petrarch’s oration clearly marks the establishment of a new 
linguistic, literary and poetic tradition that hints at a nascent form of nationalism and yet attempts 
to establish an unbroken continuity with the Roman republic.  And even here Virgil’s use is 
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relevant since Petrarch’s transposes Virgil’s “love for his fatherland,” to his own longing for an 
Italian “fatherland,” that in the fourteenth century did not exist (Petrarch).  Virgil here acts as an 
expression of the unity between past and present, art and truth, tradition and the new and the 
sacred and the secular; something that Petrarch felt the new humanist learning could achieve.  
But even at this very moment when Petrarch seeks to posit new knowledge and documents upon 
which we erect civilization, like Benjamin says, there is also the dint of barbarism.  With Virgil 
guiding Petrarch’s steps, we must ask which Rome Virgil led Petrarch.  Is it the republican one 
or imperial one which clung closely to the republic’s shadow?  Petrarch’s belief that “nothing 
good ever came out of Arabia” reveals a philosophical and theological conflict (Petrarch 142).  
And as Thomas Hahn in “The Difference the Middle Ages Makes: Color and Race in the Middle 
Ages,” states in counter distinction to Foucault’s reading of the Middle Ages, an already 
emerging epistemology concerning race was emerging to ensure the West’s “pure” antiquity 
(Hahn 27). 
In irony borne out of coincidence, Ellison begins “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” with his own 
Virgil.  This Virgil – a childhood friend from Oklahoma City – is not Ellison’s guide, but instead 
asks Ellison for guidance.  As Ellison writes, Virgil’s letter “expects insight and eloquence and a 
certain quality of attention” in locating American reality understood through the prism of race 
(Ellison).   This black Virgil does provide Ellison guidance through the complex spiral of history 
he is immersed in. The speech in Virgil’s letter is not the model for a burgeoning lingua franca of 
empire, but represents the cast off oratio of the many “exceptions” living in America.  Nor is this 
Virgil a figure meant to mythologize the purity of the historical past as is Petrarch’s.  Instead 
Ellison’s Virgil, in asking to “tell a man how it is,” is asking for an account of the historical 
present defined by America’s “state of civil war.” In 1956, the literal battle lines were drawn 
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between the Supreme Court’s decision ruling Alabama’s segregation laws unconstitutional and 
the protest of this decision in the US Congress.  In 1965, these same battle lines, already 
crisscrossing the globe were extended globally into Indochina and domestically into places like 
Watts.  As Ellison’s essay demonstrates, the task of representing the “how” part of “how it is,” is 
complex.  Is ancient Virgil’s “sweet longing,” a mode of knowledge that defines the Renaissance 
aesthetic desire to present a pure continuum of history this “how?”  For Ellison there is a 
problematic continuity between the Civil War and the wars that would punctuate the twentieth-
century.  All of them invoke this aesthetic of history’s rebirth, the same pure continuum 
suggested in Burne-Jones mix of personages, which, like Petrarch conflates Christian 
iconography with secular figures to give the sense that America’s democratic project coincided 
with God’s special providence.  As we will see, Ellison’s black Virgil might not lead him to 
settle on an aesthetic longing for rebirth, but he does lead him to contemplate it.  For Petrarch 
this longing for renaissance looked like Virgil but in modernity, it took the guise of Hamlet for 
many writers.  It is with Hamlet, the titular figure of modern literary humanism that Ellison 
begins to contemplate the convoluted sense of America’s war-like “renaissance” and the 
exception it has produced. 
As careful reader of Ralph Waldo Emerson, F.O. Matthiessen adopts Hamlet as figure to 
probe the relationship between democracy and “expression.”24  Beyond Emerson’s mention of 
Hamlet in Representative Men
                                                            
24 Matthiessen admits in the beginning of American Renaissance that it is not wholly accurate to characterize the 
writings during Emerson’s mid-19th century as a literary rebirth.  America’s renaissance, he states, is achieved by the 
country “coming to its full maturity and affirming its rightful heritage in the whole expanse of art and culture” 
(Matthiessen, iiv.)  Out of all the writers composing this “rightful heritage,” Shakespeare’s works operate as the 
bridge between the ethical and moral concerns of the classical period and the modern one.  Not only was 
Shakespeare the paradigmatic literary model to imitate for 19th century American authors, but during the 19th 
century Shakespeare occupied the same position of moral instruction in American humanistic pedagogy that Terence 
and Plautus held in Fifteenth Sixteenth century British-Anglo humanistic pedagogy.   
 (1850) a more suggestive invocation of Hamlet – and one apropos 
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to his appearance in Matthiessen’s American Renaissance – appears in a letter Emerson writes to 
his brother in 1854 .  Emerson confesses to his brother that addressing the “dark question of 
Slavery” is equivalent to being assigned “Hamlet’s task,” yet being unable to complete it.  
Curiously, this inadequacy is expressed as a problem of language use.  Emerson writes that he 
knows slave owners will be as un-persuadable as “Sebastopol to a herald’s oration” (Emerson 
484-5).  Unlike his allusion to Hamlet in Representative Men, Emerson uses him in this letter to 
establish an interconnection between literature, language, and history.  In Representative Men, 
Hamlet represented the transcendental mind.  By contrast, In Emerson’s letter to his brother, 
“Hamlet” speaks directly to the problem of nineteenth century American slavery.  On the 
surface, these two instances of Hamlet in Emerson’s writing seem very different.  The 
transcendental Hamlet is indicative of what Emerson calls the horizon “beyond which we can not 
see” and in the letter to his brother Hamlet speaks truth to slavery’s imminent presence, 
(Emerson 257).  Emerson’s “task,” as is Hamlet’s is to set right that which was out of joint with 
his historical present.  America’s peculiar institution for Emerson is the equivalent to the 
unweeded garden in Hamlet’s Denmark.   As the nemesis to America’s symbols of opulence as 
well as the problems of American inequality found in slavery, “Hamlet’s task” in Emerson’s 
letter is to “drum well,” or speak (“drum”) eloquently to slavery.  It is through such high rhetoric 
that he can juxtapose slavery’s darkness to poetry’s divine nature.  As evidenced in Emerson’s 
writings, Hamlet is the figure of America’s tragic yet transcendental democratic possibility.  
Through Hamlet, Emerson expressed his sense that poetic language symbolized a truthful yet 
divine moral order that could reform America.  As Matthiessen and others have shown through 
retracing Emerson’s conception of language, Emerson saw literary language itself as a material 
incarnation.  Following Coleridge, Swedenborg and Carlyle, Emerson’s Romantic philology saw 
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the ultimate goal of language to become one with things; symbols corresponded to nature and 
finally the divine spirit.25
Emerson’s “tragic” Hamlet is not wholly borrowed by Matthiessen.  However, judging 
from where Hamlet appears in 
  Emerson’s theory of language suggests an agonistic relationship 
between language and the fleeting events of history.  In this letter, the transcendental agency 
Emerson associates with language falters since he feels himself an “unfit agent” to effectively 
speak to the problem of slavery.  So, “Hamlet’s task,” which is to speak eloquent words to 
slavery and the products of slave labor becomes an inevitable tragedy.   
American Renaissance, it is clear that Hamlet’s tragic relationship 
to American is retained by Matthiessen.  Matthiessen’s most sustained engagement with Hamlet 
is in his discussion of Herman Melville. The connection Matthiessen makes between Melville 
and Hamlet is connected to his introduction of tragedy and pessimism into the consciousness of 
mid-Nineteenth century writers.  Melville is America’s preeminent skeptical artist and 
Shakespeare is the muse guiding his exploration of tragedy amongst America’s flowering 
democratic possibilities.26
                                                            
25 This sense of language’s use cuts across many of Emerson’s works.  It is most famously represented in “The 
Poet,” the aforementioned “Shakespeare, or the Poet,” “Poetry and Imagination” and many others.  
26 Amongst the numerous criticisms of Matthiessen’s work on this point, the most forceful one is based on the works 
he chose as representative of mid-century democratic possibility.  Most of these critiques come from Feminist and 
African-American literary scholars who see Matthiessen’s omissions establishing the exclusionary nature of 
America’s literary canon.  The two authors brought to the fore in this critique are Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin (1852) and Fredrick Douglass’ Narrative of the Life of Fredrick Douglass, An American Slave, (1845).  
Douglass’ Narrative published in 1845 falls outside of Matthiessen’s historical period but Stowe’s falls right in the 
middle, published the year of Melville’s Pierre, (1852).  Eric Sunquist’s To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making 
of American Literature, (1993) Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, 
(1992) and Ronald Judy’s (Dis)forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the Vernacular, 
(1993) are a few works of criticism that note the absence of African-American literature in Matthiessen’s 
“renaissance.”  Feminist interventions into this debate include, Jane Tompkins’s famous Sensational Designs: The 
Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790-1860, (1985) and Charlene Avallone’s, “What American Renaissance? 
The Gendered Genealogy of a Critical Discourse,” (1997). 
 
  Matthiessen links Melville’s experience in Albany where he saw the 
“contrast between aristocratic pretensions and the actual state of the masses of people…” to his 
“attention to the essential problems of tragedy” (Matthiessen 376).  Galvanizing Melville’s 
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education in skepticism were his sea travels. These, as Matthiessen explains, expose Melville to 
the destructive forces of Western colonialism and predatory modes of commercial capitalism, 
(ibid). All of this rendered Melville into a “Hamlet” whose primary intellectual interest lies in 
sorting out the difference between “what seems and what is,” (376).  In Matthiessen, Melville’s 
task is to understand the American conflict between the possibilities of democracy and its 
practice.  In many ways this is very different than the “task” Emerson assigned to Hamlet.  
However, Matthiessen does not completely cleave the ties between Emerson’s optimism and 
Melville’s criticism of Emerson’s thinking.  What Matthiessen suggests is a link between 
Emerson’s conception of Christ as uniting “suffering and majesty” and Melville the author, who 
takes on the Hamlet-like task of forging a “conception of democratic tragedy” (Matthiessen 634). 
 There is a lot at stake in the connection Matthiessen’s makes between Emerson and 
Melville.  Just as important as establishing a literary continuity, Matthiessen implies that there is 
a moral sensibility intertwined in it.  In other words, despite Melville’s own repudiation of 
Emerson’s optimism, their simultaneous investment in Hamlet –a literary figure whose tragic 
vision metaphorical reveals “what seems and what is” – connects them.  Also, as Jonathan Arac, 
writes, Matthiessen wants to show that America dons the mantle of a specifically international 
and Western tradition of aesthetic expression related to democratic thought (Arac 107).  By 
forging a relationship between Hamlet, Emerson and Melville, Matthiessen connects the literary 
figures of the “renaissance,” to a moral contemplation of democracy and freedom.27
                                                            
27 There is a consensus amongst many later critics that Matthiessen’s American “renaissance” functions as a 
complex misrepresentation or oblique allegory of his own aesthetic, political and moral sensibilities.  The complex 
juggling act between his Christian, socialist sensibilities with the conservative nationalist sentiment he was 
immersed is something I am not sure Ellison was aware of.  But as an intellectual with sympathies to the Popular 
Front, wrote a book on T.S. Eliot and refers to Malraux in the pages of American Renaissance I would not be 
surprised if Ellison was aware of Matthiessen’s complexities.    
  For 
Matthiessen, the question of freedom is a literary discussion of how poetic acts suggest the 
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revelation of democratic sentiments within the American cultural imagination.  What we need to 
sort out is how Hamlet determines the shape and aspect of such a literary history and the 
historical consciousness it generates.  As many critics of Matthiessen’s American Renaissance
The consequences of Emerson and Matthiessen’s use of Hamlet are raised in Ellison’s 
intellectual work immediately after the publication of 
 
note, there is an imminent political dimension to Matthiessen crafting his “renaissance” with the 
authors and in the terms he does.  Matthiessen and those of his generation watched as Fascism 
took hold in Europe.  So they sought to create a tradition of American literature to reaffirm our 
own realized possibilities of democracy as a bulwark against what was occurring in Europe.  
Donald Pease has outlined in “Moby Dick and the Cold War,” that there is an inherently “statist” 
dimension to this element of Matthiessen’s “renaissance” (Pease 118).  If this is the case, Hamlet 
then becomes a more relevant figure to think about the historical relationship literature has to the 
democratic project in America.  The centrality Emerson has to Matthiessen’s ideas about 
American literature should give us pause to the concerns raised by Matthiessen’s critics.  Does 
Matthiessen’s “renaissance of the renaissance,” which draws a direct relationship between 
America and the long tradition of Western literature, explain the United States’ emergence in 
modernity?  Or, does Matthiessen successfully generate a historical understanding of literature 
that is imminent to the American present and the real problem of freedom within its democratic 
experiment?  If Hamlet has existed in the US literary imagination as a figure expressing the 
tragic texture of America’s democratic project is he adequate to express how this project looks 
after the Civil War?  Is Hamlet the figure capable of illuminating the American conflict between 
democracy’s promise and the presence of oppression and racism? 
Invisible Man (1952).  A year before 
Ellison began writing “Tell It Like It Is Baby” at the American Academy in Rome; he was 
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invited to teach a series of lectures for the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies in Austria 
during the summer of 1954.28  The individual seminar topics ranged from courses on American 
Political Science to “The Sources of American Music in Europe.”  If there was a general 
thematic between all of these seminars, it was their specific treatment of what Avery Craven 
called in his lecture topic, “The Emergence of Modern America” (Ellison, “Miscellaneous”).  
Ellison’s particular contribution to the Seminar was two-fold: a series of lectures over six weeks 
titled "The Role of the Novel in Creating the American Experience," and a seminar “The 
Background of American Negro Expression” (“Miscellaneous”).  Through the various materials 
left behind from his time in Austria we can trace his sustained engagement with Matthiessen, 
Emerson and Hamlet.  Particularly noteworthy about Ellison’s reading list is the inclusion of 
Matthiessen’s American Renaissance.  For Ellison, as is clear from the general title of his lecture 
series, he was interested in the novel’s role in expressing individualism and in “creating the 
American experience, (“Miscellaneous”).  Besides Kenneth Burke’s The Philosophy of Literary 
Form and Counter Statement,
                                                            
28 The Salzburg Seminar in American Studies did not begin as an official instrument of American Cold War policy.  
It was established in 1947 by the Harvard University Council and was for a moment independent of U.S. State 
control.  In fact, F.O. Matthiessen (who was teaching at Harvard at the time), as well as Alfred Kazin both taught at 
the Seminar in its early years.  As Reinhold Wagnleitner writes in, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The 
Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War (1994) at some point, the U.S. Army 
and the State Department, in its effort to create “ideological conformity,” exerted veto power over who could and 
could not be invited to teach at the Seminar (Wagnleitner, 165).  Identified as “fellow travelers,” Matthiessen and 
Kazin were not invited back to the Salzburg Seminar.  This makes Ellison’s presence there in 1954 even more 
intriguing since Ellison himself could be considered a “fellow traveler.”  Ellison’s presence at the Seminar, 
juxtaposed to Matthiessen’s expulsion sheds light on many of his Cold War activities which brought him in close 
proximity to the CIA funded Congress for Culture Freedom.  Thus far, only Lawrence Jackson’s, “Ralph Ellison's 
Integrationist Politics,” (2003), and James Smethhurst “‘Something Warmly, Infuriatingly Feminine': Gender, 
Sexuality, and the Work of Ralph Ellison,” (2004), discuss Ellison’s relationship to these institutions.       
 Matthiessen’s book was the only one specifically concerned with 
American literary criticism on the reading list. 
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But what Ellison does with Matthiessen in the lectures is a bit of a mystery.  The 
surviving lecture notes do not clearly suggest how Matthiessen was integrated into Ellison’s 
teaching.  From the fragmentary lecture notes left in his archive, a few suggestions can be made 
to link Ellison’s thinking during the Salzburg Seminar to his concern with Hamlet, in “Tell It 
Like It Is Baby.”  Ellison’s use of Matthiessen is interesting since the reading list is a significant 
departure from Matthiessen’s “renaissance” moment.  Throughout his writings, Ellison had an 
ambiguous relationship to the authors composing Matthiessen’s “renaissance.”  On the one hand, 
in “The Novel as a Function of American Democracy,” (1967) he calls them reminders that we 
were just “actors in long continued action which started before history and which, through some 
miracle…, we hoped human society could make a leap forward” (Ellison, 758-9).  Ultimately 
Ellison saw Emerson and the others composing Matthiessen’s renaissance as part of an older, 
“lyrical” sensibility.  By the time the Civil War emerges, Ellison felt they could no longer 
address the catastrophic crisis the Civil War and slavery presented to the United States (Ellison 
759).  For Ellison, the Civil War and its authors should be the proper benchmark for 
understanding America’s full “maturity,” literary or otherwise.  Matthiessen did not write much 
about the War since his study of American literature is confined to a narrow period of time in the 
decade before the Civil War.  And for reasons noted in the body of criticism about Matthiessen, 
the war did not hold a central place in either Matthiessen’s work or much of the literary criticism 
of the Twenties and Thirties.29
                                                            
29 The Civil War’s omission from Matthiessen’s American Renaissance is remarkably glaring.  Matthiessen’s 
omission is often read within the context of the aforementioned “juggling” he did of his political sensibilities.  It 
should be noted that historiography concerning the Civil War and Reconstruction leading up to American 
Renaissance’s publication in 1936 were revisionist in nature.  Called the Dunningite School after Columbia 
University’s William Archibald Dunning, many of these works interpreted the failure of Reconstruction as the 
consequence of bestowing universal suffrage on enslaved African-Americans.  This period of historical scholarship 
spanned the late nineteenth century with the publication of Dunning’s own Essays on the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (1898) and Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865–1877 (1907) through the Thirties.  
  Despite this relatively large gulf concerning historical period as 
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well as their respective canons of authors, Ellison and Matthiessen do share a concern over how 
European literary traditions are received and applied in America.  And in turn, it is American 
literature and the criticism of it that places America within this “whole expanse in world art and 
expression,” (Matthiessen iiv).   
Besides Melville’s presence, the other authors in Matthiessen’s book do not appear in 
Ellison’s course.  Of Melville’s works it is “Benito Cereno” that appears on his syllabus.  Ellison 
does add two writers excluded from Matthiessen’s “renaissance,” Fredrick Douglass and Harriet 
Beecher Stowe.  Melville, Stowe and Douglass join Francis Gierson, Abraham Lincoln, George 
Washington Cable, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ambrose Bierce to form the representative 
bedrock of modern America’s literary experience.30
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Although Matthiessen was neither part of this school nor the politics of Dunning, this milieu is worth noting 
nonetheless.    
30 It is clear that Ellison is borrowing his content from the essays that would later make up Edmund Wilson’s 
Patriotic Gore (1962.)   But interestingly enough, Wilson’s work does not appear in Ellison’s syllabus.  Ellison most 
likely acquainted himself with Wilson’s musings on Civil War literature from the chapter drafts of Patriotic Gore 
that appeared in The New Yorker starting in 1951.  When Ellison finally published “Tell It Like It Is Baby” in The 
Nation, Patriotic Gore had already been in publication for three years.  In fact, Edmund Wilson makes an appearance 
in Ellison’s dream.  Whether this was something he included before or after is uncertain.  If anything, it adds 
strength to my argument that Ellison is staging a confrontation with Matthiessen’s antebellum “renaissance.”    
  Retaining Melville from Matthiessen’s 
work is relevant in detecting Ellison’s desire to shift the historical and geographic locus for 
locating America’s “modern” origins.  Within the scattered fragments of lecture notes, Ellison 
writes: “Melville, Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne…all of a period, all New Englanders….John 
Brown…Problem of Whiteness…White as evil…The problem of Prometheus…where must we 
stop?  The failure of American Democracy…” (Ellison “Miscellaneous”).  Clearly, the grouping 
of authors, period and geography point to Matthiessen.  The historical frame around which 
Ellison puts these authors differs from Matthiessen.  In this same group of notes Ellison writes, 
“The 19th century…slavery becomes a pro…Americans the inheritors of that guilt which springs 
from [wealth?]  Then the violence done the Indians, And now the growth of Negro slavery…” 
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(Ellison “Miscellaneous”).  It is evident here Ellison sought to complicate the nature of 
America’s literary inheritance and continuity with history.  There were lines of influence 
Matthiessen attempted to delineate between the classical tradition, Shakespeare and U.S. authors.  
Understanding the possibilities of democracy in art for Ellison also meant dealing with the 
presence of democracy’s opposite.  In other words, how did chattel slavery and racism determine 
America’s reception and possibilities of literary expression?    
Even if Ellison’s use of Melville signifies an agreement with Matthiessen’s tragic reading 
of him, Melville is transformed through Ellison’s concern with how race and slavery impact 
American literary expression.  We can see this in Ellison’s reference to John Brown’s presence 
in American Renaissance.  Linking Brown with Melville shows the connection Ellison wanted to 
draw between the rather narrow, New England aspects of Matthiessen’s book to a larger, 
geographic assessment of American democratic feeling.  Despite being a marginal figure in 
American Renaissance, Brown embodies the continuum of American democratic eloquence and 
action for all five authors in Matthiessen’s book.  Matthiessen draws attention to Emerson’s 
acknowledgment that Brown’s tragically short life expressed the sanctity of America’s 
democratic experiment.  But as Ellison notes, Brown and Melville lead us toward the symbolic 
and moral problem of “whiteness.”  Democracy’s failure, “Negro slavery” and the Southern 
influence on modern American literature signals that Ellison’s interest in whiteness goes beyond 
the brilliant array of literary and metaphysical references Matthiessen sees in Melville 
(Matthiessen 290).  Brown’s literal and figurative movement from North to South symbolically 
extends the New England roots of this “democratic possibility” throughout the US and finally 
into direct and bloody conflict with Southern slave power.  Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry 
showed that in the mid-nineteenth century, the problem of “whiteness” in America was not just 
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metaphysical but one already made flesh though the institutional and juridical forces of slavery.31  
It is no coincidence that from Melville and Brown, Ellison would add Stowe and especially 
Douglass in order to read back into Matthiessen’s renaissance the counter narrative of the New 
England’s “democratic possibility.”  This wider, particularly Southern post-bellum sensibility is 
detected on Ellison’s reading list through the writings of Cable, Bierce and Lincoln.  Also, this 
Southern aspect allows us to focus on the interconnected nature of the “problem of whiteness.” 
As a symbol, it has literary and institutional meaning in mid-nineteenth century America.  And 
clearly this problem still endures into Ellison’s present under the banner of segregation as well as 
narrow conceptions of American literary history.  By coupling Moby Dick
                                                            
31 As a figure, which breaks through the myopia of Matthiessen’s “renaissance” conceptualization, Ellison’s use of 
John Brown echoes W.E.B. Dubois’s characterization of Brown in his tragically ignored biography, John Brown 
(1909).  Seen this way, Ellison not only expands the geographic dimensions of Matthiessen’s understanding of 
American literature, he also shifts the international dimensions of it as well.  This is how Dubois begins his 
biography of Brown:   
 
“The mystic spell of Africa is and ever was over all America.  It has guided her hardest work, 
inspired her finest literature, and sung her sweetest songs.  Here greatest destiny – unsensed and 
despised though it be, – is to give back to the first of continents the gifts which Africa of old have 
to America’s fathers’ fathers.//Of all inspiration which America owes to Africa, however, the 
greatest by far is the score of heroic men whom the sorrows of these dark children called the 
unselfish devotion and heroic self-realization: Benezet, Garrison and Harriet Stowe; Sumner, 
Douglass and Lincoln – these and others, but above all Brown.” (Dubois 1). 
 
By placing the above quote beneath an epigraph from Exodus (“Out of Egypt have I called My son”), Dubois 
insinuates that Brown joins a multiracial and international grouping of people called out from Egypt to free those 
who are enslaved.  It is perhaps fitting that Dubois titled the first chapter of his book “Africa and America.”  It is 
uncertain whether Ellison would have read Dubois’s biography, but it is clear that Ellison is using Brown to spatially 
displace the origins of America’s call to democratic possibilities.            
’s section on “The 
Whiteness of the Whale,” and “Benito Cereno,” Ellison performs a makeover of Melville.  
Situating him in this way, he can read into Melville, a more direct genealogical and institutional 
critique of “whiteness,” adding another historical dimension to the stylistic reading of these 
symbols we see in Matthiessen’s work.  In other words, through Brown and Melville, Ellison 
interjects the problem of racism into the heart of Matthiessen’s “renaissance” and Emerson’s 
version of tragedy.  What Ellison keeps intact from Matthiessen is the Shakespearian dimensions 
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out of which he sees Melville’s tragic art.  Ellison takes Hamlet’s task as Melville does, to probe 
“the very axis of reality.”  However, by highlighting John Brown’s and Melville’s presence in 
American Renaissance,
Ellison’s activities during the Salzburg Seminar allow us connect his thoughts in Austria 
to the work he began on “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” in Rome the next year.  The tragic, but still 
nascent democratic possibility Matthiessen expressed in 
 Ellison illuminates the historical and representational problems racism 
and slavery present to the writing of nineteenth century American literature.  
American Renaissance is already being 
infused with what Ellison would later called the South’s “torturous ambiguity” (Ellison. 31). 
Here we can see that the political aspect of America’s “torturous ambiguity” confounded Ellison.  
In his engagement with Matthiessen’s American Renaissance, Ellison recognizes the existence of 
this “tortuous ambiguity” in fiction and applies it to the Matthiessen’s work.  This ambiguity for 
Ellison points – to invoke a dramaturgical term – a fatal flaw in America’s “renaissance”, 
especially after the Civil War.  From the loose, fragmentary notes that remain from his prepared 
lectures, we see that Ellison attempted to distill out of Matthiessen’s reading of Melville “the 
problem of whiteness…white as evil,” so as to illuminate the foundation of power developing in 
America during the nineteenth century and extending into Ellison’s segregationist present.  
Ellison’s interest in the literary and representational styles of America’s “renaissance” authors 
was to see whether their style spoke adequately to the historical situation they found themselves 
in.  Out of all of them, Melville’s novels seemed to point toward an adequate style to represent 
this state of affairs.  It is through Melville that Ellison can link this New England constellation of 
writers to a larger understanding of American literature.  Ellison’s course creates an American 
(in a geographic and stylistic sense) portrait of literary expression where Matthiessen’s 
“democratic possibility” is exposed to writers that complicate this possibility.  In doing so I see 
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Ellison – like Matthiessen and Emerson before him – also engaged in “Hamlet’s task.”  Melville 
does tell the tale of tragedy for Ellison as he does for Matthiessen.  However, by remaking 
Melville and thereby Hamlet, Ellison also allows us to think about Hamlet’s adequacy as such a 
representative figure.32
Closely reading Ellison’s essay we find within it many of the concerns from the Salzburg 
Seminar.  Not only do the themes of literary traditions emerge, but also the need to historical and 
geographically re-imagine what constitutes representative “American” literature.  Within the 
midst of all this Ellison drops a tragic figure in the mold of Hamlet.  But as I will show, Ellison’s 
use of this figure should be read as the ultimate act of re-imagining Matthiessen’s vision of 
America’s place within the Western democratic possibility.  “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” starts in the 
Twenties with Ellison going to visit his dead father’s body in Oklahoma City as a child.  
Following an ambiguous, ghostly apparition assumed to be his father, the scene quickly 
transforms into a “dark colonial alley” outside of Ford’s Theater on the April evening of 
Lincoln’s assassination in 1865.  Ellison describes this scene as “though a book of nineteenth-
century photographs had erupted into life” (Ellison 34).  Just when this “child” Ellison is within 
eye-line of this ambiguous figure, the essay shifts into a stream of consciousness where Ellison 
finds himself back in Oklahoma City looking at his father for the last time before he dies.  The 
dream swiftly shifts from Ellison’s contemplation of his father death in Oklahoma City back to 
Washington in time for him to witness Lincoln’s assassination and lynching by a wild mob.  
   
                                                            
32 Melville’s 1852 novel Pierre or the Ambiguities is parody of both Emersonian Transcendentalism as well as 
Hamlet.  Outside of Sacvan Bercovitch’s discussion of Pierre in Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic 
Construction of America, (1993) most Pierre criticism does not picked up on Melville’s engagement with the 
aesthetic relationship between European literature and America’s own sense of mythos.  Melville performs a not so 
subtly engagement with the connection between poetics and race through his characterization of the Glendenning 
family.    
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These swift juxtapositions are represented seamlessly enough for the “child” Ellison to 
momentarily confuse Lincoln with his own dying father (34).  
Besides the establishment of filial identification between Ellison’s father and Lincoln 
there is a geographic palimpsest the essay suggests.  The place where Ellison begins to write this 
essay, Rome is layered on top of the double scenes of action, Oklahoma City (Ellison’s 
birthplace) and Washington D.C. (where Lincoln is assassinated) in the essay.  As the essay 
moves forward, it is clear that Washington D.C. is the center of action despite this juxtaposition 
of national (Oklahoma) and international (Italy) spaces.  This geographic register also remarks 
upon two other relevant elements of the essay.  First is the staging of the dream at the center of 
American political power, the nation’s capital.  In this essay as well as in Invisible Man, Ellison 
deploys tropes that create an interconnected sensibility about America.  In Invisible Man, the key 
moment in that description is in Chapter Seven, where Ellison says that “unseen lines” run from 
his school to Manhattan, or South to North (Ellison 168).  Invisible Man created an imaginative 
space where the figures, institutions and instances of power are configured as a de-centered 
circuit filled with relays, loops and repetitions.33
                                                            
33 Recent work on Ellison, namely by Herman Beavers’ “Documenting Turbulence: The Dialectics of Chaos in 
Invisible Man,” (2004) and Yonka Krasteva’s “Chaos and Pattern in Ellison’s Invisible Man,” (1997) attempt to link 
Ellison to the recent scholarship of late Cold War literature and its figural relationship to “chaos theory.”  Two 
books in the last fifteen years, Gordon Slethaug’s Beautiful Chaos: Chaos Theory and Metachoaotics in Recent 
America Fiction, (2000) and N. Katherine Hayles’, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and 
Science, (1990) have done this work on a larger scale.  Throughout Ellison’s works there is a meditation on “chaos” 
and more specifically, how literature is a form that controls the worlds “chaos.”  Perhaps his most eloquent 
explication of this is in “Society, Morality and the Novel,” (1957).  Beavers and Kristeva’s attempts are part of the 
rehabilitative efforts to make Ellison somehow “post-modern.”  Hence, Ellison can be periodized with 
contemporaries like John Barth, Thomas Pynchon, Ishmael Reed and others.  Not only was Ellison hostile towards 
the styles these authors represented, but it is a denial of his very modernist roots in Eliot, James, Pound, Faulkner, 
and others.  If there is a scientific figure that Ellison deploys in interesting ways, it is the very modernist figure the 
radio circuit.  His use of this figure in the interview “The Same Pain, That Same Pleasure,” draws allusions to Henry 
James’ idea of the “circuit of life.”  
  But in the essay we have a different 
conception.  Here, Ellison’s idea of history’s spiral appears to be a more apt metaphor than it 
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does in the novel.  While time does loop in the novel, Ellison renders in upon a two dimensional 
plane stretching from South to North and back again.   
In the essay however, space and time folds upon each other.  Unlike the de-centered 
geographic element that Ellison portrays in Invisible Man the essay presents Washington D.C. as 
a geographic center.  Ellison’s interest in re-conceptualizing the imaginative space of American 
literary history and displacing Matthiessen’s New England context is represented by the 
imaginative space of Washington D.C.  By contentiously using Edmund Wilson’s Patriotic Gore 
against Matthiessen’s American Renaissance, during the Salzburg Seminar we saw this re-
conceptualization at work.   While Washington D.C. is the symbolic and political center of 
America’s democratic sensibility, it is also an in-between space that symbolizes the intertwined 
nature of American space and power.  Historically, while both Delaware and Maryland stayed in 
the Union they, including Washington D.C., remained slave territories albeit under martial law.  
This in-between sense is already conveyed in Invisible Man.  When rebuking the Vet who 
“cures” Mr. Norton, Crenshaw tells him that “you ain’t going North, not the real north.  You 
going to Washington.  It’s just another Southern town” (Ellison 154).  All of this makes Ellison’s 
appearance in the dream as a “literate slave child” even more relevant since, by the time Lincoln 
was assassinated slavery had not been abolished in Union territories yet.  Therefore, Ellison is 
both an anachronism in the dream, and yet his own indeterminate status in the dream is reflective 
of the spatial in-between D.C. represents.  For these reasons Washington D.C. is the perfect 
space to invoke the South’s “torturous ambiguity,” which was the imaginative element Ellison 
sought to insert into Matthiessen’s “renaissance.”                  
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From this rumination we can more properly contextualize the dominant themes of 
hereditary and filial belonging that saturate the essay. Besides his biological ties to his father, 
Ellison does not remember enough to detect his father’s imprint on his development.  Ellison’s 
memories of his father are mingled with the public and political memory of Lincoln’s 
assassination.  By confusing his father with Lincoln, Ellison casts his personal sense of familial 
loss into the political uncertainty left in the wake of Lincoln’s death.  Ellison wonders aloud:  
“what quality of love sustains us in our orphan’s loneliness; and how much is thus required of 
fatherly love to give us strength for all our life thereafter?  And what statistics, what lines on 
whose graph can ever convince me that by his death I was fatally flawed and doomed…,” 
(Ellison 35). Whatever his father’s flaws, Ellison is uncertain how to quantify or account for 
them (“what statistics”…“what lines on graph.”)  Lincoln’s death has cast a similar shadow of 
uncertainty on the twentieth century, a century Lincoln “fathered” according to Ellison.  Running 
parallel to his father’s love is another simultaneous act of “fatherly” love, Lincoln’s destruction 
of slavery.  Like Ellison’s uncertainty concerning his father, there are similar feelings as to 
whether Lincoln’s act was enough to sustain a reborn and now orphaned nation.  Just as Ellison 
collapses his private mourning with the public loss of Lincoln, the same collapse happens with 
public history and imaginative literature. The twin loss of Ellison’s father and Lincoln casts a 
shadow of undetermined fate upon the dream Ellison; a fate he casts into tragic dimensions of 
world literature.  In the “epilogue” of “Tell It Like It Is, Baby,” Ellison suggests this happened 
when he fell asleep reading the eminent classicist Gilbert Murray’s The Classical Tradition of 
Poetry.  Lincoln’s martyrdom has generally symbolized our nation’s definitive break with 
Europe and its history.  But Ellison also saw it fitting within the poetic traditions of human 
history.   
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Murray’s chapter on “Hamlet and Orestes” seems the most pertinent to the content of 
Ellison’s dream.  In The Classical Tradition of Poetry
In Murray, Western tradition is sustained through imitation and not invention.  Contained in “the 
children of the poets…artists and the audience” is a figure for the human community sustained 
by the “tradition” (237).  Orestes and Hamlet are literary figures that sustain the unconscious 
poetic solidarity between Homer, Euripides and Shakespeare’s artful reshaping of our ancient 
memories.  Reading Ellison’s essay proves that such “solidarity” with the ages is more tenuous 
for post-bellum America, especially if we are to take his dream as a retelling of 
, Murray compares the son of Agamemnon 
and Hamlet to point to the: 
“process of traditio – that is, of being handed on from generation to generation, 
constantly modified and expurgated, re-felt and rethought – a subject sometimes 
shows a curious power of almost eternal durability.  It can be vastly altered; it 
may seem utterly transformed.  Yet some inherent quality still remains, and 
significant details are repeated quite unconsciously by generation after generation 
of poets” (Murray, 237).     
Hamlet.  In 
Ellison’s version, Lincoln occupies the role of the King of Denmark and Ellison’s dream-self, an 
orphaned Hamlet.  If Lincoln and Hamlet are supposed to represent the continuity of a literary 
humanism and its democratic possibilities Ellison expresses his pessimism about this in the 
essay.  One way Ellison’s pessimism is expressed in “Tell It Like It Is Baby,” is through 
metaphorical allusions to the failure of writing in the essay.  After Lincoln’s assassination in the 
dream, his body, barely clinging to life is not accompanied by the ordered “lines” of dignitaries, 
military men, gentlewomen and freed slaves found in “history book descriptions of the event” 
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(Ellison 34).  Instead, nothing “goes as it was written.” The ordered “lines” become a “mob” 
which quickly metamorphosis into a “carnival…with the corpse become the butt of obscene 
jokes.”  Ellison’s play on the tropes of writing (“lines,” and “book descriptions”) that descend 
into chaos becomes a moment where Ellison illuminates the problem of recalling written records: 
historical, literary or otherwise, (Ellison 36).  The “history book” in this case and the ordered 
“lines” of the sentence are inadequate to convey the complex events the dream is attempting to 
link.  Even Ellison’s description of Oklahoma City before it becomes the street of Washington 
D.C. bears this out.  Characterized as the spacious and empty “well-trimmed walks that led to 
handsome walks…,” Oklahoma City becomes the cacophonic “arcade,” of Washington D.C. that 
teems with “relentless crowds” (Ellison 33).  Not only is this another example of orders descent 
into disorder but it also simultaneously shifts the tropes of a pastoral space (Ellison’s childhood 
home) to that of the chaotic and modern present (Washington D.C).   
This shift can be read as a displacement of the pastoral imaginary enveloping America’s 
“renaissance authors” with a sensibility capturing our modern American “tortuous ambiguity.”  
The foundational books in American literary study seize upon this pastoral sensibility as well as 
understand American literature as an extension of what Murray called “traditio.”  Besides 
Matthiessen’s American Renaissance, Lewis Mumford’s The Golden Day: A Study in American 
Experience and Culture (1926) and Van Wyck Brooks’ The Flowering of New England (1936) 
both summon allusions to America’s relationship to and rebirth of Western literary traditions.  
These three books are central in establishing the transatlantic and trans-historical dimensions of 
the American literary canon.  They also come out of an ethos beginning at the Civil War’s end 
that included figure like Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, who would later be associated with 
the New Humanism.  While all of these thinkers differed in their critical, aesthetic and political 
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proclivities, they saw and idealized the classical tradition as a pattern for imitation.  With his 
mention of Gilbert Murray, Ellison inserts himself within this same lineage.   
We can register Ellison’s filiative uncertainty about this lineage through his use of racial 
and other biological descriptions.  The precarious nature of order and lineage found in the 
essay’s beginning scenes extends to Lincoln’s physical description throughout the nightmare. 
Like the aforementioned tropes of writing, these shifting descriptions also reveal a certain 
anxiety concerning Lincoln’s relationship to the nation he is a relative of and father to.  After the 
assassination, Ellison’s “dream self” asks what everyone is laughing at; the answer, “at our 
American cousin, fool,” is a play on both the production Lincoln was watching when shot and 
Lincoln himself who is simultaneously demarked as “our American cousin” (Ellison 36).  The 
status of “cousin” given to Lincoln denies him a patrilineal relationship to the United States and 
its founding fathers, whose work he is supposed be carrying out.  Lincoln is not quite estranged, 
but instead of the Civil War strengthening his familial ties, it ostracizes him.  Not only does the 
act of Emancipation render Lincoln into a cousin, but his cousinhood simultaneously plays into 
an ambiguity concerning his racial identity during the dream.  Returning to the initial scene 
where Ellison spots Lincoln, the description shifts from someone who is “familiar” to that of a 
“stranger” whose race is uncertain (Ellison 32-3).  After his assassination Lincoln’s racial status 
takes another significant shift.  At first Ellison writes that Lincoln’s complexion was “darker 
than I’d even imagined,” and later one man in the mob bearing his body through the streets of 
Washington calls out “We’ve caught the old coon at last!  Haven’t we now” (Ellison 37).  By 
identifying Lincoln as a “coon,” Ellison invokes a moment of catachresis.  Unlike the filial and 
human connection to the nation “cousin” invokes, the word “coon,” marks him as inhuman, a 
denial of humanity legitimating Lincoln’s lynching at the foot of the Washington Monument.  
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When Ellison recognizes Lincoln as a “coon,” it also marks the moment that tears “at the 
foundation of that which I had thought was reality…” (Ellison 37).  Slowly, Ellison realizes that 
his own status in the dream and in the world is precarious since, how he could be himself, “a 
slave or even human” if Lincoln himself is not (37).  This goes to explain the dynamic changes 
Lincoln goes through in the dream.  The lynching violence visited upon his body eventually 
changes him from an ambiguous silhouette to a “coon” that is eventually castrated and dies yet 
another death.   
Lincoln’s ambiguous status during the essay is seen from perspective of what Ellison 
describes as a “literate slave child.”  Despite the chaos around him, Ellison uses this figure to 
give “ordered significance” to the chaotic mixture of present and past, human and inhuman 
(Ellison 46).  This “literate slave child” is only given the role of witness to the horrific events 
without the capability of acting to stop it.  He tells us that thrust at the front of the mob; he was 
not allowed to enjoy the “forced detachment…anonymity…freedom to not participate” (Ellison 
42-3).  Even after he witnesses Lincoln’s violent death by assassin and mob, this dream-self 
states that out of a sense of “familial completeness,” harking back to memories of his own father 
that he “had not felt the President was actually dead.  He isn’t dead: I wouldn’t have it so” 
(Ellison 42).  As we can see, Ellison’s most concerted intervention into Hamlet is the 
displacement of Hamlet, with this “literate slave child.”  Hamlet calls himself a “rouge and 
peasant slave,” and in Hamlet’s predecessor, Orestes there appears the stock slave character who 
avoids death at the hands of Orestes and his sister.  By creating a “literate slave” that could “tell 
it like it is,” Ellison introduces innovation into the “traditio” of Emerson, Murray and 
Matthiessen. This figure reveals a countervailing poetics of race and slavery into American 
democratic expression.  Unlike Emerson and Matthiessen’s Hamlet, this figure brings us closer 
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to the problems of anti-black racism and slavery, not further away.  Essentially, racism and 
slavery have disrupted the filiative and literary tropes of continuity established by this 
“renaissance” sensibility.  Despite his desire of familial completeness, the literate slave reveals 
how Matthiessen’s “democratic feeling” as been torn asunder.  It is in this register that we can re-
read the figures of writing that fail in the essay.  The “tragedy” both Emerson and Matthiessen 
suggest reveals a metaphysical crisis over the problem of freedom.  Ellison’s literate slave – by 
attempting to bring ordered significance into these disparate traditions – suggests that both 
politics and the products of literary criticism are in crisis.  Not only does Ellison show that the 
slave complicates American “democratic expression” but that any attempt at finding such 
expression must account for anti-black racism and slavery.   
Ellison’s use but simultaneous displacement of Hamlet’s tragedy is significantly different 
from most modern criticism on the play.  Modern critics like Harold Bloom, Catherine Beasley, 
Thomas Grady, and Terry Eagleton have understood Hamlet as indicating the line between 
medieval and modern subjectivity.34  But they all use their observations to critique bourgeois 
subjectivity: meaning subjectivity understood as sovereign, empowered and autonomous from 
worldly ideologies (Grady 252).35
                                                            
34 Here I am specifically referring to Harold Bloom’s Hamlet: Poem Unlimited, (Riverhead Books, 2003) Catherine 
Beasley’s, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama, (Taylor & Francis Books Ltd, 
1985,) Terry Eagleton’s William Shakespeare (Blackwell Publishers, 1987) and Thomas Grady’s Shakespeare, 
Machiavelli and Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard II to Hamlet. (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
  If Ellison’s slave bears any relationship to Hamlet, it is 
35 Implicated in these readings of Hamlet is the way he navigates the political and moral obligations in this tragedy.  
This, of course, is through Hamlet’s acts of poesis.  Shakespeare constructs a figure that: feigns madness, refers to 
the Attic traditions of tragedy as well as the New Comedic traditions of Terrence, and stages a production of 
Euripides’ Hecuba.  In other words, “Hamlet’s task,” which is to find the truth behind his Uncle’s involvement with 
his Father’s death, is done though a self-conscious deployment of poetic registers and rhetoric.  It is poetic 
languages ability to create what Sidney called “another nature,” that clears the fog of uncertainty and reveals the 
truth surrounding the play’s central tragedy.  Just as important as poetry’s function is the fact that it is a poetics that 
operates outside of the law in the same way that Hamlet’s uncle ascends to the throne by these same means.  This 
fact, as well as the bloody violence in the play is attributed to it Greek and Spanish dramaturgical roots.  Plot wise, 
the “morality” of Hamlet (a dominant characteristic of Greek and Spanish Revenge Tragedy) is rather uncertain.  
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Hamlet’s curse of inaction.  But there is a subtle difference between their respective failures to 
act.  Hamlet could literally act as an author within the play.  The most alluring element of 
“Hamlet” is his self-consciously deliberate acts of poesis (producing Mousetrap, faking his 
madness, etc…) Ellison’s use of Hamlet positions his essay closer to the discussion of tragedy 
between Walter Benjamin’s and Carl Schmitt’s reading of Hamlet.  Between Benjamin and 
Schmitt we can see the relationship between modernity, poetics, and power suggested in Hamlet.  
Carl Schmitt’s book Hamlet or Hecuba: The Eruption of Time in the Play is a response to 
Benjamin’s The Origins of German Tragic Drama (1928). 36
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The end of Shakespeare’s play – which suggests that Hamlet’s death is to be used to generate political consensus – 
does not give us a clear moral sense suggested by tragedy’s roots.  What is clear from the modern reception of 
Hamlet is a positive valence given to his flexible range of poetic registers.  It is language that allows him to work 
outside the law in order to reveal the “truth” as well as exact revenge.  These two things: a moral sensibility to 
language’s use and that sensibility’s connection to a tragic concept of freedom exist as we have seen in Emerson and 
Matthiessen’s use of Hamlet.    
 
36 There is a pretty substantial difference between the original German title and the English translation.  In German 
the word “einbruch” as multiple meanings that more or less translates into some sense of “zeit” “breaking through” 
Shakespeare’s play.  Schmitt’s point in using “einbruch” is to critique the German Romantic cultural tradition.  By 
having historical time “break-through” Shakespeare’s play, he shatters the idea of art’s autonomy from ideas and 
political history.  This is not to say that Schmitt is not concerned with literature or aesthetics at all.  In fact many of 
his key intellectual terms borrows from the realm of aesthetics like “representation,” “myth,” and “iconography” 
amongst many others.  
  Schmitt’s motive for straying into 
the realm of aesthetics was to correct Benjamin’s reading of the play.  Benjamin relied on 
Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign in order to draw a distinction between classical tragic forms 
(found in Aristotelian and Attic traditions) and the baroque “mourning play’s” origins.  The 
subtle, but powerful differentiation between Benjamin and Schmitt has to do with how each 
author understands sovereign power changing between the German Reformation and the 
Counter-Reformation in England.  At its core, this differentiation is about the exercise of the law 
and what does and does not fall within the purview of the law.  For Schmitt, the great crisis and 
revolutions precipitating the modern state’s emergence revealed a new tool for the exercise of 
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sovereign power…the “state of exception,” (Schmitt). Across many of Schmitt’s writings he 
explicitly argues that this legal suspension of the law should and can be integrated into the 
workings of state power in order to situate the state as the final arbiter of power.  For Schmitt, 
the power of the sovereign rests in its decisions over matters of life and death as well as when the 
law can be suspended (Schmitt 138).   
Benjamin, on the other hand sees this extra-legal, “state of exception” as something 
outside of the sovereign’s ability to declare.  The key to Benjamin’s formulation is retaining the 
potential for the exercise of power and violence out of the reach of state law (Benjamin 283).  
Benjamin’s discussion of the “state of exception” in his published works is part of a long 
standing argument with Schmitt’s conception of the sovereign.  In The Origins of German Tragic 
Drama we can see a continuation of this argument and how it influenced the evolution of 
tragedy.  Benjamin’s emphasizes Hamlet’s acts of creation because he is concerned with the 
place of mourning in tragedy.  When Hamlet acts out his “mourning,” this is where Benjamin 
finds the separation of his sovereign power and his ability to weld it (Benjamin 137).  This is 
why Benjamin reads Hamlet as the paradigmatic trauerspiel and consigns the sovereign figure of 
the baroque tradition into the secular realm of historical consciousness.  Hamlet is a play about 
the loss of sovereign power’s mythical right and the transfer of power to the secular realm.  This 
new, secular nature of power for Benjamin holds the potential for something revolutionary to 
occur.  What it allows for is the willful capriciousness of human agency to act against 
sovereignty’s power (Benjamin 66-7).   Carl Schmitt on the other hand does not see such a 
cleaving.  History’s “irruption” into the play for Schmitt demonstrates the opposite tendency.  
Through reading the “irruption” of the 16th century into Hamlet, he sought to destroy the roots of 
overt aesthetic conservatism defining 200 years of German aesthetic criticism.  Instead of seeing 
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criticism sheltering art from the capriciousness and violence of time, Schmitt wanted to think 
about how ideas and politics far-flung of aesthetics are vital sources to aesthetic creation.  As 
David Pan saw, Schmitt’s recognition that the saturation of “politics” in art is advantageous to 
the State’s domination of civil society. (Pan, 154-5)  Schmitt effectively recognized that art’s 
autonomy could work both ways.  It could either shore up the control by becoming a field of 
action for the State or its autonomy could be a cauldron of thinking antithetical to the States 
designs.  In Schmitt’s view, everything was political and designations between friend and 
enemies were a constituent part of civil society, even its art.  The fatal element of tragedy in 
Schmitt’s work works to summon the sovereign to act.  Sovereign action is what restores order 
and contains the capriciousness of human agency (Schmitt 140).   
Ellison’s “literary slave child” shifts the concerns in modernity from the bourgeois and 
“free” representation of Hamlet to the American conundrum over racism and its relationship to 
democracy and power.  The “mourning” that Benjamin sees in Hamlet has its analogue in the 
powerlessness that characterizes Ellison’s “literate slave”.  Ellison describes himself as “held and 
forced to the front of the crowds” in the dream and unconsciously swept up in its movements and 
actions (Ellison 36).  His words, which we are reading on the page, are never heard above the 
roar of the crowds nor can this slave go against their tidal movements.  All of this poses a crucial 
question.  Can Ellison’s slave “mourn” in Benjamin’s sense of lamenting to loss of previously 
held power?  What Ellison shows us is a figure of representation born within a purely secular and 
historical realm.  The language and writing that Ellison’s “literate-slave” deploys is not 
transcendent but one that expresses the indelible marks of racism and its historical legacy on the 
modern subject. If Ellison’s “literate slave” suggests a poetic language that is not transcendent, 
what sort of poetics does Ellison’s essay suggest we use to express our common fate?  By 
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making Lincoln, the father of our twentieth century a “coon” Ellison weaves the problem of 
racism into the very fabric of America’s ideas of humanity and literature.   
When Ellison began writing “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” in 1955, America was still 
embroiled in a civil war.  Southern Congressmen manned the ramparts when the Supreme Court 
ruled that Alabama’s segregation laws were unconstitutional in 1955.  Ellison’s essay 
demonstrates that the task of representing “how it is,” is complex.  It also shows that there is a 
problematic continuity between the Civil War and the wars – both global and domestic – that 
would punctuate the twentieth century.  With the assassinations of Malcolm X, John Kennedy as 
well as his own novelistic venture into political assassination, it makes sense that Lincoln would 
be Ellison’s subject.  The trope of familial bonds that appear in his essay suggests that Ellison 
was also uncertain about what sort of “father” Lincoln was for our twentieth century.  Perhaps 
Ellison thought the contemporary crisis gripping America s desperately needed Lincoln’s 
leadership?  Of all the elements of tragedy both missing and present in Ellison’s dream, the one 
that disturbs him most is the absence of Lincoln’s successor.  Ellison wonders aloud why there 
was no one “to play Anthony to Lincoln’s Caesar?” (Ellison 45).  To stave off the wonton chaos 
and powerful violence in the dream, Ellison summons’s Lincoln’s “eloquent words” contained in 
the Gettysburg Address (Ellison 44).  He struggles to recall them and finally, perhaps ironically 
recalls them through Charles Laughton’s recitation of it in the film Ruggles of the Red Gap.  The 
scene Ellison recalls has Laughton’s character (a British butler) using the address to rebuke the 
Gilded Age materialism of his American employers.  As was Laughton’s rebuke so is Ellison’s.  
The Gilded Age following Reconstruction and the Civil War repudiated the potential America 
had in its grasp to truly transform the terms upon which civil society and humanism was 
understood.  With Ellison as was with many other intellectuals of the post-Civil War era, Lincoln 
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symbolizes that paradigmatic expression of America’s new found humanism after destroying 
slavery.   
During his time in Austria we know that Ellison, read the entirety of Lincoln’s corpus of 
writings (Ellison “Miscellaneous”).  As Richard Hofstadter writes in American Political 
Traditions and the Men Who Made It
Telling it “like it is,” the historic task assigned to Hamlet proves “too complex” for 
Ellison in the end, (Ellison 46).  Using Murray’s 
 (1948) the political environment of the nineteenth century 
was not antagonistic but complicit to the fundamental working arrangements of state power 
(Hofstadter vi).  This arrangement existed because the “rise and spread of modern industrial 
capital” was commingled with the defense of the American constitution (vi).  Lincoln does not, 
in Hofstadter’s account, deviate from this American ethos.  Lincoln’s decision is not based solely 
on a moral repulsion to slavery but is also strategically instep with the political ethos of the 
United States.  Hofstadter’s account of Lincoln rationale for emancipating enslaved Blacks and 
pressuring the Union demythologizes this impenetrable morality.  Reading many of Lincoln’s 
address on slavery, Lincoln appears to be a parochial – if strategic – mind bound to the political 
realities of anti-black racism that under-girded the Free Soil Movement of the 1850s.  Hofstadter 
writes that applying the moniker “revolutionary,” to the Civil War is dubious at best since in the 
long view of American history it aimed to “preserve a long established order,” not necessarily to 
overthrow it (Hofstadter, 126).  If Ellison did read all of Lincoln’s works then he could not deny 
Lincoln’s ambiguous duplicity.  Perhaps it is for this reason Ellison describes Lincoln as a 
combination of “wisdom and guile,” “enigma and lucidity” (Ellison 46).  Maybe Ellison saw 
Lincoln simply as politician swaying with the perilous, divided nature of his times?  
The Classical Tradition in Poetry was an 
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attempt to speculate about the classical renaissance tradition’s ability to speak to what he calls 
“those centers of stress within” American life (48). But Ellison admits defeat, since this tradition 
is unable to reconcile the state of chaos that has defined American life since the end of the Civil 
War.  Through this tradition, Ellison attempts to bring an “ordered significance” to America’s 
particular humanistic quandary; but ultimately it falls apart.  “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” gives us 
glimpses of why the patterns of classical tragedy offers insight but does not necessary solve the 
riddle.  At “Hamlet’s task,” Ellison – like Emerson and Matthiessen before him – sought to 
understand America’s role in the vast expanse of Western ideas of humanism, freedom and 
democracy.  His engagement with Matthiessen’s literary “renaissance” reveals Ellison’s sense 
that our founding American writers failed to properly represent the historical relationship 
between anti-black racism, regimes of power and ideas of freedom in America.  Realizing that 
America’s aesthetic “renaissance” cannot in fact “tell it like it is,” Ellison performed a revision 
of Matthiessen by writing the American South’s “torturous ambiguity” into it. 
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Chapter 3: Arendt and Ellison Speak for the Negro 
In 1958, the editors of Commentary deemed Hannah Arendt’s essay “Reflections on 
Little Rock” so controversial they passed on its publication.  This happened despite the fact that 
someone on their editorial staff asked Arendt to write the essay.  “Reflections” controversial 
content was not lost on Irving Howe and the editors of the Socialist quarterly Dissent.   Arendt’s 
acquiescence to publish in Irving Howe’s journal seems rather strange.  Howe’s quarterly was a 
revitalization of what he saw as the decay of democratic socialism American thought (Howe iv).  
Dissent’s creation in 1954 provided a counterweight to the centrist-liberal politics Partisan 
Review was associated with.  Even though Arendt herself was a critic of such liberalism (yet a 
very frequent writer for Partisan Review), she was a much stronger opponent of Howe’s brand of 
socialism.  “Reflections” appears in the belly of the very beast she was seeking to spear with her 
intellectual lance.  From Arendt’s position, Dissent
Agreeing to publish it a year later, Howe and 
 and its editors were provocateurs of the very 
“liberal cliché” she sought to address with her essay, (Arendt 44).            
Dissent took precautions to distance 
themselves from the potential fallout.  Hence, when “Reflections” appeared, it was with two 
disclaimers and two rebuttals to its content.37  Such strong rhetorical buffers made sense given 
Arendt’s comments and the historical context they appeared in.  Published in Dissent’s winter 
issue, “Reflections” suggested that enforcing desegregation in public education was in Arendt’s 
words, “an impatient and ill-advised measure,” (Arendt 48). For Cold War Liberals, such 
comments, let alone from one of their own could not have had worse timing.  The legal grounds 
for “separate but equal” public facilities had been struck down only five years earlier.  
                                                            
37 The very next issue of Dissent was concerned with the problem of education in America.  Almost predictably, the 
essays take aim at both Arendt’s “Reflection on Little Rock,” “Crisis in Education” and Partisan Review. 
Brown vs. 
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Board of Education’s success was seen as an extension of liberalism’s social and political 
coalition building begun with the Popular Front in the late 1930s.  In the five years between 
Brown
Arendt’s essay “Reflections on Little Rock” has raised the ire of past and present readers 
for the author’s insensitivity to America’s long-standing problem with racism.  Instead of 
instilling Arendt with a feeling of courage and admiration, the image of black children facing 
white mobs in Little Rock, Arkansas filled her with horror.  Such acts of protest represented a 
breakdown of what Arendt – following Kant – called “common sense.”  Despite the success of 
Federal attempts to desegregate southern elementary schools, Arendt saw desegregation as a lost 
cause.  Writing to her critics in the very next issue 
 and Arendt’s “Reflections” violent physical and legislative battles were fought in an 
attempt to subvert the Supreme Court’s legal decision.  In retrospect, 1959 was also the threshold 
where integrationist and coalition building politics of the 30s began to change.  Local, state and 
federal violence against black political action in the US was quickly causing a reevaluation in the 
Civil Right Movement’s strategies.  Slowly, the sun began to set on the integrationist ethos of 
coalition and cooperation.  Dawning in its place would be the defensive and more radical 
nationalism of SNCC and the Black Panthers.  Despite her clear agreement with legal 
desegregation, Arendt’s comments were the equivalent of sweaty, intellectual dynamite in this 
volatile historical milieu.  For many, “Reflections” displayed intellectual activity in its most 
aloof, anti-social posture.  Arendt’s ideas appeared morally reprehensible and worst seemed to 
reside in the clouds like Socrates in Aristophanes’ play of that same name.            
Dissent, Arendt felt that school desegregation 
impressed her with a “sense of futility and needless embitterment,” since “all parties concerned 
knew very well that nothing was being achieved under the pretext that something was being 
done” (Arendt 181).  Arendt’s rationale for criticizing Federal enforcement of desegregation was 
136 
 
complex.  She gives three interrelated reasons for her stance.  Public school desegregation: 
subverted “authority” by asking children to do the political work of adults; misguidedly sought to 
enforce social instead of legal integration and finally raises the specter of “tyranny”, which 
occurs when “legislature follows social prejudices,” (Arendt 53).  “Reflections” and the 
controversy surrounding it often fails to make its way into contemporary assessments of Arendt’s 
writings.  When it is mentioned it appears in two iconic ways.  More forgiving readers see 
“Reflections” as emblematic of what Arendt scholar Margaret Canovan calls her 
“contradictions” in thought.38  Less forgiving readings of “Reflections” charge Arendt with 
racism.  Not only is this later charge dubious but usually comes when Arendt’s comments in 
“Reflections” are divorced from the context of her other works.39
                                                            
38 I refer to the more recent books on Arendt’s political thought including Kristeva’s book Hannah Arendt, Lisa Jane 
Disch Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, Maurizio Passerin D’Entreves’ The Political Philosophy of 
Hannah Arendt, Margaret Canovan’s Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought and “The 
Contradictions of Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought.”   
39 Here I refer to the works of Anne Norton in “Heart of Darkness: Africa and Blacks in the Writing of Hannah 
Arendt, Linda M.G. Zerilli’s “The Arendtian Body,” Meili Steele in “Arendt versus Ellison on Little Rock: The Role 
of Language in Political Judgment,” and Kenneth Warren, “Ralph Ellison and the Problem of Cultural Authority.”  
Her one defender is Seyla Benhabib in her The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt.  More importantly, 
“Reflections on Little Rock” is most obviously a companion piece to her “Crisis in Education,” written the same 
year as “Reflections.”  What is interpreted as “racism” in “Reflections” comes from her complicated political and 
philosophical position on public education in “Crisis in Education.”  In “Education,” she argues that the American 
educational system demonstrates problems that reflect general problems in modern American society.  The absence 
of political authority, a dismissive attitude towards “tradition” and the “past”, and an insidious “Pragmatism” 
indicate the instrumentalization of knowledge.  Influenced by a Rousseauian ethos, American education is 
politicized to the extent that it demonstrates the egalitarian nature of American politics.  Instead of making 
“aristocratic” distinctions as European educational systems do, American education blurs the distinctions that 
establish authority.  Arendt demonstrates the effect of this in various ways in “Crisis.”  All of this leads to Arendt’s 
conclusion that we must “decisively divorce the realm of education from the others…most of all from the realm of 
public, political life, in order to derive from it alone a concept of authority and an attitude towards the past which are 
appropriate to it but have no general validity and must not claim a general validity in the world of grownups,” 
(Arendt 512).  School desegregation, which she decries in “Crisis”, is rearticulated in “Reflections.”  In both, she 
expresses this above idea that school should not be the arena for “political” action.     
  Despite the dubiousness of 
these charges “race” does pose a problem in Arendt’s thinking.  The problem is neither “racism” 
as such nor Arendt’s avoidance of “racism” as the central political problem in Modernity.   
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While she admits that “the color question was created by the one great crime – racial 
slavery – in America’s history,” she also writes that “the country’s attitude to its Negro 
population is rooted in American tradition and nothing else” (Arendt 46).  Arendt’s assessment 
of American political traditions separates the “crime” of slavery’s institutions from American 
“tradition”.  This is a separation she repeats in both On Revolution and On Violence, two of her 
later works focusing on America and its political traditions.  Not only is a thoughtful 
consideration of racism and slavery missing in On Revolution but in both “Reflections” and On 
Violence
In Arendt’s writings on America, the problem is not racism nor is it symptomatic of her 
“contradictions” in thought.  Like many European intellectuals, Arendt misunderstands the 
relationship between anti-black racism and America’s intellectual and political traditions.  Her 
analysis of political action by African-Americans reveals this.  The relationship she draws 
between black protest in “Reflections” and 
 she links the attempts by blacks at political recognition (desegregation) to the 
breakdown of what she calls “common sense.”  As Meili Steele remarks, in “Reflections” Arendt 
assumes the existence of a “common world that is in good enough shape to draw together” the 
speech and actions of both blacks and whites in America, (Steele 187).  It is for this reason that 
Arendt cannot understand black political acts since they defy this assumed “common world.”  If 
“black” acts of political recognition violate “common sense” then it is clear that Arendt gives 
little value to the force of racism within American “tradition.”  Judging by Arendt’s use of this 
word in “Reflections,” tradition is different than common sense.  If they were synonymous, 
Arendt would not so dismissive of this “attitude” about race.  Just as importantly, by framing 
slavery as a “crime” Arendt casts slavery as a moral problem instead of a philosophical 
conundrum at the heart of America’s democratic experiment.      
On Violence is similar to the rise of mob rule and 
138 
 
violence she discusses in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1950) and The Human Condition
While Ellison makes elliptical references to Arendt in his debate with Irving Howe in the 
 
(1957) respectively.  In all of these works, Arendt centralizes speech as a vital activity that 
communicates “common sense”, initiates civic recognition and wards off the potential descent 
into mob rule. When speech and its ability to create and communicate judgment fails, common 
sense disappears, the political sphere is compromised and the precipitous decent into totalitarian 
power begins.  On principle, Ralph Ellison would agree with the importance Arendt gives to 
speech.  But speech is often times rational and not “poetic” for Arendt.  This difference between 
Arendt’s and Ellison’s thought is crucial.  Ellison sees literature and poesis exhibiting the very 
properties of common sense and recognition Arendt denies them.    
New Leader, his most extended published response to Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock” 
appears in Robert Penn Warren’s Who Speaks for the Negro?  Ralph Ellison’s rebuttal to 
“Reflections” remark on Arendt’s misunderstanding of America’s race problem.  Meili Steele 
suggests that there is more to Ellison’s response than just a clash of political sensibilities.  As 
Steele remarks, Ellison’s engagement with Arendt reveal the limits of Arendt’s Kantian concept 
of language and speech, (Steele, 144).  I would like to use “Reflections on Little Rock” as an 
occasion to discuss Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of American political traditions.  
Arendt’s “Reflections” began her three year study of American political culture that culminated 
in On Revolution in 1961.  Her suggestion that desegregation is a deviation from America’s own 
political “common sense” at the beginning of “Reflections on Little Rock” reveals her nascent 
interpretations of America’s foundational political ideas.  As I will show, Arendt’s interpretation 
of American “common sense” is linked to her misreading of Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the 
State of Virginia.  This misreading began in The Origins of Totalitarianism and extends through 
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“Reflections on Little Rock” and On Revolution
  Arendt begins “Reflections on Little Rock” asking how a nation founded on “common 
sense” could allow the occurrence of federally mandated desegregation.  Her allusion is of 
course to Thomas Paine’s famous 1776 tract 
.  By mistaking anti-black racism as a social 
problem – rather than a political one – Arendt cannot properly interpret the “common sense” of 
America’s political traditions.   
In the second part of this chapter I draw attention to Ellison’s description of the events at 
Little Rock, and its connection to Arendt’s misunderstanding of American “common sense”.  I 
read Ellison’s response as a critique of Arendt’s reliance upon Kant’s sensus communis to 
conceptualize political speech.  Instead of the rational “common sense” speech of Kant, Ellison 
suggests a speech deriving from a “common sense” of literary and vernacular origins.  Ellison 
gives an example of this literary common sense in two ways.  First through his sublime 
description of the black children at Little Rock and secondly through a similar reading of Martin 
Luther King’s “humility”.  Instead of a clash with “common sense”, Ellison’s literary reading of 
Little Rock and King takes this notion to task.             
Common Sense.  Paine, like most of the other 
American eighteenth century authors she cites in her work are champions of the distinct 
separation of governmental power and civil society.  These are the very issues Arendt suggests 
are at stake in the debate over school desegregation.  Although Arendt does not take this into 
account, these early American political thinkers also descend from the tradition of Locke and 
Hobbes, which secularizes political power, yet uses Christian moral idealism to legitimate it.  
Significant elements of Paine’s argument in Common Sense are arguments against the divine 
right of Kings along national and racial lines -- as Sections II and III of Common Sense bear out.  
Arendt herself admits that the foundations of arguments like Paine’s are Christian and not secular 
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in origin.  By the end of the eighteenth-century, this Christian and racial thought eventually 
calcify into the ideology of American racism.  But this is not where Arendt begins her 
investigation of “common sense”.  Arendt first asks what the nature of “sovereign power” was in 
America political traditions.40  She writes in On Revolution
                                                            
40 However limited and problematic Arendt’s observations are in On Revolution, this particular observation exhibits 
one of the book’s strengths.  Recent criticism, particularly Giorgio Agamben’s The State of Exception attempts to 
read the problem of the “King’s” political sovereignty into American political institutions.  What does not appear in 
On Revolution but makes an appearance in The Origins of Totalitarianism is the relationship between modern 
theories of political sovereignty and private, economic interest.  It is surprising that Arendt’s discussion of the 
American Revolution does not include a discussion of Hobbes.  Property and its ties to the American conception of 
political happiness have its roots in Hobbes even if the Republican element of the American democratic experiment 
was not part of his “leviathan.”  Why Arendt leaves Hobbes out of her assessment of the United States is rather 
curious, especially since her concerns of about American mass society is so pronounced.  As with many of Arendt’s 
observations about American political and intellectual traditions, she leaves much to be desired.               
 that the British Civil Wars of the 
seventeenth-century and their culmination in the Glorious Revolution, created the conditions of 
limited sovereignty within the British Isles.  This in turn set the template for America’s political 
milieu.  The next step the Founding Fathers took in developing their ideas of revolution was with 
an eye towards ending Britain’s limited but still sovereign exercise of power.  When it was time 
to break from England and create an American republic the debate was not “where do we put 
sovereignty” but as Arendt writes “where do we rest authority.”   The difference between these 
two conceptualizations of power is crucial to Arendt’s narrative of American Revolution.  
Sovereignty represents the consolidation of political decision making in one institution – namely 
the King. “Authority,” on the other hand is derived from the colonists’ experience at autonomous 
self-governance within local institutions of power.  “Authority” represents an alternative 
formation of power based on the shared and collective experience of political subjects.  Arendt 
links the shared and collective nature of authority to the effect Christian theological concepts had 
on American colonists.  Puritan stress on Hebrew ideas of covenant as well as their belief in the 
Church’s origins in “consent” appear as important precursors to the American Revolution.  The 
constitution of each original American colony into commonwealths with “freely chosen” 
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representatives leads Arendt to believe that this spirit of “covenant” building was in the air, 
(Arendt 173).                     
In Arendt’s account, these aforementioned facts created the conditions of a “specifically 
American experience” which: “taught the men of the Revolution that action, though it may be 
started in isolation and decided by single individuals for very different motives, can be 
accomplished only by some joint effort” (Arendt 171).  The action of “covenant making” led to 
the formation of political institutions (and the penning of America’s Constitution which 
expressed this form of power) based on the literal power of constitution, promise and covenant 
amongst citizens.  Juxtaposed to French revolutionaries, whom Arendt reviles in On Revolution, 
she describes the Founding Fathers as interested in creating revolution in terms of “speech” and 
action, not violence.  Her omission of war and violence from the American Revolution is 
purposeful.  As she repeats throughout On Revolution, the American Revolution is singular in 
the West precisely because its foundations are in the power of covenant making, an act 
necessitating the preservation and transmission of rational speech.  Violence and the instrumental 
element of speech accompanying it are on the other hand “antipolitical.”  Neither relies on 
covenants between human beings but reverse this action.  As Arendt writes in On Violence
The multifarious institutions of racial slavery are the clearest, most indelible blight upon 
the green pastures of America’s political common sense.  Not only does American chattel 
slavery represent the enduring presence of the “sovereign” within American legal traditions but it 
, 
violence, in its more extreme expressions is “One against All,” (Arendt 42).  In other words it is 
the purposeful breakdown of political power gained in concerted deliberation, action and 
judgment.  The “instruments” (from weapons to rhetorical speech) of violence are a substitute for 
the living, breathing presence and consent of the many (42). 
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also operated by exercising the greatest tool of violence -- the destruction of speech and common 
sense.  Slavery’s presence in America is not lost on Arendt in On Revolution.  As she writes, the 
fact that the American Revolutionaries were not motivated by “compassion” towards slaves is 
striking.  She finds their silence to the “abject and degrading misery…in the form of slavery and 
Negro labor,” surprising since it was such an eighteenth century commonplace, especially after 
the Naturalist philosophy of Rousseau, (Arendt 65).  Arendt explains this apparent contradiction 
as a historically specific one.  Juxtaposed to Rousseau, eighteenth century American thinkers 
saw slavery as a “social question” and therefore outside the concern of political institutions.  
Rousseau saw compassion as the, “most natural reaction to the suffering of others, and therefore 
the very foundation of all authentic ‘natural’ human intercourse,” (Arendt 74-5).  French 
Revolutionary thought supplanted concepts of freedom based on political deliberation, consensus 
and participation with the alleviation of material suffering – which for Arendt was strictly a 
“social” concern.  It was for this reason that Arendt saw the political life imagined by the French 
Revolution parting ways with common sense and “reason.”  Instead Robespierre, inspired by 
Rousseau, saw virtue in the sacrifice of one’s own will.  A general sense of suffering – based on 
the agon between an individual’s selfishness and the selflessness found within the will of the 
people – should guide political action and institutions.  Human (as well as assumedly civic) 
intercourse is based on assuming that such an a priori suffering exists for all.  Rousseau’s ideas 
push “thinking,” whose governing metaphor for Arendt is the “dialogue” outside the realm of 
politics.  More perniciously for Arendt, Rousseau’s “general will” reintroduces the concept of 
the sovereign into political thought again.  But these were not the concerns of America’s 
fledgling political thinkers.  Arendt speculates that motivating Thomas Jefferson and others was 
the “incompatibility of the institution of slavery with the foundation of freedom,” not “pity or by 
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a feeling of solidarity with their fellow man,” (Arendt 66).  She blames this lack of pity on the 
dark obscurity of slavery itself, which made humans into objects thereby causing politicians to 
overlook the “abject and degrading misery” of its victims.   
Arendt recognizes that the Founding Fathers knew that slavery could not philosophically 
coexist with the political institutions they wanted to set up.  However it is also clear that Arendt 
cannot understand how slavery – an experience she readily associates with tyranny – did not 
allow these same Founding Fathers to be moved by “pity…with their fellow man.”  This 
misunderstanding can be traced back to her discussion of racism in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism
Race and racism carried a new sort of law that accompanied European nations into their 
colonial exploits.  While extending the nation-state, it also established the inherent and 
eventually lawful superiority of colonizers over the colonized.  These new laws also require new 
modes of organization in order to fully expedite the domination of peoples and resources.  At the 
.  Racism in Arendt’s account becomes an instrument of late nineteenth-century 
imperialism.  She ties it to two late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth - century impulses within 
Europe’s bourgeoisie.   “Race consciousness” is first an attempt to either affirm or challenge 
political and property rights.  Arendt sees both aristocrats and members of the bourgeoisie used 
race thinking in such ways during the eighteenth century.  Second, race consciousness is tied to 
the emergence of the European nation-state.  France, Germany and England at some point use 
race in order to organize concepts of nationalism based on organic and “tribal origins, (Arendt 
170).  Intertwined with the biologics contained in such common origins (concepts of “innate 
personality” and “natural nobility,”) race consciousness also acquired a messianic hue.  In part, 
this messianic component creates the conceptual legal and social ground work for Western 
European imperialism.   
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center of these laws is an abandonment of the idea of humanity (Arendt 157).  As Arendt writes, 
by excluding the principle of humanity from international law, politics – which is based upon 
covenant – is abandoned for a Hobbesian “perpetual was of all against all” (157).  Under the 
conditions of an accumulating society, there is “no other unifying bond available between 
individuals who in the very process of power accumulation and expansion are losing all natural 
connections with their fellow-men,” (157).  Racism and the true practice of politics for Arendt 
are at odds.                  
Because of its relationship to imperialism, Arendt identifies “race-consciousness” as a 
strictly nineteenth-century phenomenon in both Europe and America.  Despite its racial and 
colonial aspect, Arendt took eighteenth-century desires to abolish or retain slavery as evidence of 
an absence of race consciousness.  Even if her comments are confined to the European continent, 
this could not be further from the truth.  Not only do her observations ignore the ideas of 
Immanuel Kant but also the works of David Hume, John Locke and many other seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century political philosophers.  Both Benjamin Franklin’s Observations Concerning 
the Increase of Mankind and Benjamin Rush’s Address to the Inhabitants of the British 
Settlements in America upon Slave-Keeping are pre-Revolutionary American works weaving the 
principles of race-consciousness into the speculations of America’s political future.  Rush and 
Franklin’s discussions of race define what Ronald Takaki calls the “nationalistic fervor” defining 
America’s pre and post Revolutionary period (Takaki).   Overlooked by Arendt’s as well our 
twentieth- century reception of America’s “Revolutionary” generation this same race 
consciousness is most prominent in the most iconic of America’s revolutionary thinkers, Thomas 
Jefferson.  Quoting Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
and in On Revolution, Arendt understood Jefferson’s “trembling” at God’s justice as the 
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indication of this absence of race consciousness.  Indeed, Jefferson and the American Founding 
Fathers were worried about slavery’s incompatibility with eighteenth-century American political 
institutions but they were not – according to Arendt – enforcing a regime of control and 
exploitation based on race.  Read in the context of his Notes on the State of Virginia Jefferson’s 
“trembling” is based on more than a possible retribution for slavery’s injustice against humanity.  
Jefferson trembles because he fears eventual black insurrection in the United States.  It is this 
fear that leads Jefferson to suggest the gradual abolishment of slavery, the education of 
manumitted slaves and their eventual deportation to a “distant area under the protection of this 
country” (Jefferson 201).  Undoubtedly, events in Haiti and Toussaint’s own eventual act of 
revolution weighed heavily upon Jefferson’s mind.  But more than this fear was another clearly 
expressed reason for Jefferson’s trembling. As he writes, it is the “real distinctions…nature has 
made,” that translate into “political” as well as “physical and moral” objections to the 
coexistence of Blacks and whites in the United States (201).41
Jefferson assigns “natural” distinction to the realm of “political” objection and hence 
   
Notes on the State of Virginia
                                                            
41 Jefferson’s fear of American slave insurrection and its roots in the Haitian Revolution do not make it into Arendt’s 
assessment of Jefferson’s thoughts on slavery.  Neither does the Haitian Revolution make it into her account of the 
French Revolution either.  Arendt’s comments about blacks in Africa contained in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
hinge on the fact that they “had not created a human world, a human reality, and that therefore nature had remained, 
in all its majesty, the only overwhelming reality,” (Arendt 192).  Most explicitly, this absent “human world,” for 
Arendt means the establishment of a “political body,” (Arendt 193).  The Haitian Revolution clearly fitting into 
Arendt’s own paradigm of “revolution” in On Revolution as well as being a counterweight to her discussions of race 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism is a silent event in her assessment of modernity, race and the Totalitarianisms 
relationship to modern slavery.  As with her misreading of Jefferson and 18th Century America slavery, an account 
of Haiti and France’s dominion over it would have illuminated the 18th Century relationship between “Race and 
Bureaucracy.” relationship found within slavery’s institutions.  A recent work attending to this oversight is Sibylle 
Fisher’s Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution (2004).  Also noteworthy 
is C.L.R. James’ The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’ Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.  Tim Mathewson’s 
“Jefferson and the Nonregcognition of Haiti”, David Byron Davis’ Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 
John C Miller’s Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery, David Geggus’, “The Haitian Revolution,” 
amongst innumerable works talk about the domestic effects the Haitian Revolution had on Jefferson and the United 
States domestic politics in general.   
 demonstrates the taint of “race-consciousness” that had already 
permeated the eighteenth-century political discourse about slavery.  One would have to look no 
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further than the presence of Constitutional laws limiting suffrage along racial lines as well as the 
assignment of congressional legislative power to see that natural distinction was given “political” 
expression.  Arendt’s blindness to such political realities – ironically grounded in the very 
secularism she seeks to express – limits her ability to fully understand America’s common sense.  
Jefferson and the Founding Fathers’ lack of pity, their fear and trembling before the hand of 
Providence were not based on the political thought of deliberation, covenant and speech.  The 
wheel of fortune Jefferson saw turning on its diabolical yet natural axis had on its end what 
Melville would later have Delano utter in terror – “the Negro.”  The Founding Father’s politics 
of deliberation were also the strategic politics of distinguishing friend from foe.  Blacks posed a 
political threat to the burgeoning Republic; a threat that Jefferson and many others sought to 
eliminate or contain.                                       
As we can see, Arendt extends her misapprehension of America’s “color question” from 
Origins of Totalitarianism into “Reflections on Little Rock.”  “Reflections” contains the ideas 
that would later develop into her political portrait of the Founding Fathers in On Revolution.  In 
both “Reflections” and On Revolution, Arendt’s assumes a rational political common sense 
guiding America’s political institutions.  Such assumptions directed her mind away from the 
political form violence took in American slavery.  Jefferson’s assessment that race was primarily 
a political problem stands in stark contrast to Arendt’s reading of America’s eighteenth-century 
political common sense.  With this admission, the principle of humanity was already dispelled 
from America’s political imagination.  Blacks, as Jefferson writes in his Notes, represented 
potential combatants he wished to check by casting them outside any human covenant with white 
Americans.  If, as Arendt claims, America’s revolutionary common sense was made “by the 
combined power of the many” and the “interconnected principle of mutual promise and common 
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deliberation” its authority was based on a racial version of Hobbes’ perpetual war of all against 
all (Arendt 215).                         
This conflicted aspect of American political common sense – lost on Arendt – is not lost 
on Ralph Ellison.  Like Arendt, Ellison recognizes the hope found in the pluralistic principles 
resting at the center of America’s democratic experiment.  Yet, as I outlined in Chapter Two, he 
also recognized the countervailing force of violence and domination contained in this same 
experiment.  It should be of no surprise then that Ralph Ellison’s most direct response to 
“Reflections” expresses the coeval relationship of hope and violence.  Nor should it surprise us 
that Ellison’s response does not discuss the relationship between racism and America’s 
“common sense” through political science, sociology or philosophy.  What is crucial to Ellison’s 
response is its profoundly aesthetic sensibility.  As he tells Warren, Arendt:  
has absolutely no conception of what goes on in the minds of Negro parents when 
they send their kids through those lines of hostile people.  Yet they are aware of 
the overtones of a rite of initiation which such events actually constitute for the 
child, a confrontation of the terrors of social life with all the mysteries stripped 
away.  And in the outlook of many of these parents (who wish that the problem 
did not exist), the child is expected to face the terror and contain his fear and 
anger precisely because he is a Negro American.  Thus he’s required to master the 
inner tensions created by his racial situation, and if he gets hurt – then his is one 
more sacrifice.  It’s a harsh requirement, but if he fails this basic test, his will be 
even harsher. (Ellison, 344 italics mine).  
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Ellison appears to describe this “rite of initiation” in terms of the sublime.  In the writings of 
Burke, Addison and Shaftsbury through to the German Idealism of Kant and the later Romantics 
this “confrontation” with “terror,” defined the sublime experience.  Yet, this same terror also 
spawned the experiences of pleasure, harmony and Kant’s most important contribution, reason in 
the perceiving subject.  However unlike the Anglo, German Idealist or Romantic ideas of the 
sublime, Ellison does not necessarily place this terror in nature nor does it inspire reason in the 
Kantian sense.  Terror is not natural (or supernatural) but “social” and its chaos is not 
harmonized with its perceiving subjects (“parents” and “children”) but purposefully revealed and 
necessarily confronted (“rite of initiation”).  Here – at the place where terror is confronted and 
“contained” – is where the sublime overlaps with the stronger impulse found in Ellison’s writing: 
the tragic.42
 This tragic confrontation and recognition of social “terror” brings us to the most 
important concept bearing on Ellison’s response to Arendt: the theme of containment.
 
43
                                                            
42 I have discussed Ellison’s use of the tragic extensively in my second chapter.  Also, it is here – with the gesture 
the sublime makes towards the tragic – that the criticism of Max Dessoir is important to note.  His Asthetik und 
allgemeine Kunstrissenschaft sees the sublime in a contiguous relationship with the “tragic consciousness.”  Where 
Ellison’s writings differ from Dessoir’s is how he treats the place of “fate” within the tragic.  There is also a body of 
critical literature linking the “American” with the “sublime” that is worth mentioning.  Beginning with Walt 
Whitman as well as Wallace Steven’s 1935 poem “American Sublime” a range of American intellectuals take up 
this concept in their work.  In the last 40 years the most notable authors are Perry Miller, Leo Marx, Rob Wilson and 
Donald Pease.  
   
43 I will say that Ellison’s use of the word “containment” is peculiar in its frequency throughout this interview.  Alan 
Nadel’s Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism and the Atomic Age is one of the most 
important books to deal directly with this trope of containment.  Ellison’s work has had a central place in Nadel’s 
literary and cultural criticism and in Containment Culture Nadel places him within the “narrative of black American 
culture during the Cold War” that “contrast the narrative of containment,” (Nadel 226).  Ellison’s precise place 
within such a narrative is dubious at best.  He does not belong with the other authors Nadel mentions, namely John 
A. Williams, Alice Walker and Eldridge Cleaver.  Where they clearly demarked themselves as anti-establishment 
and part of the nationalist elements of the Civil Rights struggle, Ellison sought distance from these very things.  To a 
large extent he played a very important if – to use a favorite Ellison phrase – ambiguous role in the very 
“containment culture” Nadel sees Ellison outside of.    
  As 
Ellison tells Warren, Negro American’s are required to “master the inner tensions created by his 
racial situation.”  Ellison mentions the necessity of containing and mastering these tensions later 
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on in the interview when – speaking about Martin Luther King’s followers – he says King, 
“knows that these people have been conditioned to contain not only the physical pressures 
involved in their struggle but…mastering the psychological pressures,” (Warren 341, emphasis 
mine).  The play between mastery and containment repeated through this interview should be 
familiar.  In one form or another they all appear throughout Ellison’s writings.  The most iconic 
example happens in the famous Battle Royal chapter of Invisible Man
Where Arendt retells the story of America’s political beginnings as a rational tale of 
“common sense,” Ellison cannot do so.  For Ellison, the repercussions of desegregation do not 
indicate the loss of what Arendt sees as America’s common sense but the endurance of its 
terribly convoluted logic.  Arendt’s response to the events in Little Rock, Arkansas expresses the 
limits of her secular political humanism.  Despite their beginnings in speech and covenant 
making, by the eighteenth century, political thinkers in American had already mingled the logic 
.  When caught between 
the currency covered electrified rug and the Battle Royal’s white Southern spectators Ellison’s 
narrator talks of being able to “contain the electricity – a contradiction but it works,” (Ellison 
27).  In Ellison’s non-fiction writings, this trope of mastery and containment is related to 
discussions of artistic form.  Such sentiments range from his writings on music where he says 
that proper jazz “reduced the chaos of living to form,” to the art of the novel, which Ellison sees 
as “a ship in which man conquers life’s crushing formlessness,” (Ellison 133, 229).  With 
Warren however, Ellison takes the thematic discussion of literary form and language and applies 
them to describe the politics of segregation.  The terms change from an aesthetic one (“form”) to 
describing the political ramifications of a psychological act (“containment”).  Yet there is clearly 
continuity between Ellison’s description of art’s formal function and the act of confronting and 
containing the “terrors of social life.”   
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of racism with the radical nature of political life they envisioned.  Instead of being opposed to the 
legal and philosophical grounds of American freedom, Jefferson’s Notes show that the racist 
logic of slavery was part of this same movement towards freedom.  This simultaneous movement 
between political freedom and its destruction is what Ellison implies by the “terrors of social 
life.”  Blindness to this countervailing, destructive force limits Arendt’s ability to properly 
understand the operation of political power or the function of racism in contemporary American 
segregation.  While many have pointed out this blindness, Ellison included, his comments on 
“Reflections” also suggest a broader critique of her secular humanism.  Hinted at in the above 
response to “Reflections,” Ellison’s critique has to do with where Arendt places common sense.  
Arendt rests this sense in public and political life while for Ellison politics is not the adequate 
realm for finding this sense.  This sentiment is not directly expressed in his reference to Arendt 
and “Reflections” but as I will show it is suggested in the context she appears in.                           
Who Speaks for the Negro? is not the first time Ellison makes reference to Arendt and 
“Reflections.”  His initial reference appears in an elliptical and rather witty allusion to 
“Reflections” four years after the essay’s publication.  Amidst his debate with Irving Howe on 
the pages of the New Leader Ellison satirically refers to Howe as just as much an “Olympian 
authority” on Negro matters as Arendt in “Reflections on Little Rock” (Ellison).  Outside of its 
humor and irony, associating Arendt and Howe implicates Arendt in Ellison’s broader attack on 
the ontological privilege social scientific and philosophical modes of inquiry are given over 
literature.  Their profound methodological differences aside, Howe and Arendt are guilty of the 
same thing for Ellison.  Ellison begins “The World and the Jug” with a question directed towards 
Howe but just as easily applied to Arendt:  “Why is it that sociology-orientated critics seem to 
rate literature so far below politics and ideology that they would rather kill a novel than modify 
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their presuppositions concerning a given reality which it seeks in its own terms to project?,” 
(Ellison 155-6).  For Ellison, this tendency is shown in the over-determined connection between 
Naturalism and Black authors Irving Howe made in much of his literary criticism.  In Arendt, 
this tendency is much more complicated and has to do with the kind of relationships literature 
has to philosophical “truth”. 
Arendt’s works use a range of literary figures from Virgil and Herman Melville to 
William Faulkner in order to illustrate philosophical points.  Yet “literature” holds a dubious and 
at times sinister place in her writing.  In On Revolution, she faults the French “men of letters” for 
basing their experience of revolution on “language and literature rather than experience and 
concrete observation,” (Arendt 116).  Her most explicit and biting reference to literature comes 
in this same work.  Unlike her immediate intellectual contemporaries Arendt took a rather 
pessimistic stance on the nineteenth century European novel.  The works of Balzac and his 
nineteenth century progeny (Flaubert, Zola, etc…) are indicative of the novel’s passivity to the 
emergence of bourgeois social Darwinism.44  They are, in her words, indicative of the “elevation 
of chance to the position of final arbiter over the whole of life,” (Arendt 141).  Novels can only 
be written in a “world without action” and the destinies of human subjects are determined either 
by “necessity” or the favoritism of luck.  As Arendt goes on to explain in The Origins as well as 
in The Human Condition
 In these same works, Arendt centralizes “speech” as a vital activity that communicates 
“common sense” and initiates human “recognition”.  But speech is not “poetic” for Arendt.  
 “chance” and necessity dominate in a world where the economic forces 
of capital have eviscerated the possibilities of traditional political action. 
                                                            
44 In talking about Balzac, she is talking about the roots of Naturalism.  This is curious since the literary figures she 
uses in her works are not these writers.  Across her works if she is not referring back to either Greek or Roman 
literary sources she often references modernist writers like William Faulkner, Brecht and Thomas Mann.   
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Instead “speech” belongs to another realm of language use.  In fleshing out the division between 
“Work” and “Action,” Arendt makes this distinction between poetic language and “speech” 
clear.  All art functions as both “remembrance and recollection” for Arendt but poetry in 
particular exhibits its durability through “condensation, so that it is as though language spoken in 
utmost density and concentration were poetic in itself,” (Arendt 169).  Even though this quality 
makes poetry durable and worldly, this condensation also renders it “dead”.  Poetry cannot 
acquire or store up knowledge, nor can it reason or deduce.  Neither does it have the 
characteristics of the highest activity – thinking itself – which Arendt describes as the relentless 
and repetitive process of life itself.  It is speech that has these characteristics.  Accompanied by 
action, speech for Arendt serves the function Aristotle designates for it in his Politics
The distinction Arendt draws between speech and poetic language can be read back into 
 which is to 
communicate and form “a common perception” of what is “advantageous and what is the 
reverse…to declare what is just and unjust,” (Aristotle 6).  Speech also plays a part in revealing 
human distinctiveness amongst other human beings.  Poetry, which only deals with reified 
“objects”, cannot do this.  Describing the relationship between “speech” and “life” Arendt writes, 
“with word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second 
birth in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical 
appearance” (176).   
The Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt characterizes the ideal subjects of totalitarian rule as 
those unable to distinguish “the reality of experience” (fact and fiction) or “the standards of 
thought,” (truth or falsehood) (321).  The erasure of these distinctions signifies the destruction of 
speech and hence the capacity of judgment for Arendt.  Poetic language, while the space of 
remembrances, is essentially “thoughtless.”   While it might be meaningful, poetic language is 
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not capable of disclosing either experience or the “standards of thought” as speech does.  The 
political realm – which is defined by people acting, speaking and deliberating in concert – is also 
the space where judgment based on common sense is created and communicated through speech.  
The author figure that produces “poetic language” represents the opposite of speech and action in 
concert.  Arendt notes this and purposefully drives a wedge between the two since the analog to 
such an author figure in the political realm raises the specter of tyranny. 
As many critics have noted, this is where Arendt’s use and revision of Kant’s idea of 
common sense emerges.  Arendt’s idea of speech presupposes two things.  As Jurgen Habermas 
notes Arendt’s notion of speech presupposes a non-coercive “common course of action” for its 
listeners and speakers (Habermas 257).  Secondly, as Andrew Norris notes it also assumes that 
all phenomena are primarily “that which appears to others,” (Norris 170).  It is from this 
capricious, yet communal appearance that we achieve human distinctiveness and unified 
belonging.  By borrowing Kant’s idea of aesthetic judgment, Arendt abandons his notion of 
impartial political judgment.  Common sense becomes a public, non-objective and non-coercive 
means of recognition.  Arendt was aware that Kant’s political writings, which rest political 
judgment with a disinterested sovereign ruler, could not constitute a properly free political realm.  
Also, Arendt had to have recognized that for Kant, common sense did not hold a place for the 
kind of secular moral judgment she sought to elaborate in the political realm.  In fact, the 
Critique of Judgment
Arendt’s common sense has its roots in the Greeks.  Specifically, it calls to mind 
Aristotle’s split with Plato over the idea of the good and the relevance of practical knowledge.  
However, in both 
, Kant excludes common sense from his concept of moral philosophy. 
The Human Condition and On Revolution, she reveals that the weight of her 
understanding owes more to the practical attitude of Roman interpretations of common sense.  
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This decisive split in the Romans had to do with their rejection of the “theoretical speculations” 
of Greek philosophers as Hans-Georg Gadamer writes in Truth and Method, (Gadamer).  In On 
Revolution, Arendt’s interest in creating a parallel between the derivation of Roman law from 
the concept of lex, (or “intimate connection”) and America’s own “covenant making” marks her 
reliance on the secular immanence of common sense.  Establishing such a parallel writes the 
American Revolution within a humanist tradition stemming from Aristotle to the Roman 
Republic and then lost until fleetingly appearing the eighteenth century.   The Human Condition 
is where Arendt, in a more modern attitude, uses the concept of common sense as a critique of 
modern scientific reasoning based in the categorical thought of eighteenth-century rationalism.  
Ironically, Arendt joins a genealogy of humanist thinkers – beginning with Giambattista Vico – 
for whom common sense was intimately tied to hermeneutical forays into philology and rhetoric.  
Arendt, as a student of Martin Heidegger, clearly shares their philological and rhetorical interest 
in the power of words and speech.  Further, like Vico, Arendt sees common sense as a vehicle of 
criticism and way of forming truth, (Gadamer).  Owing to her Aristotelian and Kantian 
predilections however, she shies away from the line from Vico to Bergson that embraces the 
poetics of speech and human action within this sense.  While speech is the “living sense” that can 
create such common sense, literature on the other hand is dead thought.  The weight of 
literature’s dead language can give us a memory of what was.  But within the political realm only 
living speech creates knowledge and forms a community capable of making judgment.   Speech 
and its potential to convey common sense is as close to “reason” that humanity can get, and here 
is where Arendt’s Kantian sensibilities are the most obvious.  Nonetheless, it is through speech 
that Arendt feels “things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their 
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identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity.”  
It is only here that “worldly reality truly and reliably appear,” to us (Arendt 57).    
Despite the many ways their interests intersect, Arendt’s dismissal of literature clearly 
puts her at odds with Ellison.  Beyond her general skepticism of rhetorical and literary language, 
Arendt’s attack on the novel furthers this split.  As a genre of “chance” and “fate,” Arendt 
suggests that – at least in the hand of the Naturalists – the novel can only “present” the 
passionate response of humans to an inhuman fate.  The novel only pantomimes the agency that 
the human will would have in actual worldly affairs.  For Arendt even this act of mimicry 
remarks on the novel’s abject status.  All the novel did was project a world where “artists” and 
“intellectuals” were protected from the cruel world of chance that visited “philistines,” (Arendt 
141).  If taken as a critique of Naturalism (beginning with Balzac) then Ellison would 
undoubtedly share Arendt’s sentiments.  Combined with Arendt’s more systemic comments on 
literature, her understanding of the novel only intensify her general dismissal of literature as an 
inquiry into truth or model for the possibility of speech.               
  This battle over how we define our inquiries into the truth frame Arendt’s second and 
most iconic appearance in Who Speaks for the Negro.  Warren does not prompt Ellison to 
discuss “Reflections.”  Instead, Ellison invokes “Reflections” in the midst of a response about 
Kenneth Clark, the social psychologist made famous in the Brown vs. Board of Education case.  
Clark, whose Dark Ghetto and other writings dismiss Martin Luther King’s tactics of non-
violence, is cast in a similar light as Irving Howe in “The World and the Jug.”  As Ellison tells 
Warren, the only way Clark and others will become interested in the “plight” of Southern 
Negroes is through “a description, replete with graphs, statistics and footnotes, of Negro life as 
so depraved, hopeless and semi-human that the best service that money could perform would be 
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to stuff the mouths of the describers so that the details of the horror could stop” (Warren 340-
1).45
For Ellison, there is will and thinking contained in Martin Luther King’s non-violence.  
King’s “humility,” is not the irrational, pathological response to Southern racist violence Clark 
would make it out to be.
  As with Howe in “The World and the Jug”, Ellison’s critique of Clark is bound up with an 
attack on deductive and sociological modes of inquiry.  “Graphs, statistics and footnotes,” are 
only capable of describing the “depraved, hopeless and semi-human” aspects of Negro life.  
Clark’s valuation of Southern (and Northern) Blacks eliminates what Ellison calls the “necessary 
psychological complexity” needed to understand and respond to American racism.  Instead, 
Ellison says Clark imposes a “psychological norm,” upon Negro life that inadequately interprets 
the way blacks might understand their American experience.  As with Howe’s “Realism,” 
Clark’s psychological portrait of black life renders it as purely sensuous and not willful, 
reactionary and not thoughtful.     
46
                                                            
45 Ellison’s critique of Clark here reminiscent of his criticism of Gunner Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, which 
was written almost 20 years before.  Clark was a student of Myrdal’s at Columbia and Ellison’s comments in Who 
Speaks for the Negro echo his earlier criticisms of Myrdal method of studying Black life.  Part of this description 
entails a not very casual link between the empirical powers of social science and the institutions of capital, 
bureaucracy and finance.  Ellison makes similar connections in his unpublished review of An American Dilemma in 
1944.  The problem of race and its relationship to this same triumvirate can be found in many of his essay and 
interviews like “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity,” “Some Questions and Some 
Answers,” and other places.  Ellison’s insights into the exploitative dimensions of advanced capitalism are hard to 
pin down.  It is clear that he understands its exploitative effects though the aftermath of racial slavery and Gilded 
Age industrial capitalism.  There is no explicit systematic position Ellison expresses on the relationships between 
labor, capital, science and industry.  Where Ellison discusses language and literary form is where this becomes 
complicated.  He has no problem combining technological and organic metaphors in his description of literary 
practices.  When it comes to criticizing the social sciences, Ellison does not shy away from making the connection 
between science, capitalism and the effective exploitation of labor.  In fact, in his review of Myrdal he writes that 
An American Dilemma creates a “more effective blueprint for the exploitation of the South’s natural, industrial and 
human resources,” (Ellison, 337.)  It seems that Ellison accuses Kenneth Clark’s project, the Harlem Youth 
Opportunities Unlimited of the same thing.        
  In counter-distinction to the historical baggage and hopeless 
46 In “A Strategy for Change,” the penultimate chapter of The Dark Ghetto, Clark argues that the integrationist, non-
violent political strategy of Martin Luther King suffers from an unrealistic, if not pathological basis.  He writes that 
the “natural” reactions to injustice, oppression and humiliation are “bitterness and resentment,” (Clark 218).  What 
Clark reserves the bulk of his criticism for is the “philosophical and strategic” significance of King’s philosophy.  
These are things that Clark says, “could only appeal to the educated or to White liberals,” (218).  It is in the 
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pessimism Clark saw in King’s strategies, Ellison thought there was a “great power in humility,” 
(Ellison, 341).  He continues: 
Getting back to King and Clark, I think this – and it might sound mystical, but I 
don’t think so because it is being acted out every day: there is a great power in 
humility.  Dostoevski has made us aware – in fact, Jesus Christ has made us 
aware.  It can be terribly ambiguous and it can contain many, many contradictory 
forces, and most of all, it can be a form of courage.  Martin Luther King isn’t 
working out of yesterday or the day before yesterday.  He is working out of a long 
history of Negro tradition and wisdom, and he certainly knows more about the 
psychology of his fellows than Dr. Clark.  He knows that these people have been 
conditioned to contain not only the physical pressures involved in their struggle, 
but that they are capable, through this same tradition, of mastering the 
psychological pressures of which Clark speaks (Ellison 341, italics mine). 
As was the case with Howe, Ellison’s critique of Clark judges his deductive modes of inquiry as 
inherently “negative.”  Neither Clark nor Howe seeks active thinking – what Ellison refers to as 
“mastery” in this passage – but quantifiable reaction and pathology.  These are the values easily 
documented through “graphs, statistic and footnotes.”  Ellison starts out describing humility as 
“mystical” but then quickly corrects this by situating humility’s “every day” acts into a trans-
historical legacy of literary and historical figures.  Ellison begins with Dostoyevsky, whose 
pivotal presence in his response suggests two intertwined narratives.  In Demons, The Idiot and 
Notes From Underground
                                                                                                                                                                                               
“natural” reaction towards injustice that Clark places authenticity but it is precisely the “unrealistic” character of 
King’s response that Ellison’s wants to place both truth and value.  
, Dostoyevsky literary works were in part skeptical polemics against 
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the positivist rational ideas of progress infiltrating Russian politics and culture.  Literature and 
the willful potential it embodied were presented in Dostoyevsky’s works as a response to the 
many guises of this positivism.  Dostoyevsky’s American appeal was in part based on this 
element of his thinking and like Irving Howe – Ellison embraced Dostoyevsky precisely because 
his works represented an opposition to the dogma associated with proletariat realist fiction 
during the Thirties.  For Ellison especially, this dogma was heavier when it came to the 
representation of Blacks in literature. 
The humanistic and redemptive example of literature also blends with Dostoyevsky’s 
known Christian sensibilities.  Salvation’s potential in works like The Idiot and The Brothers 
Karamazov
Ellison’s placement of Martin Luther King’s “humility” and the “long history of Negro 
tradition and wisdom” within such a constellation are telling.  It represents a fusion of the more 
secular modernist version of American humanist inquiry and the politics of Black vernacular 
 are only achieved by tragic sacrifice.  It is no coincidence then that Ellison goes from 
Dostoyevsky to Christ in the above passage.  Despite Ellison’s movement back through time as 
well as from the secular to the sacred, he is always still centered upon the word.  Christ is as 
much a literary figure as he is both a spiritual and historical personage.  Outside of 
Dostoyevsky’s own invocation, Christ’s tragic sacrifice resonates within American literary and 
political traditions.  There is on one side the line coming out of Emersonian Transcendentalism 
and reaching its apogee in the liberal democratic politics of the Cold War.  The tragic figure of 
Christ resonates in writers like Emerson, Melville, Kenneth Burke, Faulkner, Schlesinger, 
Niebuhr and Ellison himself.  In all, Christ is representative of the universal and also America’s 
historical struggle for freedom.  This Judeo-Christian trajectory suggests that a free willed choice 
resides in sacrifice.   
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conceptualizations of Christ.  The complex role Christ and Christianity play within Black social 
and political discourses of freedom are testified to by the works of E. Franklin Frazier, C. Eric 
Lincoln, Albert Raboteau and James Cone.  In The Black Church Since Frazier (1974) Lincoln 
places King’s blend of social activism and Christian sensibility within the permeable boundaries 
between the Black Church and the public sphere Frazier documented in The Negro Church in 
America (1963). Frazier ends The Negro Church in America stating that the Black church’s 
centrality to black social formation is unequivocally pertinent to the secular comportment of 
Black participation in American political and intellectual life.  Cone’s version of this same 
dynamic does not end in such an integrationist tone.  Stretching from David Walker to Malcolm 
X, Cone links the historically political nature of Black Christianity to the anti-colonial discourses 
of Liberation Theology during the Cold War.  In A Black Theology of Liberation
Beginning this constellation with Dostoyevsky demonstrates where Ellison’s sensibilities 
rest.  The very things Dostoyevsky meant for Ellison’s generation of writers he finds embodied 
in King and the “Negro wisdom” he brings to American social life.  In the same way 
Dostoyevsky’s works engaged Russia’s positivist political discourses of the late nineteenth 
century – discourses often hinged around the ideologies of racism and nationalism – King’s 
“humility” engages a similar American phenomena.  “Humility” then actively functions as a 
skeptical and secular engagement with the presence of racism in America.  As Ellison writes, 
through “humility” the irreconcilable clash between the “implicit heroism of people who must 
 (1970) Cone 
fits King’s Christian sensibilities within this ethos.  Ellison’s version of King clearly fits within 
the secular, Cold War integrationist and American modernist ethos of Ellison’s thought and 
writing.  Ellison’s version of King, while suggesting the complexities of Civil Rights politics 
during the Cold War is clearly an example of this American secular invocation.     
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live within a society without recognition, real status,” but who are also ironically “involved in 
the ideals of that society,” is revealed (Ellison 342).  Yielded from this clash are truth and the 
capabilities of judgment, since “such people learn more about the real nature of that 
society….They might not be able to spell it out philosophically but they act it out.  And…against 
the white man’s indictments of this conduct, [it produces] folkways and values which express 
their sense of social reality…” (Ellison 343, emphasis Ellison’s).  Simultaneously, “humility” 
also creates the possibility of transcendence, a concept sitting on the other side of Dostoyevsky’s 
concern with humanity and clearly part of King’s political strategy against segregation.  When 
we encounter Ellison’s description of this transcendence it appears to clash with his own secular 
sensibilities.  At times he speaks a metaphysical and romantic language of “universality” and 
recognizing the shared “core” within our shared human experience.  This metaphysical 
characteristic reaches its apogee near the end of Ellison’s interview with Warren.  Here, Ellison 
associates the transcendent, “human side” of interracial communication (won through the 
political effects of humility) in the American South outside of “political and social and 
ideological” reality (Warren 344).  He describes this reality as a “particularly negative art form” 
draining the “energy of the imagination,” and “breaking up” the human ideal (Warren 344). 
As David Harvey writes in The Condition of Postmodernity, the rebirth of an 
international and universal political ethics was simultaneously expressed in Modernist aesthetic 
expansions and experimentations with time and space in art (Harvey 273).  In bringing together 
Dostoyevsky, Christ and Martin Luther King Ellison juxtaposes this triumvirate of heroic, trans-
historical figures against the “negative art form” of parochial American Southern reality.  The 
new version of humanistic continuity Ellison establishes here also demonstrates a complex 
version of historical time symptomatic of what Harvey calls the “privileging of conceptual space 
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over the linearity of homogeneous time (Harvey 273).  For Ellison, what unites Dostoyevsky, 
Christ and King are their shared conceptual notions of humanistic freedom; one that is 
unbounded by geographic or racial belonging.  Also, in a very familiar rhetorical move, Ellison 
figuratively associates the American “South” with the same sociological and rationalist methods 
of inquiry hampering the achievement of “human communication…and social intercourse,” 
(Warren, 344).  In an echo of Ellison’s debate with Howe in the New Leader
These “negative art forms” are not only juxtaposed with art writ large, but with the 
complex Modernist lineage of the novel Ellison often returns to in his works.  As I have 
suggested above, Dostoyevsky’s presence represents the invocation of this tradition and its links 
to post-Civil War American literature and Cold War intellectual humanism.  Creating continuity 
between the literary works of Dostoyevsky and the actions of Martin Luther King, Ellison 
demonstrates how these American phenomena is part of a poetic humanist continuum.  In the 
United States this continuum challenges the imaginative and intellectual parochialism driving the 
violence of segregation, the inquiries of sociology and Naturalism’s style.  This dangerously 
unimaginative, anti-humanist parochialism defined part of American “common sense” for 
Ellison.  From Jefferson’s 
, he links Kenneth 
Clark’s sociological thought with the roots of southern segregationist thought.  Both are 
examples of race-based intellectual parochialism, which limits the potentiality for a transcendent 
concept of humanist understanding.  And while Ellison’s critique of positivist science and 
contentious embrace of American “vernacular” forms brings to mind Leo Marx’s pastoral 
modernism his intentions cannot be completely read in the “Great Divide” narrative of 
Modernism (Huyssen 15).  
Notes on the State of Virginia to Kenneth Clark’s and Arendt’s 
misreading of race; Ellison saw the “negative art” of America’s “common sense” sealing the fate 
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of human possibility.   Dostoyevsky’s figurative appearance in this interview is used to suggest a 
genealogy suggesting another version of American “common sense.”   
Illuminating the link from King to Dostoyevsky moves us closer towards understanding 
Ellison’s place within the poetic traditions of inquiry and critique begun in Vico’s The New 
Science.  As was Vico’s intention so was Ellison’s.  In differing contexts both sought a method 
of studying human action that left behind the legacy of Positivism and mechanistic philosophies 
that read a priori presuppositions into the study of human life.  Vico’s “new science” was to use 
the resources of philology to recovery a sense of human beginnings out of human vernacular 
language use.  He argued that the development of humanity should not be studied through a 
concept of “natural law” but by the dynamic relationship between words, and human custom, 
human speech and the institutions developed from them.  As Vico wrote in The New Science, 
In “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity,” Ellison wrote that 
“perhaps the most insidious and least understood form of segregation is that of the word…for if 
the word has the potency to revive and make us free, it has also the power to blind imprison and 
destroy,” (Ellison 81).  Ellison’s response to Arendt’s “Reflections” in 
the 
“sequence of human institutions sets the pattern for the histories of words” and these words are 
“carried over from bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind 
and spirit,” (Vico 78).  Placing the “institutions of mind and spirit” within the realm of deed and 
speech, Vico’s axioms on etymology open up the radical possibility that our principles of 
humanity must be understood by studying the generative potentiality of words and actions 
themselves.   
Who Speaks for the 
Negro demonstrates that in both the eighteenth and twentieth-century, American words and deed 
are literally a paradox to the rationality of our political institutions and their ability to capture a 
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“common sense.” Despite Arendt’s attempt to articulate an inclusive, non-legislative political 
space, black political action and American anti-black racism creates a conundrum to the 
humanism she sees in American political traditions.  The philosophical and imaginative 
limitations Arendt puts on human action and speech are revealed in her inability to comprehend 
Black political acts.  Arendt does not understand that American “common sense” – 
communicated by speech and action – casts blacks outside of its realm understanding.  This, as I 
have argued, has as much to do with Arendt’s narrow interpretation of American political theory 
as with her narrow conceptualization of language.  In her rejection of the “word’s” poetic 
potential she also limits her ability to understand “speech” as a true space for civic recognition.  
Juxtaposed to this is Ellison’s broader understanding of human activity.  The potential for 
humanity Ellison sees in literary language and speech corrects the failures of America’s 
“common sense,” which does not properly fit blacks within its idea of the human.  Ellison 
centralizes a more dynamic sense of belonging through an appeal to literature which allows him 
to unite words of Dostoyevsky to the deeds of Martin Luther King.  By creating this integrative 
space of “speech,” Ellison continued to read into American literary traditions an imaginative 
alternative to America’s legacy of segregation by word and deed.   
Despite their difference, the Cold War drew Ralph Ellison and Hannah Arendt together.  
Their initial works Invisible Man and The Origins of Totalitarianism were responses to World 
War II and the significant changes that war wrought upon the twentieth century.  Working in 
different genres and traditions, Arendt and Ellison’s works were part of America’s intellectual 
front line heading into the Cold War.  There they were joined by Lionel Trilling’s The Liberal 
Imagination published in 1950 and Arthur Schlesinger’s Jr.’s The Vital Center: The Politics of 
Freedom published in 1949.  Ellison’s response, a work of fiction and Arendt’s, a work of 
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political philosophy, are united still in their mutual forging and use in the arena of Cold War 
American anti-communism.  Even before the onset of the Cold War both Ellison and Arendt 
separately critiqued the intellectual roots from which Communism emerged: ideological thought.  
It is ideology, as Arendt often says, that reveals Modernity’s newest and most indelible stamp 
upon political thought.  At the end of Origins, Arendt defines ideology as “the logic of an idea” 
as it is applied to the events of history.  Ideology’s power comes from the instrumental force of 
its own logic, which can predict the inherent movement of events.   For the “ideas” rooted within 
any given ideology, there is no need for an “outside factor” to set an event in motion.  Hence, she 
distinguishes this modern application of an idea’s “logic” from the eternal eidos of Plato and 
Kant’s concept of “regulative principle of reason” (Arendt 469).  Ellison’s understands the effect 
of ideological thought in similar ways.  In letters to Richard Wright as early as 1937, written 
before his split with the CPA, Ellison expresses a concern about ideological constraints Marxist 
thought put on poetic and literary expression (Fabre).  Ellison’s concern with Marxist ideology’s 
effect on literary expression also extended to his concern over its effect within literary criticism.  
His public responses to Irving Howe’s “Black Boys and Native Sons” on the pages of The New 
Leader in 1963-4 are perhaps the most iconic and famous expressions of this concern.  It was not 
Marxist ideology alone Ellison bristled under.  In a 1964 review of Amiri Baraka’s Blues People 
for the New York Review of Books
For Ellison as with Arendt, it is with the “word” where the potential for democratic 
plurality and the problem of ideology is the most destructive.  However it was Arendt’s 
 Ellison shows why he was not the most popular writer with 
the Black Arts movement.  The problem with Baraka’s analysis of the blues music was the rigid 
correlation Baraka created between “color, education, income and the Negro’s preference in 
music” (Ellison 282).                   
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misunderstanding of the “word” and its American context that brought Ellison’s critique.  One 
important question is how far does Ellison’s critique of Arendt’s politics go?  In On Violence
Ellison, who was aware of this aboriginal contradiction in “common sense,” was also 
unapologetic about The Black Power Movement and its aesthetic arm – the Black Arts 
Movement.  Much of his writing and interviews during the 1960s reveals this.  His above review 
of Baraka’s 
, 
Arendt puts Frantz Fanon and the Black Power movement at the center of her polemic.  She is 
unapologetic about her fear and unflinching with her warnings about their liberation politics.  
Both Fanon and the Black Power Movement were indicative of a larger and more disturbing 
trend in modern Western politics: the destruction of proper political power and their institutions.  
In their stead, all that was left are the implements of force.  Arendt never seemed to understand 
that this very force, founded before Modernity’s birth has always been used against Blacks in 
America as well as Black Algerians by the French.  Instead, she mistakenly saw this force only 
arising at the end of the nineteenth-century and welded by the children of Rousseau’s natural 
rights philosophy.  
Blues People, an address given to the Free Library in 1967, a tribute to Duke 
Ellington written in 1968, and perhaps most tellingly, his testimony in front the United States 
Senate in 1967 betray Ellison’s political predilections.  Like Arendt, Ellison sees Black Power as 
a symptom of the dissolution of political power and the decadence chaos of modern times.  
Instead of “aspiring to project a vision of the complexity and diversity of the total experience,” 
Ellison says, writers lose faith and “falls back on something which is called black comedy – 
which is neither black nor comic, but a cry for despair,” (Ellison 764).  Ellison was beginning to 
draw a distinction during the 1960s.  Those black children fighting segregation in the 1950s and 
early 60s were seen as part of his own “literary” common sense.  He believed this so much that 
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he enveloped them within the descriptive aesthetics of the novel during his interview in Who 
Speaks For the Negro
Concerning Black Power, a topic Ellison is silent on in his published writing, his indirect 
dismissal of its sociology and ideology are similar to Arendt’s own rejection of the unfortunate 
political power these positivist scientific pursuits weld.  When Ellison’s more direct concern with 
politics does appear it is attached – just as Arendt in 
.  It makes sense that Ellison could draw such an intimate relationship 
between the potential of literature and the attempts of these Blacks to “truly and readily appear” 
in the desegregating south.  As Ellison writes, being a Negro “imposes the uneasy burden and 
occasional joy of a complex double vision, a fluid, ambivalent response to men and events, 
which represents, at its finest a profoundly civilized adjustment to the cost of being human in this 
modern world,” (Ellison 178).  While they were still kept from that “common world” Arendt 
assumed existed in America Ellison saw Blacks expressing its common sense nonetheless.  The 
same burden of humanity Ellison sees expressed by the actions of Blacks he also sees in the 
American novel.  But Ellison saw the art and artists affiliated with the Black Arts movement as a 
repudiation of all these things.  Instead of a complex Duboisian “double vision” or a fluid 
“response to men and events,” Ellison saw these Black Artists as moving swiftly away from 
accepting this burden.  The young black artists he shared the late 1960s with were part of the 
“cacophony of styles” endemic of mass culture.   As writers they were more interested in being 
“sociologists” than projecting a comparative vision of Negro American experience out of the 
“broad knowledge of how people of other cultures live” (Ellison 747).   
On Revolution – to the founding documents 
of the American Republic.  As he writes in “Society Morality and the Novel,” these documents 
“form the ground of assumptions upon which our social values rest; they inform our language 
and our conduct with public meaning, and they provide the broadest frame for our most private 
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dramas, (Ellison 702).  Ellison even repeats Arendt’s claim when he writes that there is a 
“superstitious overvaluation of Europe” and not enough attention to the “explicitness of the 
omnipresent American ideal,” (702).  Whether it is because of the acute political failures of 
America to live up to this heritage in the 30s and then in 60s it is not towards politics that Ellison 
suggests we turn to understand these social values, language or conduct.  Instead these principles 
are best expressed in the “consciousness of those writers who created what we consider our 
classic novels,” (702).  Predictably, he goes on to list Hawthorne, Melville, James and Twain as 
examples of this proper novelistic practice.  Nor is it to politics that Ellison suggests we turn to 
achieve the sort of “common sense” Arendt sees as achieved in political deliberation.  Again, it is 
the novel which can “communicate with us…by appealing to that which we know, though actual 
experience or through (other) literature, to be the way things occur” (Ellison 697).  Between the 
novelist and the reader there must exist “a body of shared assumptions concerning reality and 
necessity, possibility and freedom, personality and value, along with a body of feelings, both 
rational and irrational, which arise from the particular circumstances of their mutual society,” 
(697). 
The large “body of shared assumptions” Arendt saw within the politics of deliberation 
Ellison saw in a mixed tradition of post-bellum American fiction and European Modernism.  It 
was only when the designs of politics entered American literary criticism and the practice of art 
these “shared assumptions” are lost.  In his interview with Warren, Ellison saw all African-
Americans “caught up” in the egalitarian ideals of American life but simultaneously caught up in 
their continued contradiction, whether that is the de facto or de jure practices of racism.  Ellison 
places the blame for this with a reality defined by political, social and ideological concepts.  
Perhaps it is for this reason he gives Warren such a literary way to explain Martin Luther King 
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and Negro protest in Who Speaks for the Negro
Throughout the 60s, Ellison – as well as his Cold War contemporaries from the Forties – 
would continually fall back on this “broad knowledge,” best expressed (for them at least) in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century American and European novel.  But we must wonder 
whether Ellison and contemporaries like Arendt were just as guilty of blending politics and 
aesthetics.  And if so how were they doing this?  When the Congress for Cultural Freedom – a 
high profile international consortium of artists and intellectuals created in 1947 – was exposed as 
a Central Intelligence Agency front in 1967 it was revealed that its tendrils stretched into the 
very intellectual and cultural life of this country. Ellison himself was a member of the American 
Committee for Cultural Freedom.  During the 50s and 60s many of Ellison’s essays were 
published in journals under the editorial steward of intellectuals associated with the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom or indirectly funded (and in some instances directly funded) by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (Saunders 101, 162, 179).  From 
.  It reveals Ellison’s own understanding that 
“common sense” – at least the sort described by Arendt in “Reflections” and elsewhere – has yet 
to be achieved in politics.  For Ellison, it is to be found in the words “spoken” within the novel – 
albeit a very specific version of the novel.   With this, Ellison, unlike Arendt, veers closer to 
Vico and the embrace of rhetorical and literary languages’ potential for conveying such sense.  
When crafted properly Ellison believed that literature was the “positive” art form capable of 
capturing our humanity.  In the novel, our eventful past and lost human conditions are made to 
endure through the shaping of our speech and the language used to create it.  
Partisan Review to Prevue, the same 
Modernist American and European artistic traditions championed and utilized by writers like 
Ellison were also used to wage an intellectual battle with the Soviet Union.  The same “black 
comics” Ellison derides in later writings – comics he pointed towards the modernism of 
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Faulkner, James and Dostoyevsky –  were also designated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s COINTELPRO program as terrorist “enemies of the state” in 1968, (Churchill).  
All of this should give us pause since it brings up the pernicious exercises of force by the US 
State during the Cold War.   
By the 70s, when Ellison turned his mind towards finding America’s “common sense,” 
he sought it out in the traditional disciplines of sociology, philology history and literary criticism.  
More importantly, he looked for it in the broad knowledge offered in nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century American novelistic fiction.  Was Ellison’s burgeoning interest in American 
language an occasion to transcend this pernicious reasoning and use of force by the US State?  
As Walter Benjamin asks in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” was 
Ellison turning these politics into art or was he politicizing art against it?  It is to this next phase 
of Ellison search for the “common sense” of American literary language that we should turn 
next.  
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Chapter 4: An Integrative Vernacular 
Out of all the significant events occurring in the United States one particular set of 
changes has had and continues to have a profound effect on American life.  With the destruction 
of Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Movement had achieved its most important task.  It had 
vanquished the central juridical quagmire of American political and social life.  As history has 
borne out though, the solution to this problem has only exposed the deeper architectonic 
structure of racism and the shifting grounds of humanism in America.  The solution, known as 
“integration,” was a based on the legal and moral principles founded in the Brown vs. Board of 
Education decision in 1954.  As these safeguards against Jim Crow’s reappearance were 
implemented, they released unpredictable social and political forces into the dynamo of 
American life. 
Integration describes a whole host of technological, economic and social changes in the 
United States and globally.  It was used as a slogan for federally mandated racial reconciliation 
that has cemented the concept in the minds of Americans.  Abolishing the legal grounds for 
“separate but equal” institutions led to what Orlando Patterson in The Ordeal of Integration: 
Progress and Resentment in America’s “Racial” Crisis calls the “paradoxes of integration” 
(Patterson 15). While the federal government continued to pass legislation dismantling the legal 
legacy of Jim Crow, Patterson discovers that the same post-Brown vs. Board decades saw an 
increase in racial chauvinism (Patterson 65).  Literally and intellectually, the field of literary 
criticism was not immune to this “integrationist” impulse or its paradoxical consequences.  The 
influence of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism in literary criticism had a profound effect on 
how African-American literary works were read by African-American scholars.  During this time 
Ralph Ellison published “The Little Man in Chehaw Station: The American Artist and His 
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Audience” in The American Scholar (1977).  Ellison’s essay does not bear the overt marks of 
these interpretive sea changes.  However, the essay undoubtedly taps into the social and political 
vectors of integration simultaneous with these academic events.       
For the proponents of theory’s embrace, Ellison’s “Little Man” essay seemed to fit 
perfectly.  So much so that Ellison’s essay would become a crucial touchstone for Post-
Structuralist and Cultural Studies readings of African-American literature.  Early critics such as 
Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Houston Baker read into Ellison’s description of the artistic process as 
both “coopera [tion] and resist [ance]…” echoes of Derrida.  Ellison’s essay was just another 
example of the applicability of post-Structuralist semiotic approach to language to African-
American literature.  
Looking back on this period, an obvious change does come over Ellison’s writing during 
the 1970s.  It makes sense that his work would be used to engender post-Structuralist, vernacular 
readings of African-American literature.  The fact is “vernacular culture” does begin to occupy a 
more explicit role in Ellison’s reflection on and understanding of American identity.  As a 
poignant sign of times, so does the word integration.  Whenever this later term appears in his 
writings, as it does in essays like “Going to the Territory,” (1979) “Perspective of Literature” 
(1976), the aforementioned “Little Man” (1977) and his 1981 “Introduction” to Invisible Man
In “Ellison’s Racial Variations on American Themes”, Kun Jong Lee sees antagonistic 
cooperation as an anticipation of black Post-Structuralist interpretations of literature (Lee 433-4).  
 
others, it is more often than not linked to the “dynamic process” of vernacular creation (608).  
Central to Ellison’s adoption of integration and the vernacular is his use of the term “antagonistic 
cooperation.”   
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However, when we trace the roots of this term and Ellison’s particular use of it in “Little Man”, 
it does not readily yield the proto post-modern or racialist readings projected onto his essay.  
Ellison’s use of “antagonistic cooperation”, a term he borrows from the late nineteenth century 
sociologist William Graham Sumner, is linked to his continued search for a proper American 
“common sense.”  “Little Man” is years removed from his debates with Hannah Arendt over 
desegregation and Little Rock.  Nonetheless, I believe that in “Little Man” Ellison elaborates an 
alternative to the racialized metaphysics found in Arendt’s version of American “common 
sense.”  Instead of tracing the origins of black aesthetic practices or simply reiterating the 
“melting pot” thesis, I argue Ellison’s essay and its focus on “antagonistic cooperation” is the 
end product of a project to re-conceptualize the dominant metaphor of American social cohesion.  
This project culminated during the country’s transition from the Civil Rights Era.  And by the 
1970s, I see Ellison invoking “integration” to express these thoughts.   
Ellison’s aesthetic interpretation of antagonistic cooperation in “Little Man” and its 
connection to integration is no coincidence.  Reading the essays Ellison published during the 
1960s and combing through his archived papers at the Library of Congress shows that he had 
been thinking along these lines for at least a decade before “The Little Man” essay.  His tenure as 
the Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at New York University during the 1970s also 
had an overwhelming influence on these ideas and in particular “The Little Man” essay.   
As I will show in a reading of Ellison’s essay “The Myth of the Flawed Southerner” 
(1965), “On Bird, Bird-Watching and Jazz” (1962) and handwritten notes from his time at NYU, 
we see nascent versions of both “antagonistic cooperation” and integration in his thinking.  All of 
this culminates in the “Little Man” essay and what he called his poetic understanding of the 
“integrative, vernacular note” of American experience (Ellison “Miscellaneous”, 507).  Ellison’s 
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notes from the 1970s also reveal this aesthetic interest in antagonistic cooperation and 
“integration” is directly linked to Ellison’s anxiety over what he calls the “ideology of 
blackness”, a term he uses to identify the Black Arts and Black Power Movements.  Ellison’s 
elaboration of a poetic yet antagonistic vision of “integration” offers us a way to think about 
America’s transitional post-Civil Rights moment.  Like his peers, Ellison’s pessimism is 
connected to the new challenges life in the post-Civil Rights era presented to Americans and 
African-Americans alike.  Many African-American intellectuals in particular began to express a 
great deal of pessimism beginning in the 1970s and into 1980s.  Much of it was tied to the 
perception that once culturally cohesive African-American communities were fracturing in the 
face of urbanization and a globalizing, post-industrial market economy.  Preoccupying Ellison’s 
thoughts in particular was the threat Black Nationalism and essentialist ideology posed to 
American social cohesion.  In this vein, I see Ellison’s use of Sumner and his appropriation of 
integration as a counter to the social chaos he detected in these movements.  In spite of what 
some call Ellison’s “withdrawal” from active participation in African-American intellectual life 
during the 1960s and 70s, he echoes the same culturally based pessimism.47
To close this chapter I will read his melancholic optimism about the present into the 
Dantesque coal-heavers vignette that ends the essay.  Instead of being the moment of 
transcendence found in Canto XXXIV, I will read it through Canto X of the 
  In “Little Man” and 
other contemporaneous writings, Ellison articulates a hopeful but in the end rather pessimistic 
assessment of African-American (as well as American) life.   
Inferno
                                                            
47 When it comes to race matters, Ellison’s mandarin intellectual tendencies have been much debated.  Despite 
evidence that casts Ellison’s intellectual activities in a broader, more complicated Cold War context, recent studies 
by Jerry Gafio Watts and Arnold Rampersad have not tied Ellison views on race to the machinations of American 
state power in the cultural realm.  In fact, both authors use Ellison’s biography almost as a cautionary tale about the 
failure of African-American leadership.  Watts suggests that Ellison should have read his Gramsci and Rampersad 
sees Ellison as an embodiment of Bledsoe, the power-obsessed Dean in Ellison’s novel Invisible Man.  The irony of 
this last suggestion is interesting and shall be taken up in the conclusion of my dissertation.          
.  Drawing 
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parallels to Gramsci’s reading of Canto X in “Canto X of Dante’s Inferno”, I argue that Ellison is 
making a similar non-metaphysical, material claim to language and expression through the “little 
man” and coal heavers.  For Ellison, the question is not about the problem of “leadership” as 
Paul Bove reads into Gramsci’s interpretation (Bove 214).  Instead it is an attempt to displace the 
epistemological assumptions behind the question Farinata asks Dante and Virgil: “What is your 
name and race?”  Ellison’s “heretical” portrayal of the little man and coal heaver’s challenges the 
dogmatic political meanings these questions had during the time Ellison wrote his essay.  By 
casting this “little man” amidst the chaos of the 1970s, Ellison reveals the forces threatening the 
literary and historical significance of his little man.  Just as the Gilded Age roots of Ellison’s 
little man suggest a profoundly radical version of the human, at the same time, Ellison’s “little 
man” reminds us of his own complex political stance.  Ellison’s feelings about Black 
Nationalism are tinged with remnant, Cold War, anti-communist sentiments.  At the same time 
Ellison’s “little man” rescues a crucial element of America’s humanist past and suggests its 
necessity for the future, I read him as showing the author’s own exile and inability to properly 
see his present.             
The same year Robert Penn Warren’s interviewed Ralph Ellison in Who Speaks for the 
Negro? Ellison attended the National Festival for the Arts held at the White House.  With 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s commitment of more troops to Vietnam and the conspiratorial cloud 
enveloping Malcolm X’s recent assassination, the Festival became a charged political event.  
Ellison’s decision to attend drew criticism by those on the Left as well as fellow African-
American artists and intellectuals.  Outside of individual speaking engagements, it was not until 
he contributed to To Heal and to Build (1968), a compendium of essay on Johnson’s legacy that 
Ellison addressed his reasons for attending.  Ellison’s contribution, “The Myth of the Flawed 
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Southerner” also presents what I see as a turning point in his thinking.  Read in retrospect, it 
foreshadows the way Ellison would grapple with the concept of integration in the 1970s.  In 
“Myth”, Ellison’s comments about Johnson’s legislative achievements are scant.  Instead, the 
essay chides both the new and old Left for boycotting the National Festival for the Arts.  
Invoking his own “personal and group history” – a history he sees himself sharing with Johnson 
– Ellison suggest that his Southern identity and blackness compelled him to attend.  Both speak 
to “meanings that went deeper than the issue of the government’s role in the arts or the issue of 
Vietnam…” (555).48
                                                            
48 Robert Lowell’s open letter to the New York Times was the most public and forceful rebuff of the Festival.  As 
Robert Tomes suggests in Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War (1998), the boycott, along 
with the publication of Lowell’s “Waking Early Sunday Morning” in the New York Review of Books crystallized 
the growing dissatisfaction many artists and intellectuals had with the Johnson Administration’s policy in Vietnam.  
The boycott also exposed the growing tension within the left, which as they pertained to the Vietnam War, came to a 
head with the events of 1968.  Ellison’s comments in the midst of this are interesting.  Like Saul Bellow, John 
Hershey and others Ellison decided to attend despite his wish that the Vietnam War “be brought to a swift 
conclusion” (Ellison 554).  But unlike Bellow and Hershey clear disagreements with Johnson’s policy, Ellison was 
notorious for his equivocating stance on the war; a stance captured by the one direct statement he makes about it in 
this essay.  It was this issue that also distanced Ellison even further from African-Americans during this period.          
  
These meanings of course are the vexed history of anti-black racism and the continual 
attempts to reconcile America’s present with this troubled past.  His meeting with Johnson 
sparks Ellison to ruminate on Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.  He also ponders 
other post-Civil War interactions between African-Americans and past presidents. Johnson’s 
attempts to redress this past from the executive branch have in Ellison’s mind “changed the 
iconography of federal power” (Ellison 562).  Like Lincoln before him, Johnson has done what 
all great Presidents do in times of national turmoil, take “the essential conflicts of democracy – 
the struggle between past and present, class and class, race and race, region and region,” and 
bring them “into the most intense and creative focus” (Ellison 559).  
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Lincoln’s appearance and his comparison to Johnson in “Myth” should not be surprising.  
The centennial anniversary of the Civil War was celebrated just three years prior to the 
publication of Ellison’s essay.  Ellison, amongst many other intellectuals of the time, alludes to 
the resemblance between the 1960s and the 1860s.  In “Myth” Ellison makes this point 
explicitly.  Besides the historical allegory invoked by Lincoln’s appearance there is an aesthetic 
one as well.  Ellison’s reference to Lincoln, the invocation of the South and the White House 
scene he paints in “Myth” suggests the same catachresis between race and American power he 
portrayed in “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” (1965).  And like that essay, Ellison draws upon a mixed 
tradition of American literary history to understand it.  The myth Ellison refers to in his title is an 
old “slave borne myth” about a southerner who – regardless of his feelings towards blacks – can 
“move with tragic vulnerability towards the broader ideals of American democracy” (Ellison 
561).  Similar to his comments about Lincoln in “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” and also Martin Luther 
King Jr., in Who Speaks for the Negro
Once again, race and region generate the torturous ambiguity at the heart of American 
democracy.  This myth, like his tragic portrayal of Lincoln does not dispel this ambiguity.  And 
neither the southerner, nor the nation, necessarily transcends it.  As Ellison writes, this 
southerner is “flawed” (Ellison 561).  But in counter-distinction to the tragic dramaturgical 
, Ellison sees Johnson containing and ultimately mastering 
these conflicts.  Unlike King and Lincoln however, Johnson’s southern whiteness creates even 
more conflict with these goals.  Ellison’s representation of Lincoln focused on that president’s 
indeterminate racial status.  But in “Myth” Johnson’s whiteness is unambiguous.  Reminiscent of 
his lectures in Austria on Herman Melville and John Brown, this lack of ambiguity foregrounds 
the epistemological and symbolic problem “whiteness” poses to the achievement to the “broader 
ideals of American democracy.”                 
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allusion, this flaw is not fatal.  Ironically, not only is this flaw the source of Ellison’s 
identification with Johnson but without it, the myth itself could not exist.  But what sort of 
nascent metaphor for “integration” does this myth and Ellison’s essay present?  How does the 
“flawed Southerner” and Ellison, the representatives of seemingly insoluble principles of race 
and region, past and present, compare to other visions of social cohesion?  Is it similar to the 
“melting pot,” Schlesinger’s Cold War “vital center,” Arendt’s belief in “common sense”, 
Trilling’s “liberal imagination” or even Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society?”   
Instead of parsing the statistical or legislative concepts under-girding Johnson’s 
integrationist policies, Ellison remakes him into a late nineteenth century literary figure.  In the 
work of post-Reconstruction American writers like Charles Chesnutt, Mark Twain, Albion 
Tourgee and George Washington Cable, the “flawed southerner” is a figure encapsulating the 
forlorn hope of American progress during the Gilded Age.   Like Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn in 
Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn
For example, Jim’s “freedom” in 
 or Sheriff Campbell in Chesnutt’s “The Sheriff’s 
Children”, Ellison’s mythological white southerner does not completely abandon the symbolic 
and ideological power whiteness has given him.  Nor does an enlightened understanding of race 
lead them to recognize their shared humanity with blacks.  Like Twain’s and Chesnutt’s 
characters, Ellison’s flawed southerner recognizes that anti-black racism’s power is both 
instrumental and situational.   
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is just as easily 
made into a joke since Tom admits that he was going to pay Jim if they succeeded in releasing 
him (Twain 368).  And despite Sheriff Campbell’s decision to protect his mulatto son in “The 
Sheriff’s Children”, he fully recognizes that when it comes to race, equality in the face of the law 
is not guaranteed.  As he tells a mob of whites waiting to lynch his son, “I’m a white man 
178 
 
outside, but in this jail I’m sheriff” (Chesnutt 140).  If it is out of this literary and historical 
context Ellison’s “flawed southerner” emerges, then clearly he does not represent the 
assimilative utopia of the melting pot.  Nor does this figure suggest the presence of reason, 
something the lies behind both Schlesinger and Arendt’s concepts of American social and 
political cohesion.  The roots of Ellison’s myth indicate a combative relationship between race, 
civil society and literary presentation in America.  Neither a juridical (in the case of the Sheriff) 
nor moral (with Tom and Huck) appeal to humanity fully comprehends it. More importantly, this 
myth and literary works do not embody a vision of social progress.   
Such pessimism – especially about the possibility of racial reconciliation – was 
constitutive of the times Twain and Chesnutt wrote in.  Ironically then their presentation of 
blacks in fiction simultaneously embraces Gilded Age optimism yet exposes its progress as a 
disastrous version of Anglo-American exceptionalism.  The reintroduction of “the Negro” (as 
well as ethnic minorities) within the aesthetic realm has to be thought of in relationship to a 
triumvirate of forces: The plantation tale, minstrel entertainment and pseudoscientific thought 
about race and human progress.  And in one way or another each of these authors were 
influenced by these forces.  They are examples of the “scoffers” Henry May discusses in The 
End of American Innocence
Ellison’s metaphor of “civil war” very much fits the skeptical tenor of this period.  And 
the myth at the core of his essay – a mixture of black vernacular folk tale and late nineteenth 
century literary type – does not suggest a cessation to these hostilities.  The “flawed southerner” 
is Ellison’s hope that raciology does not completely arrest the democratic potentiality that racial 
 (May 201).  Yet even skeptical writers like Twain, Chesnutt, Cable 
and Tourgee, could not resist the aesthetic and intellectual whirlpool of forces perpetuating anti-
black racism.   
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chauvinism extinguishes.  Perhaps to Ellison, the “iconographic” changes Johnson makes are 
literal.  Instead of policy, Johnson has sent into circulation an old, yet necessary symbol of late 
nineteenth century mythology.  It is the composition of this myth (the contiguous blend of black 
folk tale and post-reconstruction literary trope) that “The Flawed Southerner” gives us a glimpse 
of the direction Ellison would take his understanding of integration in the 1970s.  After Ellison’s 
attendance at the festival, his interview with Robert Penn Warren and his eventual position as the 
Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at New York University in 1970, American 
political life strove to but did not appear to arrive at any form of common sense or integration.  
The diverse spectrum of political voices speaking during this time reached their nadir.  Three 
years after the festival Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy would also be assassinated.  
Lyndon B. Johnson, the very man Ellison celebrated in “Myth” chose not to run for reelection.   
Ellison’s remarks about Martin Luther King in Who Speaks for the Negro literarily 
represented the civil rights leader as a black and American approximation to “common sense”.  
But by the end of the Sixties even King’s transcendent potential became a threat to not an 
enrichment of America’s democratic foundations.  King’s murder was one of many incendiary 
events leading to America’s violent and tumultuous “Summer of 68”.  And it was during this 
long, hot summer that America’s concept of the “melting pot” and twentieth century promises of 
desegregation seemed to wash away in a tide of bloodshed.  If Martin Luther King symbolized 
the need to forge a true commonality within America’s civil and political “sense,” Presidential 
hopeful Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy symbolized the countervailing force at its core.  
King’s death and Nixon’s ascent marked the end of the Civil Rights Era – a swath of American 
history beginning with Reconstruction and ending with Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” 
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legislations. It also encapsulated the intertwined and conflicted relationship between Civil Rights 
Era politics and America’s international Cold War priorities.49
For many Americans voting in the 1968 Presidential Election, this violence became the 
civil rights era’s symbolic capstone.  Nixon and most of the GOP exploited this violence and ran 
on a platform emphasizing a return to “law and order”.  This not so subtle euphemism cast the 
agitation for civil and political rights as law breaking activities in need of punishment; not 
activities that sought political redress.  Just as importantly, the visage Nixon and Republican 
strategists gave this agitation was familiar.  It was what Thomas Jefferson saw waiting on the 
other end of Fortune’s wheel; the familiar mare disturbing America’s innocent slumber and 
republican dreams.  For once again, African-Americans had cast a long shadow upon America’s 
national politics.  Nixon’s Southern Strategy and its emphasis on “law and order” was a clear 
exploitation of America’s historic fear of black political insurrection.
   
50  In the wake of King’s 
assassination as well as the end of Johnson’s presidency both of these political agendas were 
substantially transformed.  In Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy
                                                            
49 Casting Martin Luther King as a threat was in part the job of COINTELPRO.  In the years after King’s 
assassination it was revealed that the United States Government had been spying on its own citizens since 1956.  
Given the title COINTELPRO, the United States used the Federal Bureau of Investigation to gather intelligence on 
specifically targeted domestic political groups.  Created to counter and destabilize the effectiveness of the CPUSA in 
the Fifties, by the late Sixties this organization was used by the FBI to track a host of domestic political groups.  
Categorized under “Black-Nationalist Hate Groups,” were groups ranging from The Black Panther Party to SNCC to 
Martin Luther King’s SCLC.  By the late Sixties King’s alignment with the anti-Vietnam War and organized labor 
movements made him look like the very “black messiah” the FBI feared would emerge.49   
 
50 The GOP’s veiled allusion to the civil rights movement and black protest in its “law and order” mantra spurred the 
next permutation of American conservatism into Neo-Conservatism.  Historians, economists, political scientists and 
other scholars have shown that the modern roots of Neo-Conservatism are found in the reaction stance the GOP took 
towards the Civil Rights movement.  The majority of this scholarly work has centered on the reactionary stance 
taken against Affirmative Action.  However, the revelation of domestic spying programs throughout the Cold War, 
the “terrorist” designation given to Black Liberation Movements and finally the relationship between tax reform and 
wealth redistribution in the wake of American urban riots show that anti-black racism in particular marshaled 
political forces that eventually evolved far beyond their roots in this racism.            
, Mary Dudziak writes that by the end of the Sixties “just as Vietnam had eclipsed 
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civil rights as a defining issue affecting U.S. prestige abroad, law and order had eclipsed social 
justice as a politically popular response to racial conflict” (Dudziak 248).  
The end of the Civil Rights era also marked the end of desegregation.  That term, which 
defined a legal goal and shaped political strategies, was replaced by a more nebulous and 
controversial idea: integration.  If desegregation was the battle to gain and enforce legal rights, 
integration’s goal – while clear – was much more complicated.  Two legislative actions by 
Lyndon B. Johnson buttressed America’s turn towards integration.  First was his Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the other was Presidential Executive Order 11246 in 1965.  Both called for 
“affirmative action” by federal contractors to insure that employment practices do not 
discriminate against minority candidates.  It is not until the early Seventies, when George Schultz 
revised Johnson’s mandate, which the political impact of integration trickled down into 
American social institutions.  This revision called for “proportional representation” in 
employment, elementary school and college admission decisions.  Despite the clear legacy of 
racial discrimination many saw integration as a threat to the perceived egalitarian meritocracy 
defining American social life.  These fears centered on the legal and statistical nature of this 
mandate since “proportional representation” invariably meant reverse discrimination to the 
critics of this practice.  Integration was understood as the answer to America’s legacy of 
segregation and inequity.   Yet by the 1970s, policy makers and pundits began to attack the legal 
and philosophical rationale undergirding integration.  That rationale was the Brown vs. Board of 
Education decision.   
As Richard H. King writes in “Race, Equality and ‘Hearts and Minds’” the attacks on 
Brown vs. Board of Education center on a fundamental conflict at the foundations of the 
decision.  Besides its origins in the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown emerges out of a specific 
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post-World War II intellectual context where a “universalist paradigm of thinking about race had 
emerged among intellectuals” (King 5).  From the UNESCO statement on racial equality in 1950 
to the publication of works like Theodore Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality
Alongside this juridical and international context was a countervailing discourse about 
race rooted in American social-scientific and psychological inquiry.  A key component to the 
Brown decision was the use of social psychology to legitimate the court’s decision.  Footnote 11 
contained arguments by Kenneth Clark and Gunnar Myrdal showing that segregation had an 
adverse affect on the psychological development of African-American youth.  This moral-
clinical discourse about the struggles facing African-American children (and culture) was 
indicative of the sociology of race practiced during the Cold War.  Despite the differences in 
their intention, Clark and Myrdal’s work about African-Americans existed on a continuum with 
other works during the Cold War like Stanley Elkins’ 
, King argues 
that the aftermath of World War II witnessed a vigorous dismantling of biological theories of 
racism (ibid).   Thought of in this context, Brown vs. Board was the product of an intellectual 
and social movement occurring on many fronts.  However, as Mary Dudziak suggests it was also 
another weapon in America’s Cold War battle with Soviet Russia.  School segregation, as all 
legal and vigilante forms of racial violence, was a public relations crisis for the American State 
(Dudziak). 
Slavery: A Problem in American 
Institutional and Intellectual Life (1959) and later Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report The Negro 
Family: The Case for National Action (1965).  All suggest that at the root of African-American 
cultural life there is, as King writes, a root pathology that has made African-American culture 
“inadequate to the tasks of modernity” (King 6).  The intellectual currency of this argument was 
powerful enough that it found its way into the Supreme Court’s ruling.  This despite the fact that 
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as an argument, Clark and Myrdal’s moral-clinical discourse undermined Brown’s strength as an 
interpretation of the constitution.  So instead of making the constitution “color-blind” as it were 
or focusing on the institutional roots of American racism, Brown, King writes, shifted attention 
to the “psychology/culture of the victims of discrimination and racism” (6).   
As the 1950s gave way to the more confrontational racial politics of the 60s and 70s, this 
moral-clinical discourse modulated as well.  Black Nationalism challenged the victimage 
arguments of the 50s but did not completely dispel them (King 7).  And if anything, the 
confrontational politics of the Black Power movement reinforced the sense that African-
Americans were not up to the tasks of modernity.  I doubt that Nixon’s use of the phrase “law 
and order” was a direct allusion to Enlightenment philosophy.  However, this phrase invokes a 
Hobbesian concept of civilization.  Nixon’s phrase suggests that the paradigmatic achievement 
of the nation-state is the imposition of “law and order.”  To read African-American political 
protest as opposed to this suggests an inherent tension between the achievement of African-
American political rights and the process of modernity itself.  So in many ways, “law and order” 
implies a “pathological” reading of African-American culture as an unruly element in the 
operations of American modernity.  Keeping the above account in mind, it would make sense 
that the actual implementation of integration was complex.  As Michael Dawson writes in Black 
Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, the benefits of 
dismantling Jim Crow were obvious for the majority of Americans.  However, broad changes in 
America’s political economy challenged the philosophical and legal underpinnings of Brown vs. 
Board.  Tied to the fracturing of traditional Civil Rights groups is the shift from Fordist 
economic arrangements to those of “flexible accumulation” (Dawson 37).  The two are 
commensurate since as Dawson suggests, the Fordist regime “integrated the racial and economic 
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orders” (37).  Beyond the effect these economic changes had on American political economy, the 
State had also waged a devastating campaign against dissonant groups in the America.  And the 
anarchic forces that emerged while the Civil Rights movement waned were destroyed both 
internally and externally.  Even if African-American political protest was part of a long tradition 
of American political unrest, those traditions were being disciplined at the end of the Cold War.            
While African-American culture became a celebrated and contested object of critical 
analysis, it also became the scapegoat for African American ills.  The –“pathological” school of 
cultural analysis was taken up by later African-American intellectuals.  From William Julius 
Wilson and Orlando Patterson to Cornel West and Henry Louis Gates Jr., all saw contemporary 
black life going through a crisis whose roots were “cultural”.  Much of this sentiment is captured 
in West’s term “black nihilism”.  As Madhu Dubey suggests in Signs and Cities: Black Literary 
Postmodernism (2003) it is no coincidence that the romantic excavation of an African-American 
Modernist past was the focus of so many African-American intellectuals during this period.  This 
romanticism was evident in African-American social scientists who argued that the benefits of 
Jim Crow were the creation of culturally cohesive black communities (Dubey 14).  It is hard not 
to think these critics have become black versions of Matthew Arnold.  African-American 
thinkers in this period of transition faced a complex landscape.  They saw these changes yet all 
of them chose not to think with them. Like his contemporaries, Ralph Ellison was quite vocal in 
labeling contemporary black culture anarchic compared to America’s cultured “Negro” past.  But 
as his writings of the period reveal, the past he sought to excavate was neither completely 
reactionary nor romantic.  Ellison’s “Flawed Southern”, which was a figural integration of 
racism and democratic sentiment, slave tale and American literary conventions, foreshadows the 
lines of thought from the past Ellison would pick up in the 1970s.   
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As Jim Crow unraveled into the prime knot of integration, Ellison became the Albert 
Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at New York University in 1970.  Swimming with some 
of the reactionary academic tide of his time, Ellison refused to teach courses in African-
American Literature (Rampersad 435).  While programs like Yale, University of Pittsburgh, and 
San Francisco State University were integrating this emerging discipline into their curriculum, 
Ellison wanted no part.  It is not as if he was not concerned with race (something we will see his 
courses bear out).  But it did seem as if he saw these courses as a negative byproduct of the 
Black Power and the Black Arts Movements.  This attitude becomes evident from lecture notes, 
syllabi and other materials from the period Ellison was at NYU.  More importantly, it appears 
that this attitude has direct bearing on Ellison’s initial thoughts for his “Little Man” essay.  The 
tumultuous changes of the 1970s preoccupied his private and public thoughts.  Despite his well 
known criticism of the Black Power Movement, in handwritten notes written in the early 1970s, 
he characterizes its force in neutral but anarchic terms.  The original thought for the “Little Man” 
essay comes in the midst of Ellison’s contemplation of the “chaos released when angry blacks 
began pressuring the principle of race linguistically…” (Ellison “Miscellaneous”).  Out of this 
chaos emerges what he calls “the ideology of blackness”, which appears to be Ellison’s umbrella 
term for the various Black Nationalist groups that emerge in the 1960s (Ellison 
“Miscellaneous”).   
When Ellison wrote these notes, Malcolm had already left the Nation, gone through his 
conversion to Sunni Islam and was subsequently murdered.  The Panthers would have begun 
their disintegration and split into ideological factions.  Cleaver, along with Stokley Carmichael, 
had already moved towards a more fervent Black Nationalist rhetoric while Newton and Bobby 
Seale would embrace Leninist Marxism and later Communalism.  More importantly, by the 
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1970s, the Black Power movement was involved with Third Worldism as well as other 
identitarian political movements within and outside of the United States.  Constructing 
monolithic representations of this “ideology” was and still is a commonplace as James 
Smethhurst writes in The Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s
His fiction appears to be useful however.  It is this broad, somewhat dated version of 
Black Nationalism that he characterizes as the “inadequate” response to the political and social 
chaos of the 60s.  The problem, Ellison writes, is this ideology places “little stress…upon the 
need [of African Americans] to deal with the complexity of their own background, society or the 
world at large.”  Instead, Ellison writes that it “reduce [es]” their ability to understand these very 
things (“Miscellaneous”).
 
(Smethhurst 17).  Black Nationalist politics was just not the same by the 70s.  It had taken on 
multiculturalist and internationalist aspects in the face of post-colonial struggles across the globe 
(Smethhurst 317-8). This is important to note since these changes are not registered in Ellison’s 
notes.  In fact, Ellison gives a one dimensional representation of Black Power (referring to 
“Malcolm Little and Eldridge Cleaver” as representatives of this ideology).   
51
                                                            
51 As I noted at the end of Chapter 3, the politics of Black Nationalism went through significant changes during the 
1960s into the 70s.  The local political concerns it addressed began to give way to a Pan-Africanist and Third World 
Internationalist sentiment by the late 1960s.  The specific aesthetic and cultural concerns in Ellison’s notes makes it 
difficult to discern his knowledge of Black Nationalism’s internationalist dimensions.  Also, I am curious to know 
whether Ellison’s rejection of it is also tied to the anti-Communism still part of America’s political fabric at the 
time. 
  The deeper we go into these notes, the more Ellison elaborates the 
problematic stakes of this “ideology of blackness”.  And the most powerful insight he makes 
comes out of an error.  Ellison writes that the supposed “connection” these separatists have to 
their “‘black brothers’” is based on a “condescension…displayed by young black separatist 
students when referring to the uneducated people who live in black slums.”  These uneducated 
people play the “noble savages” to what he calls the separatists “own type of Rousseauism” 
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(“Miscellaneous”).52  Against this supposed savagery, he describes these young separatists 
projecting themselves as “heroes” in a dialectical struggle against “uncle Tom[’s], capitalism, 
whiskey…and Louis Armstrong” (“Miscellaneous”). 
Ellison makes a common mistake when he attributes John Dryden’s literary figure of the 
“noble savage” to Rousseau’s thoughts in the Discourse on Inequality. As I discussed in Chapter 
One, Ellison’s understanding of the eighteenth century reveals a Demanian like blindness that 
plays out to be an insight.  The Christian nature of Dryden’s sentimental romanticism is the 
source of most Anglo-American literary representations of “noble savages”, not Rousseau’s man 
in the state of nature.  In Discourse on Inequality
At the same time, in 
, Rousseau saw civil society as a corrupting 
force not the civilizing one as it is portrayed in many works of the eighteenth century.  Because 
of this it is at first difficult to decipher what Ellison means by this reference, since it suggests 
that black nationalists saw themselves on a civilizing mission. 
Discourse on Inequality
                                                            
52 The entirety of Ellison’s note reads like this:  
 
It is amusing, the [uncurious?] condescension displayed by young black separatist students when 
referring to the uneducated people who live in black slums.  It makes me suspicious that the 
younger blacks see such people as noble savages in keeping with their own type of Rousseauism.  
It’s all so [unintelligible…], by making an easy identification with the submerged condition of his 
“black brothers” he doesn’t have to pay his respects to any difficulty or discipline, either of 
conduct or manners; he finds justification for his rank social-[unintelligible] criminal impulses, 
rationalizes laziness, academic shoddiness, bad manners and projects himself as hero, accusers of 
whitey, uncle Tom, capitalism, whisky (in favor of heroine and pot) and Louis Armstrong.  In 
other words, he adopts the lifestyle of a hustler and pimp with the blessings of a [unintelligible]-
made ideology (Ellison “Miscellaneous”). 
 
  
    
 Rousseau’s one elliptical reference to 
“Negroes” expresses a commonplace eighteenth century idea; that “Negroes” existed in a 
perpetual state of nature.  According to Rousseau, the uniformity found between all living things 
in a state of nature explains “why Negroes and savages are so little afraid of the wild beasts they 
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may meet in the woods” (Rousseau 88).  Not surprisingly, Rousseau treats Negroes and savages 
as separate yet contiguous categories.  Singling out the Negro as exhibiting “savage” tendencies 
yet constituting a separate, categorical class suggests the epistemological and “ideological” force 
anti-black racism represented in eighteenth century thought.  As Ronald Judy suggests in “Kant 
and the Negro” (1991), expelling the “Negro” is not simply an “error” of eighteenth century 
humanist inquiry but shows the Negro as a “force to be resisted ideologically” (Judy 70).   
In Discourse on Inequality, it is uncertain whether Rousseau’s “Negro” is prelapsarian – 
as is his man in the state of nature – or modern but simply outside the chain of being.  This 
uncertainty is crucial because Rousseau’s thoughts on the Negro have implications for his 
understanding of slavery in The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right.  Like Kant’s 
own comments on the Negro in Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime, 
Rousseau’s comment suggests that the Negro is irreducibly and essentially irrational.  The Negro 
is of nature but not in the same way his man in “a state of nature” is.  Man can understand nature 
as an object of contemplation as well as become a social being.  The Negro however cannot.  Its 
relationship to nature is contiguous and purely experiential.  Clearly, Ellison’s comment is not 
produced out of a deep reading of Rousseau.  Nonetheless, it does provide a damning indictment 
of Black Nationalism.  Ellison suggests that these “separatists” traffic in the same essentialisms 
that they are attempting to overturn.  Privileging the “uneducated” might give the sense that 
Ellison is involved in his own romantic version of “Rousseauism.”   But this is far from the case.  
In fact, this misreading becomes an occasion for Ellison to present a counter narrative to this 
supposed “savagery”.  It is not romanticized simplicity but complexity that Ellison sees in these 
“uneducated” folk.  Instead of a pre-modern “state of nature” Ellison sees them as a 
contemporaneous expression of modernity.  Within the context of Ellison’s notes, this complex 
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modernity and its historical singularity explains the aesthetic concerns found in Ellison’s initial 
articulation of the “Little Man”:         
Essay: What is signified by discovery that voices arguing about the qualities of 
Metropolitan Opera sopranos belonged to coal heavers.  Hazel’s advice, always 
play your best because in this country there’s always the little man behind the 
stove who knows what’s cooking.  The unstructured class defying availability of 
knowledge, techniques and tradition. 
Mrs. Breaux, Ma Rainey, King Oliver.  The role places of vernacular 
entertainment in the mixture of styles and traditions (“Miscellaneous”). 53
In the above note, Ellison is not attempting to paint a pre-modern scene of the vernacular.  His 
invocation of Armstrong, the “coal heaver” aesthetes, and his own time at Tuskegee suggests a 
parallel moment of “chaos” to the one he is in the midst of in the 1970s.  Morris Dickstein argues 
in “Ralph Ellison, Race and American Culture” that Ellison’s “spiral of history” conjoins 
Garveyite Nationalism and Popular Front radicalism to similar ideological challenges emerging 
in the 1950 and 60s (Dickstein 21).  In these notes Ellison extends this same palimpsest into his 
thoughts about the 1970s.  Beyond the comparison between the chaos of the 1970s and the 
1930s, at the root of this fragment are historical and aesthetic allusions to post-Reconstruction 
America.  Adam Gussow points out in “Fingering the Jagged Grain: Ellison’s Wright and the 
Southern Blues Violences” that much of the work done on Ellison has not provided an adequate 
theory based on the “particulars of both post-Reconstruction history and an emergent culture of 
  
                                                            
53 This fragment and these notes were clearly written in the 1970s and were found in BOX 102, labeled 
“Miscellaneous notes, 1943, 1953-1991, nd” in Ralph Ellison’s archives at the Library of Congress.  Whether or not 
this fragment was written before or immediately after Ralph Ellison gave a speech at Philadelphia’s Curtis Institute 
of Music on May 10th, 1975 entitled “The Little Man Behind the Stove” is unknown.  Nonetheless, his thoughts are 
clearly a precursor to “The Little Man” essay published in 1977.   
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blues performance” (Gussow 138).  Louis Armstrong’s presence in these notes is a key link to 
this post-Reconstruction moment.  His presence reveals how this past shapes Ellison’s essay 
fragment.  Also, by invoking Armstrong, Ellison makes a clear statement about the relationship 
race has to American vernacular forms of expression.   
In “Checking Our Balances: Ellison on Armstrong’s Humor” (1999), Robert O’ Meally 
writes that by the 1940s, many thought Louis Armstrong’s jazz performances and career choices 
crossed the line into “Uncle Tomism” and blatant minstrelsy (O’ Meally 119).  This critique of 
Armstrong only intensified in the 1960s and 70s.  During this period, the musical dichotomy 
between Swing (typified by Armstrong and Duke Ellington) and Bebop (John Coltrane and 
Miles Davis) changed into an ideological one about racial politics.  Ellison’s defense of 
Armstrong in the 1960s, particularly in Shadow and Act (1964) only intensified this dichotomy.  
Ellison’s notes further support the political concerns some African-American critics had with 
Armstrong and early jazz music.  Coincidentally, these accusations against Armstrong curiously 
mirrored the growing chorus against Ellison at the height of the Civil Rights movement (119).54  
Along with giving insight into Ellison’s musical tastes, Armstrong crystallized an aesthetic and 
philosophical perspective on life for Ellison.  With this in mind, it is no coincidence Armstrong’s 
version of “So Black and Blue” opens Invisible Man
Andy Razaf’s original version of “So Black and Blue” was a satirical turn on 
vaudevillian, blackface performances.  Instead of condescendingly staging the pathos of African-
. 
                                                            
54 Just as Ellison became a lightening rod figure of the Civil Rights era for his perceived quietism and “uncle Tom” 
behavior so did Armstrong.  These criticisms of Armstrong and Ellison naturally reached a crescendo as Black 
Nationalist became the dominant voices of the late Civil Rights era.  But even in recent works assessing the legacy 
of Ellison these sorts of claims are suggested.  Arnold Rampersad’s new biography Ralph Ellison: A Biography 
paints a picture of the author suggesting that his pursuit of fame trumped his literary pursuits as well as a firmer 
commitment to the Civil Rights struggle.  Jerry Gafio Watts’ Heroism and the Black Intellectual: Ralph Ellison, 
Politics and Afro-American Intellectual Life (1994) goes even further suggesting that Ellison’s commitment to 
writing disabled his political sentiments.   
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American life, as it was originally commissioned to do, Razaf made the song a ribald lover’s 
compliant.  Written to be sung by a woman, the song told of the inability of dark-skinned 
African-American women to find the love of men who wanted lighter-skinned ones.  But 
Armstrong took the ribald, sexual content out and let in the tragicomic images of Africa-
American life (“even a mouse/ran from my house”).  Ellison both expands upon and distills the 
thematic elements of Armstrong’s rendition in the preface of Invisible Man
What emerges out of the dialectic between art and conduct is the assumption that race (in 
this case “blackness”) holds a “purity of status” that – depending on what aesthetic an artist 
utilizes – can be sullied or preserved.  But Ellison’s claim is that Armstrong, like all performers 
and artists, exemplifies that by definition such purity of status “is impossible” (259).  When 
Ellison contextualizes Armstrong’s performance within the traditions of minstrelsy and “Uncle 
Tom” [Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel was a mainstay of minstrel performances in the 1850s] he 
reminds us that slavery forms the backdrop upon which the drama of modern art played out in 
 and makes it, as 
O’Meally remarks, a representative “site of contestation over the meaning of black expression 
and history” (O’Meally 130).  A similar and more revealing example of this contestation is seen 
in Ellison’s reference to Armstrong in the essay “On Bird, Bird-Watching and Jazz” (1965).   
Here, Ellison speculates on the historical reasons why Armstrong is rejected by a new 
generation of jazz aficionados.  His comments reflect the ideological fault lines that tinged most 
discussions of art in the 60s and 70s.  Ellison writes that this rejection is rooted in what he calls 
bebop’s “understandable rejection of the traditional entertainer’s role – a heritage from the 
minstrel tradition” (Ellison 259).  Ellison’s problem with this is the leap made when the 
trumpeter’s “personal conduct” (his aforementioned “Uncle Tomism”) are assumed to somehow 
reflective of his “artistic qualities” (259).   
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America.  In the case of minstrelsy, it crystallizes the relationship capital and mass culture has 
had to concepts of racial authenticity in American expressive culture.  In Love and Theft: 
Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class
While the moral and political implications of minstrelsy are clear, it is the aesthetic 
relationship between minstrelsy, vaudeville and later black expression that is more problematic.  
From the perspective of musicology, the relationship early jazz has to minstrel and vaudeville 
musical expression – is an unbroken one (Schuller and Emerson.)  Ellison’s account, which 
ruminates on the transition between minstrel performativity and early jazz, focuses on a 
politically problematic but nonetheless worthwhile line of thought found as early as W.E.B. 
Dubois’s essay “The Negro in Literature and Art” (1913).  In Ellison minstrelsy is 
conceptualized as a contiguous form of expression within African-American culture.  Enough so 
that in “On Bird,” Ellison can assert that Armstrong’s aesthetic forbearers (“the entertainer”) are 
from the minstrel stage.  While it is not certain that Ellison read Dubois’s essay it is obvious he 
 (1993) Eric Lott reads minstrelsy as a 
reflection of white desires in the Jacksonian Age and beyond.  More importantly, Lott reads 
minstrelsy as the aesthetic doppelganger of slavery that stalled “the development of Negro public 
arts and generated an enduring narrative of racist ideology – a historical process by which an 
entire people has been made the bearer of another people’s ‘folk’ culture” (Lott 145).  Henry 
Louis Gates Jr. in “The Trope of the New Negro and the Reconstruction of the Image of the 
Black” (1988) suggests a similar moral and political narrative.  Unlike Lott, Gates’ interest is in 
the aesthetic response of African-Americans.  And rather ironically, Gates suggests that it is 
music and not literature that made the most substantial break with iconographic legacy of 
minstrelsy (Gates 148).      
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was a reader of Constance Rourke and Henry Toll.55
It is within this framework that we must understand Ellison’s use of Armstrong in “On 
Bird” and more importantly, in Ellison’s notes on the complexity of African-American 
experience.  The contestation over meaning in black expression and history O’Meally refers to is 
inevitably connected to the question of racial authenticity.  In other words, is it possible to locate 
[through various modes of aesthetic, philosophical or social scientific inquiry] habitual thought 
or abiding characteristics that constitute the African-American community and the way it 
experiences life?  Then, as it still is now, this question was synonymous with finding black 
modes of expression outside of Anglo-American or Western European cultural influences.  
Besides questioning the possibility of racial or biological purity, Ellison’s invocation of 
minstrelsy and Armstrong raises this very question.  Minstrelsy was America’s first mass 
produced and globally circulated form of popular art.  Beyond its usage of white and black 
bodies to “carnivalize race,” minstrelsy transmuted African-American expression into a 
multiplicity of objects and modes.  Sheet music, a crucial element in the domestic and 
international dissemination of minstrelsy, literary dialect humor and later sound recordings are 
just some of the objects tied to minstrel show aesthetics. Along with absorbing non-contiguous 
folk and dialect forms, minstrelsy’s long history [“Backside Albany” (1815), an adaptation of a 
seventeenth century Irish ballad is thought of as the first blackface dialect performance] as a 
  His connection to these two writers 
explains why Ellison is not so dismissive of minstrelsy.  Despite its grotesquely racist and highly 
commodified packaging of African-American expressive culture, minstrelsy’s connection to 
African-American artistic forms is vital.     
                                                            
55 More on this at the end of this chapter. 
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mass cultural form suggests the intimate relationship reification has had with black expression 
(Mahar).   
Racial authenticity then has as much to do with the degree representations are circulated 
as it does with the moral and political considerations of that representation.  Lott’s suggestion 
that minstrelsy stalled “black public arts” suggests – with a significant dose of naiveté – that non-
commercial black musical expression would have escaped the forces of commodification.  
Houston Baker’s and Robert Stepto’s solution to this state of affairs suggests the same thing.56
Connecting the affective practices of blackface minstrelsy with Armstrong and early jazz 
requires a different attitude towards the African-American past.  It requires the abandonment of 
crucial presuppositions made about the aesthetic practices born in this period and their 
relationship to the question of black humanity. Ellison’s use of Armstrong to “contest” the 
  
Both see the “private”, non-circulating moments of black expressive practice as instances where 
the private self can be differentiated from inauthentic or coercive modes of expression (Stepto; 
Baker).  Making minstrelsy contiguous with Armstrong’s jazz performance necessitates a 
confrontation with a crucial presupposition at the root of African-American expressive culture 
and the discussions of it.  That presupposition, as Ronald Judy writes in his essay “On the 
Question of Nigga Authenticity” assumes that a kind of moral policing ensured the aesthetic and 
political purity of African-American communities, particularly in the post-bellum period.  Not 
only are the moral grounds of black humanity produced out of this policing, but it is also 
assumed that such morality and proper moral acts are communicated through black aesthetic 
forms (Judy 227).   
                                                            
56 Here I am referring to Baker’s thoughts in Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular Theory 
and Robert Stepto’s From Behind the Veil: A Study of Afro-American Narrative.  
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meaning of black history and expression suggests that our knowledge of the human – black or 
not – does not rest with questions of authenticity but the deeper epistemological questions about 
this very knowledge.  Instead of apprehending black humanity as fungible with certain 
governable moral and political modes of representation, Ellison uses Armstrong to move towards 
another question, which is: what the human is amongst things (Judy).  Rejecting Louis 
Armstrong means rejecting a crucial way of understanding the affective relationship between 
race, expression and identity.  For Ellison, this rejection subsequently means limiting how Black 
Nationalists think about black humanity.  I believe this question trickles down to Ellison’s 
rumination on “the role of place” and the “mixture of styles and traditions” he alludes to at the 
bottom of his essay fragment.  Minstrelsy is not explicitly referred to in these notes.  But 
Armstrong’s presence crystallizes an aesthetic genealogy (King Oliver, Ma Rainey and Zelia N. 
Breaux) that exemplifies the contested history he is produced out of.57
Much of what Ellison writes about in his notes and “On Bird” is connected to jazz 
music’s intimate relationship with commercial capitalism and the technologies of mass 
production.  As James Hardin writes in “Adorno, Ellison and the Critique of Jazz” (1995), these 
twin facts have hindered critical thinking about it.  The measure of its artistic merits has often 
been read in an inverse relationship with its commercial viability and the technologies of mass 
production.  Especially in regards to jazz (or the blues for that matter) designating certain forms 
   
                                                            
57 All three are foundational in the early development of jazz and blues in America.  Ma Rainey’s place in this trinity 
is crucial.  Born in the deep-south, she – like many early American blues musicians – developed her talents on the 
vaudeville and minstrel performance stage.  King Oliver – Armstrong’s mentor – on the other hand represents the 
Creole influence on American Jazz.  Just as important is Zelia N. Breaux.  Breaux was musical director at Douglass 
High School where, Ellison, jazz vocalist Jimmy Rushing and guitarist Charlie Christian attended.  Ellison’s 
reference to “place” could allude to his high school but most likely refers to the Aldridge Theater, a popular musical 
venue owned by Breaux in the predominantly black but ethnically diverse “Deep Deuce” section of Oklahoma City.  
Not only did Armstrong perform at the Aldridge but so did Rainey, King Oliver and host of other early jazz and 
blues greats before him. 
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as contiguous (or not) with these modes of production often determines the degree to which it 
signifies racial filiations.  For someone like Adorno who saw jazz’s relationship to minstrelsy as 
a damning one, jazz would remain an art form produced out the hegemony of the culture 
industry.  Adorno’s attitude is not far off from the Black Nationalist’s [albeit not having to do 
with the question of black identity] Ellison writes about in his notes.  Jazz, as Harding suggests, 
complicates such facile understandings of art.  It calls into question whether “the encroachment 
of technology and the culture industry” can be read as “the kiss of death to all cultural 
expression,” (Harding 153-4).  
These very elements lead us out of the unproductive binary made when questions of 
authenticity are thought strictly in terms of the degree of commodification in the market.  In 
“The Subject of Sonic Afro-modernity” Weheliye suggests that the “audiovisual disjuncture” 
created by nineteenth century recording technologies have opened up a space for thinkers to 
think questions of black subjectivity outside the teleological end point that visual and linguistic 
concerns often led.  Weheliye does not suggest that we privilege the aural, or oral vernacular in 
any reductive or essentialist enterprise.  Instead, he writes that the intersection between 
subjectivity, sound and technological reproduction “calls attention to [the] texture and 
confluence of [modes of communication] rather than striving for intelligibility, networking it 
squarely within the charged currents of opacity,” (104).58
 This confluence is what Armstrong symbolizes for Ellison.  Armstrong, like Ma Rainey 
and King Oliver before him holds in tension the multiple aesthetic traditions that have created 
American art.  Moral and ideological considerations aside, this tension reveals that romantic 
 
                                                            
58 Weheliye relies on Eduardo Glissant’s concept of “opacity”, which is found in Glissant’s book Poetics of Relation 
(1990).    
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ideas of black identity have to confront the affective elements of all black expression.  When 
Ellison writes that confusing Armstrong’s art with his personal conduct “reduces…music to the 
mere matter of race,” he is referring to the problematic categories of intelligibility used to 
understand artistic expression.  Minstrelsy of course is a complex and problematic example of 
this intelligibility.  Lott and others are right when they read minstrelsy as a product of America’s 
struggle with its own political and social identity during the antebellum period.  It shows the 
significant role raciology and anti-black racism played in shaping how American intellectual 
traditions understood these struggles.  Minstrelsy is indeed an example of the way American 
state power symbolically expresses itself in the realm of culture.  Its affective presentation of 
race is an early example of the way the market as well as the state can arrest the possibility of the 
human.  At the same time however, it was an anarchic expression of this humanity for African-
Americans.   
Ellison’s writings suggest its anarchic potentiality by foregrounding the thoroughly 
symbolic and affective presentation of race in artistic expression (Judy).  Even before the 
phonograph, minstrelsy expressed the “audiovisual” disjunction that technology later exploited 
in order to circulate music.  Precisely because race is reduced to a thing, it reminds us that the 
same constructive affect is mobilized to think the human.  Looked at from this perspective, 
music – like much artistic expression – resists the moral and ideological intelligibility race 
provides us to apprehend it (Weheliye 104).  Nothing demonstrates this anarchy more than 
minstrelsy’s myriad usages or more importantly, the appropriation of its musical conventions in 
early jazz artists. 
This last point brings us full circle to Ellison’s notes.  As I suggest above, Ellison’s 
invocation of Louis Armstrong forces us to rethink the way we understand race and the human in 
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modernity.  Against the “Rousseauism” of black nationalists, Ellison creates a counter narrative 
to their romantic conceptions.  By making minstrelsy contiguous with formative modes of black 
expression, Ellison highlights the highly affective way race was presented in aesthetic forms in 
the nineteenth century.  Just as importantly, his notes remind us that this affect is the product of a 
particular epistemological context which deserves our scrutiny.  Artists like Armstrong in other 
words come from a genealogy of black artists that are constituted by – but more importantly – 
who actively manipulated these aesthetic conventions.  Their stylistic manipulation of 
convention reveals their humanity.  Reducing music to the mere fact of race – as these 
“nationalists” did with jazz music – reintroduces intelligibility about the human that Ellison sees 
Armstrong’s art defying.  And by consequence, art becomes fungible with the kinds of 
ideological, moral and political modes of representation that limit the possibility of thinking the 
human in modernity.   
With all of this said, it is equally clear that Ellison’s “little man” is a figure born out of 
his own Cold War tinged political attitude towards black nationalism.  While attempting to think 
around these forms of intelligibility, Ellison is equally – if not willfully – blind to the very 
important transformations to the “ideology of blackness” he writes about in his notes.  What 
makes these notes so compelling are the intellectual and political consequences they lead to.  It is 
clear in 1965 that Ellison’s support of Lyndon B. Johnson was based on Johnson’s record on 
racial issues and Vietnam did not complicate this.  By the time Ellison wrote these notes, the 
remedy Johnson and later Nixon would devise to mend America’s racial problems– integration 
and affirmative action – unfolded under the very race-based intelligibility he is calling into 
question.  Beyond these notes lies one of his most famous essays “The Little Man at Chehaw 
Station”.  Seeing the context out of which this “little man” emerges, the question is: how should 
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we understand him?  Whatever his little man was, it was clearly an attempt to recall a particular 
genealogy of thinking about American unity and humanity.  But in what ways does Ellison’s 
own politicized, reactionary attitude about his times effect the maturation of these insights?  Is 
the “little man” a figure generated out of shrewd and subtle political thinking on Ellison’s part?  
Is it a bulwark against the emergent multicultural and internationalist aspect of Black 
Nationalism in the 1970s (Smethhurst); a political and aesthetic bloc that challenged the Cold 
War cultural liberalism [which trafficked in its own metaphors of unity] Ellison ascribed to?  Or 
is he representative of Ellison’s blindness to the Schmittian political nature of his times?   
And if the “little man” is a figure of unity and social cohesion what sort is it?  Integration 
had transformed into a process dependent on the very categorical intelligence about the human 
Ellison sought to evade.  Do these notes anticipate his continued support of it in the 1970s?  
Perhaps Ellison was treading the thinnest of lines between these many things.  Maybe his “little 
man” was directed towards some other threat that Black Nationalism and the logic of Federal 
integration represented.     
 “The Little Man at Chehaw Station” is a parable. Ellison begins it in Tuskegee when he 
was a young, fledgling musician attempting to master the trumpet. After a poor performance at 
his monthly music recital, he goes to seek consolation and advice from Hazel Harrison – a 
famous concert pianist and one of Ellison’s music teachers.  Rather than sympathy, she gives the 
young Ellison quixotic advice.  “Always play his best even in Mississippi’s Chehaw Station”, 
she tells him.  Ellison describes this station as “a lonely whistle-stop where swift north or 
southbound trains paused with haughty impatience,” (Ellison 490).  Lurking in Chehaw’s 
“claustrophobic little waiting room,” she tells him of a “little man whom you don’t expect,” one 
who will know the very music, traditions and standards of Ellison’s performance, (490).  Far 
200 
 
from an ideal venue to play, let alone be ambushed by a connoisseur of classical music, Ellison 
writes of his confused but eventual acceptance of Miss Harrison’s advice.  
From this anecdotal preamble, Ellison writes of his bafflement over the “little man” as a 
way to discuss the enigma of what he calls “aesthetic communication” in America.  The “little 
man” becomes a figure through which Ellison thinks the mercurial and boundless aesthetic 
knowledge contained within America audiences.  The mystery to Ellison is how such a “little 
man” is created.  For all intents and purposes this man’s race, class and education should 
disqualify him from possessing such aesthetic acumen.  The fact of his existence speaks to the 
potential virtues Ellison sees in American society.  That American art can communicate an 
experience outside the narrow phenomenology of race and socioeconomics says something about 
the unseen, dynamic forces behind American culture.  Since Ellison saw American culture as a 
reflection of the country’s social possibilities, the “little man” exhibits the potentially integrative 
and democratic nature of American social relations.  Each artist should strive to appeal to this 
“little man” on the basis of “what [artist] assumes to be truth,” (Ellison 492).   
America’s “artistic truth” according to Ellison is the pre-existing – if unrecognized – fact 
of American cultural integration.  Bringing audience and artist alike to recognize this truth is 
made analogous to rhetorical forms of exhortation, persuasion and “wooing,” (Ellison 492).  
Even though it might be a “truth” that the audience acquiesces or ultimately rejects, Ellison sees 
the persuasive nature of this integration as defining our social and artistic fabric. Failing to 
convey this truth in American art is tantamount to failing to conveying “American experience”, 
(ibid).  The truth of our integration is revealed in the activity of “antagonistic cooperation”, a 
term he uses to describe the aesthetic relationship between the audience (represented by the 
figure of the “little man”) and artist.  “While the audience is eager to be transported, astounded, 
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thrilled, it counters the artist’s manipulation of forms with an attitude of antagonistic 
cooperation, acting, for better or worse, as both collaborator and judge” (Ellison 492).  It is 
through this simultaneous cooperation and resistance that “new dimensions of artistic truth” are 
attained (Ellison ibid).       
  “Antagonistic cooperation” bears great similarity – at least conceptually – to Arendt’s use 
of “common sense”.  Both recall the “deliberative” secular sensibilities Ellison and Arendt see as 
crucial to American culture and politics.  Taking a closer look at this term, antagonistic 
cooperation returns us to the political and rhetorical differences between Ellison’s aesthetic 
sensibilities and Arendt’s Kantianism.  The truth formed out of “antagonistic cooperation” and 
Arendt’s term “common sense” is similar to what Kant calls “taste” in the Critique of Judgment
Relying on the non-conceptual, aesthetic nature of Kant’s sensus communis, Arendt saw 
speech as the product of purely rational language – thereby demoting the poetic and affective 
.   
For Kant, the critique of and debate over artistic “taste” proceeds from “quarreling” and not from 
“definite concepts as determining grounds,” (Kant 135).  Taste, as Kant says, is a kind of sensus 
communis.  But the phenomenological senses used to form aesthetic judgments do not have the 
“capacity for expressing universal rules” (135). Satisfying these rules can only come from reason 
based on the laws of logic.  What is quarreled over in debates concerning taste is “feeling” not 
the a priori concepts of truth determined by the laws of logic.  This last part of Kant’s thought is 
crucial, since his observations about taste are the foundation upon which his critique of 
aesthetical judgment is based.  Like all products of the imagination, taste and aesthetical 
judgment might goad us towards demonstrative concepts of the truth but can never lead towards 
cognition or moral ideas, (Kant 202).    
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faculty of the imagination.  As I demonstrated in my last chapter, Ellison’s response to Arendt 
revealed his understanding that in order to be truly inclusive, “common sense” must aspire to the 
very imaginative and poetic sensibilities Arendt dismisses.  Reason in other words is not enough.  
Ellison’s use of “antagonistic cooperation” simultaneously captures the political sensibility of 
Arendt’s “common sense” and the necessary poetic overtones Ellison sees as crucial to any 
version of American social integration.  His “little man” is both a product of “antagonistic 
cooperation” and simultaneously a willful agent in its creation.  Ellison never footnotes the term 
“antagonistic cooperation” and because of this, most critics credit him with coining it.  Most 
likely he borrowed it from nineteenth century sociologist William Graham Sumner, who is 
credited with coning it in his most famous work Folkways: A Study of the Sociological 
Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores and Morals
Sumner’s 
 (1901).  Sumner defines 
antagonistic cooperation as “the combination of two persons or groups to satisfy a great common 
interest while minor antagonisms of interest which exist between them are suppressed” (Sumner 
18).  As Sumner writes, this kind of cooperation is “the most productive form of combination in 
high civilization.  It is a high action of the reason to overlook lesser antagonisms in order to work 
together for greater interest” (Sumner ibid). 
Folkways is never mentioned in Ellison’s published works or unpublished 
notes.  And Ellison’s one explicit mention of him is an unfavorable.  It comes in a review of 
Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma written in 1944.  Quoting from Sumner’s essay “The 
Absurd Effort to Make the World Over” (1894), Ellison labels Sumner, who famously quipped 
“the greatest folly of which man can be capable is to sit down with a slate and pencil and plan 
out new social world,” an anti-democrat (Ellison 332).  Indeed, Sumner’s early essays including 
“The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over” and the more famous “The Forgotten Man” (1883) 
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show Sumner a vocal supporter of laissez faire capitalism during the worst economic and 
political crises in the Gilded Age.  Sumner’s support of the economic and social status quo 
comes from what Bruce Curtis in “William Graham Sumner and the Problem of Progress” sees 
as his inherent belief that free-enterprise capitalism was the engine fueling progressive society 
(Curtis 357).  Social engineering, the welfare state and attempts to regulate enterprise all fueled a 
type of egalitarianism Sumner saw hindering progress (357).  As demonstrated in breadth of 
essays found in The Forgotten Man and Other Essays (1919), Sumner’s feelings were also based 
out of America’s general antagonism against Socialism and labor unions in the late nineteenth 
century.   
The Ellison of 1944 would have undoubtedly been a sensitive and dogged critic of 
Sumner’s support of bourgeois, status quo politics (Smethhurst; Foley).  He also picked up on 
the racialist dimensions of Sumner’s thought concerning progress in civilization.  Sumner’s 
lectures on “Science of Society” (1902-3), reflect late-nineteenth century pseudo-scientific 
thought linking race to degrees of development.  And in Folkways Sumner seems to reiterate the 
argument that “Negroes” could ape “civilization” only after contact with Europeans (Sumner 
265).  There is a connection between Sumner, the Post-Reconstruction laissez faire defender of 
the status quo and Sumner, the progenitor of racialist sociology. This deadly combination, as 
Kenneth Warren writes, was widespread during the late nineteenth century.  In the end it 
effectively “consolidated the white supremacist order” by intellectually legitimating America’s 
abandonment of Reconstruction (Warren 11).  Sumner’s work on mores and folk culture was 
foundational to the later work of Dr. Robert E. Park, whose early research on race relations 
proved crucial to Myrdal himself (Ellison 331).   
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Beginning with this book review, through Invisible Man and even in the late 1960s, 
Myrdal and the sociological school he represents has been an object of Ellison’s critique.  Also, 
evident through these connections is a long – if not always evident – relationship with the 
thought of Sumner.  Ellison’s attitude towards Myrdal does not change much in this time.  The 
same cannot be said about his attitude towards Sumner.  The term “antagonistic cooperation” 
appears as early as 1964 (Ellison 188).  In the hand written notes from his time at NYU, the term 
appears again (Ellison “Miscellaneous”).  Looking back to his representation of Lyndon B. 
Johnson as a “Flawed Southern” and his thoughts about Armstrong, it seems this concept has 
guided Ellison’s imaginative thoughts about American social cohesion and integration.  What 
precipitates this change of attitude towards Sumner?  His notes do not reveal any explicit reasons 
for his reengagement with the nineteenth century sociologist.  Seeing that Ellison’s work makes 
a more explicit turn towards “vernacular” arts in the 1970s (if not earlier), revisiting Sumner, 
particularly Folkways would make sense.59  If Sumner became recoverable for Ellison it would 
seem to rest on two critical elements of Sumner’s thought.  The first, as Hanno Hardt writes in 
Social Theories of the Press: Constituents of Communication Research, 1840s to 1920s
                                                            
59 See end of this chapter. 
, is 
Sumner’s recognition that language is “a product of the need of cooperative understanding in all 
the work, and in connection with all the interests, of life” and central to social and cultural 
mobility (Sumner 134; Hardt 164.)  In particular, Sumner saw literature as “discharg[ing] an 
important function in acquainting peoples with one another’s characteristics; the novel has been 
highly effective in that way” (Sumner 144).  Using Sumner would allow Ellison to think around 
the Arendtian (and Kantian) non-poetic conceptions of “common sense” and language.  Besides 
Sumner’s interest in the connection language – and in particular literary language – had to social 
cooperation, another key component to Sumner’s thought would have undoubtedly appealed to 
205 
 
Ellison.  As Bruce Curtis remarks, from Folkways onward, Sumner’s work ventured further and 
further away from the influence of Herbert Spenser and biological concepts of social progress 
and evolution.  Instead, Sumner took recourse to physics, the Law of the Composition of Forces 
and to a limited extent, Henry Adams “in seeking to understand [the] meaning” of progress 
(Curtis 355, 364).  Curtis notes that one manuscript version of Folkways concluded with this turn 
but it remained unpublished (Curtis 362).   
After the publication of Folkways, Sumner emphasizes these lines of thought in his 
private notes and public lectures.  Speaking in 1905, Sumner describes society’s “progress” in 
terms that show the influence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics and entropy. Notions of 
social progress and antagonistic cooperation are not teleological in a Spenserian sense, but 
dependent on what he calls “conjuncture,” (Sumner 13, 51).  This phenomenon, Sumner writes, 
“is capable of infinite variation, so that it produces a rolling, tossing, swaying and endless 
dissolution of successive forms and stages in the sequence of all superorganic forms.  That is 
what history shows us” (Sumner 51).  Despite, the seeming pessimism of Sumner’s later thought 
and the unpredictable nature of antagonistic cooperation, he still saw it as the “most productive 
from of combination in high civilization” (Sumner 18).  There is enough of a latent sense of 
nineteenth-century American exceptionalism in Sumner’s thought, Curtis writes, that he could 
still view “his country as the acme of political progress” (Curtis 358).  This later work would 
then also appeal to Ellison since it is freed from the teleology and metaphysics under-girding the 
Kantian line of thought Arendt inherits.  Also, it is clear that Sumner’s dynamic non-teleological 
version of progress through antagonist cooperation was ultimately optimistic; and this optimism 
is crucial to Ellison’s own thinking. 
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These elements make Ellison’s use of Sumner’s terms in “The Little Man” essay seem 
like a conscientiously strategic choice to think American integration.  Judging from the political 
timbre of Ellison’s notes about the “Little Man” essay, he was trying to counter the dogmatic 
representational politics of his moment.   Sumner allows Ellison, whose essay celebrates “the 
processes of democratic cultural integration” in America, a way to reiterate Cold War liberalism 
through Sumner’s idea of antagonistic cooperation (Ellison 492, 512).  Traces of these 
sentiments appear in Ellison’s understanding of this same cooperation and its emphasis on 
“truth” through “act(s) of democratic faith” (Ellison 492, 494).  Adding to this is Ellison’s 
invocation of the documents of state as well as past and present American concepts of social 
cohesion like “the melting pot”, a “nation of nations” (Ellison 501, 510, 519).   
Rhetorically, Ellison uses these phrases to construct a narrative of American intellectual 
and political history that is already this dynamic process of integration and antagonistic 
cooperation.  Even when these ideals were so “brazenly violated”, in the despicable institutions 
of slavery, Ellison writes that such violations were just “sources of morale in that continuing 
process of antagonistic cooperation and of adjusting the past to the present in the interest of the 
future…” (509). The optimistic zeal of these words also contains a warning.  The social 
transformations that allows for these new dimensions of truth also harbor forces that could arrest 
them.  These forces are not impersonal but come from a very specific source for Ellison.  He 
writes that the possibility of the “little man’s” existence is under-siege by the “sociological word-
magic” of “ethic and genetic insularity,” which are both ironically the very product of this 
endless process (Ellison 505-8).  Recalling Ellison’s private notes and his own anxiety over 
Black Nationalism, it makes sense that his fear of “ethnic and genetic insularity” would appear in 
the essay.  It is the very same insularity Ellison saw preventing blacks from understanding the 
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“complexity” of their own background.  But they could just as much describe the racialist logic 
undergirding Federal integration.   
Integration and “antagonistic cooperation” are the cure to “sociological word magic” and 
“ethnic insularity” alike.  Whether conscientiously used by Ellison to remark upon this issue or 
not, the appearance of the word integration in “Little Man” marks a crucial semantic shift already 
made by American policy makers and intellectuals concerning the problem of race in America.  
The emphasis on “integration” as well as his obvious swipe at the “purity” of “militant black 
nationalists” suggests that these terms and concepts are mobilized in the “Little Man” essay as a 
counter weight to the “ideology of blackness” that concerned Ellison in his notes (Ellison 
“Miscellaneous”, 505-7).  The claims of cultural purity espoused by white supremacists and 
black nationalists are ironic to him.  In the face of these categorical imperatives it is still possible 
to observe the “irrepressible movement of American culture toward the integration of its diverse 
elements,” (Ellison 505).  This movement – bearing great similar to the anarchic forces Sumner 
described in American society – is also anarchic.  So much so that in America, a “white 
youngster” can shout racial epitaphs at black youths trying to swim at a public beach while 
listening to a “Stevie Wonder tune” – all in the name of “ethnic sanctity” (505).  Even the 
“bebopish” nature of Black styles – which have given “our streets and campuses a rowdy, All 
Fool’s Day carnival atmosphere,” – is an expression of this integration, despite its own ironic 
investment in ethnic sanctity, (505).                         
The relationship Ellison draws between integration and his aesthetic version of 
“antagonistic cooperation” suggests a sense of identification between the two.  By the force of 
Ellison’s rhetoric in this essay, the concept of integration he exposes in this essay is aligned with 
the Great Society liberalism of Lyndon B. Johnson.  His apprehensions about Black Nationalism 
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are profound enough that it would make sense for him to draws a connection between his 
aesthetic concerns and the legacy of liberalism.  Looking beyond the force of Ellison’s rhetoric 
however his concept of integration also undermines the racialist logic in the very liberalism he 
supported.  When read as an essay about the conceptualization of literary creation we can see 
how Ellison understands the American and the human as departures from these representational 
politics.  The tension between the political rhetoric in this essay and his powerful lines of thought 
can be seen in Ellison’s description of the “little man”.  Here you can see the influence of 
Sumner’s antagonistic notion of “progress”; down to the metaphors of physics he uses.  When 
Ellison starts describing the “little man” he calls him as a “linguistic product of the American 
scene and language, and a manifestation of the idealistic action of the American word as it goads 
its users toward a perfection of our revolutionary ideals (Ellison 493).  At the moment when 
Ellison should describe the syntax of the little man (to continue this grammatical and linguistic 
metaphor), he leaves linguistic metaphors behind and instead invokes metaphors of music and 
physics (493).  This change comes in part to dramatize Ellison’s point that this little man is 
representative of “those individuals we sometimes meet whose refinement of sensibility is 
inadequately explained by family background, formal education or social status” (493, my 
emphasis) and hence defies description by traditional representational signifiers of presence.   
Instead of using either social or biological ways of accounting for the presence of this 
“representative” little man, Ellison describes him as “sensitized by some obscure force that 
issues undetected from the chromatic scale of American social hierarchy” (493).  From this 
mixed metaphor of physics (“force”) and music (“chromatic scales”), the obscurity of these 
forces is compounded by their anarchic properties.  These forces have “errant” trajectories yet 
are “sympathetic” to all individuals since Ellison sees American society as offering unfettered 
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access to “the finest products of the arts and intellect” (493).  Instead of invoking specific 
institutions or dogma to convey such knowledge, Ellison suggests the capricious nature of 
knowledge; these “errant” trajectories guarantee their democratic accessibility. At the conclusion 
of this description, Ellison once again echoes Sumner’s idea of “antagonistic cooperation” by 
describing the little man as a “configuration of forces” capable of “an incalculable scale of 
possibilities for self-creation” (Ellison 494).   
Leaving the province of grammar and language and delving into the metaphors of music 
and physics, Ellison’s communicates the enigmatic presence and simultaneous absence of the 
little man.  He is signified by a “configuration” not as an object that can be completely accounted 
for by representational language.  It also suggests the relationship syntactical and referential 
operations of language should have to the boundlessness of physics and music forms.  If America 
and Americans are capable of such infinite potential, Ellison wants the syntax we use to think 
our humanity to be up to the task of accounting for it.  Ellison’s move away from linguistic 
metaphors as well as the crucial stakes of his little man’s existence is captured in an important 
word that is related to “antagonistic cooperation”: incongruence.   
If the American audience were “fully aware of his incongruous existence,” Ellison writes, 
“the little man’s neighbors would reject him as a source of confusion, a threat to social order, and 
a reminder of the unfinished details of this powerful nation,” (Ellison 492-3.).  Near the essay’s 
end and at the conclusion of his encounter with the African-American coal-heavers, Ellison 
returns to this word.  Discovering the unlikely source of their knowledge of grand opera, Ellison 
writes that “I joined them in appreciation of the hilarious American joke that centered on the 
incongruities of race, economic status and culture,” (Ellison 519).   Like the metaphors of 
physics and music, incongruence gives his little man a similarly complex non-representational 
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presence.  In the first passage, “incongruence” reveals a play between levels of consciousness 
and unconsciousness since it appears after the phrase “fully aware.”  Earlier in the essay, Ellison 
describes the “little man” as both “unrecognized and unassimilated” into the cultural life of the 
nation. In this use, Ellison seems to be channeling Freud.  More specifically, he appears to be 
referring to Freud’s psychoanalytic understanding of consciousness as “states of feeling” that 
must be brought to awareness and then reconciled in the subject.60
With Sumner’s thought in mind, I think Ellison’s use of incongruence is centered on the 
enigmatic physical and spatial character of the little man’s existence.  As Ellison’s anecdote 
suggests, there is not much physical space between the “little man,” audience and artist; that is, if 
we take his anecdotal beginning as a metaphor where Ellison is the artist and the audience is 
represented by the people waiting in Chehaw Station.  He calls the little man a “neighbor,” a 
word implying both physical proximity and belonging to a shared community.  Yet, despite his 
neighborly association and physical proximity his existence is unknown.  Etymologically, 
congruent is a derivation of the Old French verb “congrue”, which means to “meet together, 
coincide, agree, correspond, accord” (OED).  Most usages of the word convey this sense of the 
root verb.  Of these usages two bear an interesting relationship to Ellison’s word choice.  First is 
   
                                                            
60 I talk about Ellison’s use of Freud in the first chapter of my dissertation. This psychic dimension of the “little 
man’s” presence and absence is discussed by Hortense Spillers in “Formalism Comes to Harlem” (1982) and 
Nicholas Taylor Boggs in his unpublished dissertation The Critic and the Little Man: On African-American Literary 
Studies in the post-Civil Rights Era (James Baldwin, Ralph Ellison) (2005) is useful in that it forces us to treat 
seriously Ellison’s emphasis on the complex psychic “presence” of the little man.  Throughout the first few pages of 
the essay, Ellison collapses the “little man’s” physical characteristics and intellectual capabilities with those of the 
“American audience.”  Spillers and Boggs see this conflation of the individual intellect and the “many” as 
emblematic of the “endeavor of criticism itself,” which they cast in the psychoanalytic concepts of “self and other,” 
(Spillers, Boggs).  As Spillers suggests, the act of criticism should not reinforce this divide but can bridge it if critics 
conceptualize themselves not as “selves” but as a “one,” (Spillers).  Psychoanalytically, the “one” does not reinforce 
this divide but instead conceptualizes the self as “simultaneously singular and mass, an isolated reading subject and 
part of the broader interpretative community that Ellison calls ‘the American audience,’” (Boggs, Spillers).  Spiller 
sees this function as crucial for African-American critics.  
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the use of congruence to signify “grammatical agreement and concord” (OED).  The other usage, 
which was obsolete by the eighteenth century, refers to correspondence in “physical shape and 
form” (OED).   
Ellison presents his “little man” as “incongruent” to description by language and 
grammar.  This incongruence also extends to the word’s use to denote harmonious shape and 
form.  While there is no question of the little man’s humanity, at the same time, by describing 
him as a “configuration of forces” Ellison resists confining his humanity to an identifiable 
physiological form.  It is here that Ellison makes a metaphorical comment about the 
complication race adds to our physiology and imaginative understanding of the human.  
Although he dissuades us from assuming his “little man’s” race, it plays a crucial role in the 
questions about humanity and politics Ellison is writing about.  There is an irony in Ellison’s 
comment that this little man already appears “in the flesh,” since we are never given a specific 
description of the little man outside of his gender, old age and diminutive size (Ellison 491).  
Nonetheless, this figure becomes a way for Ellison to meditate on the relationship race has to 
conceptualizing our idea of the human (Ellison 498, 519).  While congruent to America’s 
“revolutionary ideal” and aesthetic principles African-Americans are treated as a social 
incongruity to the very artistic and intellectual practices enabled by this ideal (Ellison 509).   
The absurdity of this social incongruity – yet the necessity of understanding humanity as 
an incongruous, antagonistic configuration – is brought to light in the coal-heaver’s episode that 
closes his essay.  This episode is built around Ellison’s retelling of a story about his time as a 
volunteer for the Federal Writer’s Project.  By happenstance he descends into a cellar and finds 
four coal heavers whom he realizes stand in for the enigmatic “little man” he had been told to 
look for.  I read this scene as a complex rendering of Ellison’s aesthetic sense of integration.  In 
212 
 
it he dramatizes the necessity of the “little man’s” incongruence as a willful “antagonism” to the 
dogma of race within representational politics.   
This antagonism is demonstrated through a restaging of the same historical and aesthetic 
chain of signification Ellison elaborated in his notes.  Ellison disrupts the dogma of “racial 
purity” Black Nationalists held by making the coal-heavers humanity contingent on their 
heretical violation of this very “purity”. With Louis Armstrong so strongly associated with this 
violation in Ellison’s notes and published essays it is no surprise that strong allusions to the 
trumpeter are made in the final scene of the essay.  Like Armstrong, the coal-heavers “contest” 
the meaning of black history and expression by ultimately satirizing its contemporary 
representational modes of authenticity and power in Black Nationalist discourses.  The framing 
allusion Ellison makes in telling this story is Dante’s Inferno.  Like a Dante, Ellison – who is 
also a writer – passes through “the depths of the social hierarchy” in order to reach his 
metaphoric understanding of American cultural possibility (Ellison 519).  And in what seems 
like parody, this scene is even filled with images of fire (fireplace, a coal pile, and at the end the 
“vernacular phoenix”).  Connections between African-American writers and Dante’s Divine 
Comedy
Ellison plays multiple roles in this retelling of the 
 can be found as far back as the early nineteenth century slave narratives (Looney).  
Ellison’s invocation of Dante’s “decent” does not wholly fit within the role of liberator that the 
poet has represented in many African-American cultural traditions (Looney).  I see him using 
Dante to reiterate the thematic of his essay but also to amplify his satire of the representational 
politics that deny the “little man’s” existence.   
Inferno.  In his “present” narrative 
voice he plays the role of Virgil guiding the reader of the essay.  Within the narrative itself, the 
young Ellison plays the role of Dante and Farinata.  It is Ellison’s role as Virgil that I think is 
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most relevant to this reading.  Our Virgil does not end leading us to the transcendence of Canto 
XXXVI.  Instead I read him as dropping us off in the Sixth Circle, the one reserved for heretics 
and Epicureans.  I think it apt to read the intellectual and political stakes of Ellison’s Dantesque 
“descent”, through Canto X from the Inferno
The “drama” of Canto X has been a point of contention in Dante scholarship.  Most read 
it through Dante’s interaction with Farinata over Florentine politics and elide Cavalcante’s 
sorrow over his son. Gramsci’s intervention was to take the non-representational drama of 
.  As Paul Bove writes in “Dante, Gramsci and 
Cultural Criticism”, Gramsci’s focus on Cavalcante’s disappearance and the “unexpressed” 
description of his sorrow by Dante was in part should be read as Gramsci’s thinking about the 
nature of leadership, “the people’s right and ability to struggle to make their own future” and the 
representational politics of Gramsci’s time (Gramsci; Bove 214).   
Ultimately, Bove see Gramsci’s obsession with Canto X as his critique of the authorizing 
power of representation, as “ideology, language and government” (Bove 214).  Ellison’s 
concerns in his notes as well as in this essay are about the representational politics of the 1960s 
and 70s.  And in the backdrop the threat Black Nationalism poses to American liberal visions of 
social integration.  With Gramsci’s concerns in mind and Ellison own non-representational 
vision of democracy in this essay, reading Ellison’s Dante’s allusion through Canto X proves 
fruitful.  In Canto X, Dante is confronted by Cavalcante dei Cavalanti and Farinata, who both 
have been exiled because of their involvement in Florentine political upheaval.  Their particular 
punishment is confinement to tombs of fire.  More importantly, they are unable to know the 
present and eventually to have all knowledge wiped away when the future ends.  As “Epicures”, 
this punishment is fitting. The atomistic, secular basis of their knowledge would require a 
sensual apprehension of their “present”.  And it is this that is denied to them.   
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Cavalcante’s sorrow, which bursts to the surface when Dante mistakenly suggests that Guido, 
Cavalcante’s son, is dead, (Forgacs, Nowell-Smith; Bove; Gramsci).  As David Forgacs, 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Paul Bove note, Gramsci’s shift in emphasis was to correct the 
misreading of Dante’s work he saw in Italian literary criticism.  More specifically, Gramsci 
wanted to deal a blow to the “idealistic concept of language” found in the work of Benedetto 
Croce and replace it with an approach to language in its “materialist aspect” (Gramsci 150).  Paul 
Bove sees Gramsci’s take on Dante as the thinker’s own search for forms of leadership that 
avoided “nonorganic modes of representative politics” and the tropes of “masterful fathers or 
vanguard political intellectuals” (Bove 214).             
 The Canto’s significance to “The Little Man” reveals a similar need to displace Farinata 
(Gramsci; Bove 213).  Instead of Farinata’s heroic “distain”, what I see displaced is the 
representational stakes in Farinata’s first “contemptuous” question to Dante and Virgil: “What’s 
thy name and race?” (Dante 129).  Ellison’s “little man” is a mockery of these same questions 
since he is given neither in the essay.  These two questions more specifically come to bear on the 
coal-heavers scene at the end of Ellison’s essay.  In part, it is the young Ellison himself who 
suggests this question when he initially hears the coal-heavers behind the closed cellar door.  
Recalling the scene up until this point is important.  It begins in a tenement building in San Juan 
Hill, an old, predominantly African-American neighborhood in New York City.  In describing it, 
Ellison makes a note to say that this neighborhood had already “disappeared with the coming of 
Lincoln Center” (515).  The overlap between this old “Negro district” and Lincoln Center is 
significant.  Ellison’s decent in the essay is spatial as much as it is temporal.   
As a storyteller he leads his reader into a space and place doubly removed.  Not only do 
we return to the New Deal, Harlem Renaissance 1930s, but also to a place that is no longer there.  
215 
 
We are presented a landmark that is already just as enigmatic as the “little man” itself.  Ellison’s 
decent from the “ground floor” of this temporal and spatial miasma “to the basement level” as 
well as his initial confrontation with the “profane…idiomatic vernacular…spoken by formally 
uneducated Afro-American workingmen” should not be read as a descent into origins then.  This 
would assume a definitive spatial and temporal component of this image that Ellison is clearly 
playing with.  The willful nature of memory and imagination are the only modes of excavation 
Ellison can deploy here.  The initial voices Ellison hears are also important in this portion of his 
story.  They lead Ellison to a falsely assumed pride in his “knowledge of my own people”.  But 
the assumptions behind this knowledge are shattered as he draws nearer and hears the content of 
their “profane vernacular”.  Here, I see a parallel between Ellison’s assumption and Farinata’s 
contemptuous question.  For the partisan Farinata, this question would ultimately distinguish 
friend from foe.  While Dante is both a Tuscan and Florentine, he is also a Guelph.  And as such, 
Dante is Farinata’s ancient foe (“They were/Foes to me always,) (Dante 129).      
The young Ellison is not attempting to distinguish friend from foe.  And to a certain 
extent there is a similar moment of bafflement since Farinata at first does not know anything 
about Dante except his speech signifies that he is a Tuscan (“O Tuscan, walking thus with words 
discreet”,) (129).  Dante’s answer, finally gives Farinata the designation he desires and 
categorizes Dante as Guelph, not a Ghilbellines (Dante 132).  The coal heavers however do not 
yield up such a categorical designation.  The young Ellison expresses this bafflement when he 
says that he cannot understand how working-class black coal-heavers could have such “intimate 
familiarity with the subject of” opera (Ellison 517).  At this point, Ellison realizes that this 
knowledge and the assumptions he made are “under attack” (515).  Like the first scene with Miss 
Harrison, this one is also pedagogical.  But unlike that original scene, the lesson is more 
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heretical.  After his bafflement, the young Ellison switches roles.  He goes from holder of race 
knowledge to that of Dante, who is the beholder of the Inferno’s multiple spectacles and the 
poetic conveyer of this experience to the reader in The Divine Comedy
With race knowledge and Ellison’s political affiliations abandoned at the door, Ellison 
finally enters.  Putting aside these modes of knowledge returns Ellison to the role of student, a 
role he holds at the beginning of the essay.  But unlike that first scene of pedagogy, Ellison does 
not find himself in an institution of knowledge.  It is worth noting that this fact echoes a part of 
Miss Harrison’s advice to the young Ellison.  It is not at Tuskegee that she suggests he will find 
the little man but instead at a train-station, a place for all intents and purposes outside traditional 
places of knowledge formation.  The same can be said for the cellar in a more demonstrable way.  
.   
Ellison’s abandonment of the “knowledge of my own people” is also an abandonment the 
essay desires its reader to perform.  It paves the way for a new scene of instruction where 
knowledge is presented to us as the configuration of forces Ellison invoked earlier.  The coal 
heavers are presented as this very configuration.  The heretical nature of their knowledge is 
foreshadowed when one of the coal heavers, after reading the political petition the young Ellison 
has brought to him, says “‘What the hell…signing this piece of paper won’t do no good’” 
(Ellison 518).   
It is uncertain whether Ellison is nostalgically privileging the politics of that period though his 
invocation of the 1930s [a point I will return to in my conclusion].  Ellison’s own recollection of 
the petition is that it supported “some now long-forgotten social issues that I regarded as 
indispensable to the public good”, which reinforces the ambivalence Ellison conveys about this 
past (Ellison 515).  Symbolically though, “politics” is abandoned at this cellar.  
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Ellison is forcibly disabused of this institutional knowledge by the coal-heavers.  All of this 
clears the way for Ellison to ask his next question: “Like where on earth did you gentlemen learn 
so much about grand opera?” (Ellison 518).  The coal-heavers’ response is what makes them the 
heretics occupying Dante’s Sixth Circle of hell and more importantly heretical to the dogma of 
representational politics Ellison targets in his essay. 
As one of the coal-heavers responds, they learned about the grand opera as extras at the 
Metropolitan Opera: “Strip us fellows down and give us some costumes and we make about the 
finest damn bunch of Egyptians you ever seen.  Hell, we been down there wearing leopard skins 
and carrying spears or waving things like palm leafs and ostrich-tail fans for years!” (Ellison 
519).  With this revelation, the aforementioned play on San Juan Hill’s presence/absence and its 
relationship to Lincoln Center becomes clear.  The trope of incongruence as well as that of 
aesthetic integration is reiterated here.  The scene of their aesthetic instruction, the old Met at 
Broadway and 39th Street was moved to Lincoln Plaza in 1965.  So by staging his interaction 
with the coal-heavers in the San Juan Hill of the past, Ellison plays on the simultaneous 
congruence and assumed incongruence African-Americans have with an assumedly inaccessible 
form of expression: opera.  In other words, Ellison makes opera a contiguous form of expression 
with African-American expressive sensibilities by drawing these two spaces together across 
time.   
I do not get the sense that Ellison plays this scene completely straight in making this 
point.  Continuing the Dantesque frame of reading, Ellison’s exaggeration of the coal-heavers’ 
racial characteristics brings the comic nature of this scene to the fore.  When Ellison first sees the 
coal-heavers he describes their blackness as “accentuated in the dim lamplight by the dust and 
grime of their profession,” (Ellison 517).  This description takes on the level of absurdity when 
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we find out the nature of their employment at the Met as Egyptians.  Their already “accentuated” 
blackness is further made affective by their being cast as stereotypical Africans at the Met.  As a 
profound mockery of the representational politics Ellison is thinking against, he casts the coal-
heavers as doubly “black”.  Ellison’s invocation of this grossly affective nature of racial 
representation brings to mind the connections made between minstrelsy and early jazz music in 
his notes.  
It also recalls his symbolic use of Louis Armstrong in these same notes as well as in “On 
Bird, Bird Watching and Jazz”.  Recalling the original fragment for his essay, the coal-heavers 
were part of a chain of signification that included Louis Armstrong and other early jazz artists 
(Ellison “Miscellaneous”).  This connection and in particular Ellison’s counter-narrative to the 
prelapsarian reading of older generations of blacks is invoked in the revelation of the coal-
heavers as “a bunch of Egyptians”.  Louis Armstrong sneaks in here since the description of this 
“bunch of Egyptians” is reminiscent of The Zulus, a Creole jazz troupe that dressed up in 
blackface and donned stereotypical African garb.  Louis Armstrong was named “King of the 
Zulus” in 1947 and subsequently became the target of criticism as did The Zulus during the 
1960s.  
This comic accentuation of their blackness serves to dramatize the stark incongruence 
their aesthetic knowledge has to their assumed knowledge as African-Americans.  These coal 
heavers are also critics (described as “arguing about the qualities of Metropolitan Opera 
sopranos”); an activity that further contradicts their race and class position as laborers.  This is 
truly where we see the emergence of the little man.  It is not in their presence, which Ellison has 
so grossly exaggerated to the point of these coal-heavers being absent in this scene, but their 
critical activity that makes “flesh” the “little man”.  To put this in the language of Ellison’s 
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essay, this scene demonstrates the “irrepressible movement of American culture towards 
integration” by showing the configuration of Dante, black Southern vernacular, the grand opera 
of the Met and the Creole jazz traditions into an enigmatic vision of the human.  As he wrote in 
his notes, this scene demonstrates the “the unstructured class availability of knowledge, 
techniques and tradition” (Ellison “Miscellaneous”).   
The scenes of instruction Ellison leads us to in this essay are important.  The “errant” 
trajectories and “obscure forces” of knowledge Ellison sees in America are at their most 
concentrated in-between traditional institutions of instruction.  Hortense Spillers makes a similar 
point about the train station and other spaces of cultural traffic in “‘The Little Man at Chehaw 
Station’ Today” (2003).  With this we return to the concerns of Gramsci who sought, as Bove 
writes, to conceptualize a notion of polity that preserves “the people’s right and ability to 
struggle to make their own future” (Bove 214).  Ellison seems to suggest that this potential and 
just as importantly, the ability to chose, are at their highest in these in-between places.  Outside 
the institutions or ideologies that produce race knowledge or conceptualize human community 
along other ideological grounds are where these errant trajectories and obscure forces are at their 
most democratic. Cellars in vanished neighborhoods and the empty whistle-stops are not outsides 
or origins, but in-betweens; they are metaphors for the integrative operations of mind and 
imagination.  What makes these coal-heavers and the little man itself “a source of confusion, a 
threat to social order” is their composition in these non-places.  This is why these two figures are 
heretics and products of writerly heresy.  As Charles Williams writes in The Figure of Beatrice: 
A Study of Dante (1944), Dante would have understood heresy as “an obduracy of the mind; a 
spiritual state which defied, consciously, ‘a power to which trust and obedience are due’; an 
intellectual obstinacy.  A heretic, strictly, was a man who knew what he was doing” (Williams 
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142).  Speaking specifically about both Farinata and Cavalcante place in the Sixth Circle, 
Dorothy Sayers writes that “the tombs of the intellectually obdurate – iron without and fire 
within – thus fittingly open the circles of Nether Hell; the circles of deliberately willed sin 
(Sayers 132).  As an act of Ellison’s own imagination, the little man demonstrates and is 
presented to us as willed by the integrative imagination.  If the dogmas of Black Nationalism and 
other forms of racial intelligibility were the powers to which trust and obedience were due, the 
“little man” is Ellison’s conscious defiance of them.  This is where Ellison, as our Virgil leaves 
us at the end of “The Little Man at Chehaw Station”.  Not to a moment of transcendence but 
somewhere along the way.  Having confounded Farinata, we arrive at the parodic, willed 
obduracy of a writer who hopes we will complete this journey.   
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CODA: ELLISON AS CAVALCANTE 
Ralph Ellison’s appropriation of Sumner as well as his renewed interest in American 
vernacular culture can be traced to his tenure as the Albert Schweitzer Professor of the 
Humanities at New York University.  During his first year at NYU, Ellison taught a course 
entitled “The American Vernacular as Symbolic Action” (“Miscellaneous”).  In the lecture notes, 
syllabi and other materials from that course we can detect the reasoning for Ellison’s turn 
towards integration and “antagonistic cooperation” in “The Little Man in Chehaw Station.”  
Despite his oft-mentioned polemic against traditional sociological methods to understand human 
action, the materials from Ellison’s course show that he clearly relied upon literature, sociology 
and other material studies of American vernacular culture to theorize American aesthetic 
expression.  Not only do novelists and critics like Henry James, Mark Twain, Stephen Crane, 
Kenneth Burke and Constance Rourke appear in his notes and syllabus but so do more unfamiliar 
names like John Kouwenhoven and Hugh Dalziel Duncan.  Placing such emphasis on language 
as well as his concept of “antagonistic cooperation” marks a synthesis of the political and 
aesthetic strands of thought Ellison grappled with since Who Speaks for the Negro?
Combining Kenneth Burke’s sociological concern with language with Constance Rourke, 
Robert C. Toll, and John Kouwenhoven’s studies of American vernacular culture Ellison 
attempted to read the relationship American literature had to what Kouwenhoven understood as 
America’s “vernacular” impulse.  “Antagonistic cooperation” in many ways is tied to this and 
Ellison’s heavy reliance on Kenneth Burke in this course.  In particular Burke’s writing in 
   
Permanence and Change.  What becomes apparent is Ellison’s desire to combine sociological 
methods of inquiry with the study of literary and rhetorical language in order to understand the 
American experience.  Ellison’s “little man” is enigmatic only because as Ellison writes, there is 
222 
 
no “reliable sociology” to account for him (494).  It appears that Ellison was struggling to 
elaborate one for him.  And while Sumner, Duncan and others might have led Ellison to 
conceptualize the anarchic forces of American life, it is W.E.B Dubois that resonates strongest in 
this comment.  In “Sociology Hesitant” (1901), written almost seventy years before Ellison’s 
“Little Man” essay Dubois came to the same conclusion.  He write that the study of man up to 
the twentieth century was hindered by metaphysical laws that did not allow for the human will to 
make what he called “undetermined choices,” (Dubois).  This hindrance was made clear in 
America’s approach to what was called “The Negro Problem.”   
Dubois felt that new methods of humanistic inquiry were needed since present methods 
were incapable of explaining the “undetermined” and willful transformations African-Americans 
made to Western ideas.  For him, the political, social, and economic failures of post-Civil War 
Reconstruction were linked to the failures of such inquiry.  Ellison’s and Dubois’ realizations 
were that neither naturalistic nor metaphysical approaches to the study of man can account for 
his acquisition of such knowledge and capability of judgment or action.  Beyond the not so 
distant institutional legacy of Segregation and the contemporary ideological rise of racial 
tribalism, Ellison saw more than just de jure social segregation as the problem.  The demise of 
the “little man” by the word magic of “genetic” belonging was a move away from the 
intelligibility about the human Ellison was desperately seeking.   
Ellison’s essay is dominated by his anxiety about his own present.  His feared elimination 
of “the little man” stands for more than a moral concern over racism’s social effects or the way 
its creates an incomplete picture of America’s literary history. When “incongruity” and 
“antagonism” are eliminated so are the grounds upon which critique could emerge.  Between the 
little man as audience, the artist and art itself Ellison does not see a purely passive relationship 
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but one akin to – in a collapse of artisan, orchestral and juridical metaphors – collaborator, 
conductor and judge (Ellison 492).  This sense of the little man’s active incongruity and 
antagonism is also an allusion to the work of Kenneth Burke.  In Permanence and Change
Ellison’s essay leads us to the exiled coal-heaving heretics that would violate our false 
conceptualizations about race.  Yet he himself was also one of Dante’s “exiles”. I think a 
 (1935) 
Burke declares “critique” as the innate biological function of human life (Burke 6).  And part of 
this critique is waged by what he call “perspective by incongruity”, an activity which he sees 
“violates the ‘proprieties’ of a word in its previous linkages,” (Burke 119). More importantly, 
Burke sees this necessarily cultivated incongruity the “nearest verbal approach to reality since it 
will give us something more indicative than is obtainable by the assumptions that our 
conceptualizations of events in nature are real…” (Burke 94).        
In the realms of literature, politics and social life Ellison saw critique as the way these 
assumptions must be perpetually challenged and violated.  Yet the outcome of this violation is as 
capricious as any act of the human will or the tumultuous forces of history.  With this in mind, it 
is clear why we should read Ellison’s ambiguity and our own into this “little man”.   As a figure 
of critique it reminds us of the necessity of this all important human capability.  Ellison deployed 
it to advocate for a certain kind of American exceptionalist politics.  Without question his “little 
man” was a necessary check to the dangers of representational politics in the 1970s.  But as 
Ellison’s notes bear out, he did not see the changes germinating within the object of his criticism.  
Third Worldism and the emergence of a transnational, anti-colonialist politics was an important 
outcome of the maturation (and decline) of Black Nationalism in the 1970s.  This 
confrontational, antagonistic bloc was crucial in checking America’s overt and covert aspirations 
for political domination.   
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rereading of an aforementioned scene in the “Little Man” essay bears this out.  The coal-heaver’s 
episode takes place a few years after Ellison is first warned of the “little man’s” existence at 
Tuskegee.  Now it is the 1930s, his first years in New York City and we find Ellison working for 
the Federal Writer’s Project (Ellison 515).  When we are introduced to the scene, past and place 
are presented to us in a state of flux.  “I found myself inside a tenement building in San Juan 
Hill”, Ellison writes, “a Negro district that had disappeared with the coming of Lincoln Center” 
(515).  Ellison presents us with a sense of place that is simultaneously present (in Ellison’s 
recollection) yet long since disappeared (since the construction of Lincoln Center in the 1960s).  
Adding to the initial spatial and temporal displacement is a double historical remove. The San 
Juan Hill gentrified by Robert Moses in the 1960s and its association with the inner city crisis of 
that era is very different than the post-Depression, Popular Front era scene Ellison invokes in the 
essay.  And the allusions in this scene harkens to an even more distant past.  What is interesting 
about Ellison’s description is what is not there: the San Juan Hill of the immediate past; the one 
that was demolished.  Instead, Ellison brings into configuration what was once there – the San 
Juan Hill of the 1930s – and what comes after, Lincoln Center.   
Thinking about Ellison’s notes and his desire to bring into “antagonistic cooperation” 
seemingly non-contiguous modes of expression and thought, putting San Juan Hill (doubly 
removed to the past) into a relationship with Lincoln Center is important.  The “low” uncivilized 
images of the predominantly black San Juan Hill are held together with the later high cultural 
modernist structures of Lincoln Plaza.  After reading the essay it makes sense why since Ellison 
wants to make these black coal-heavers contiguous with the arts of Western modernity and 
violate our assumptions about race, identity and humanity.  Absent from his description are the 
people displaced by the brutal, contemporary forces deployed in Robert Moses’ urban renewal 
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programs.  These programs signified America’s slow turning away from the politics of the 
1930s.  In a very literal way Moses dismantled the products and politics of the New Deal.  As 
Tricia Rose, Jeff Chang and other recent African-American critics have noted, the configuration 
of artistic, political and economic forces released by Moses’ “renewal” projects spurred the 
creation of Hip-Hop.  Hip-Hop is an example par excellence of an aesthetic form that Ellison 
would call “integrative”.  Yet Ellison is blind to this chain of events and its eventual product in 
his immediate present.  Instead he decides to metaphorically burn an effigy of Black Nationalism 
sporting a Huey P. Newton mask.  He invites us to a post-1968 American version of Guy Fawkes 
Night.        
Keeping Ellison’s ambivalence about his present in mind, this further spatial and 
temporal displacement gains more meaning.  Ellison projects himself and the “little man” into 
the doubly displaced past of the 1930s not that of the recently displaced San Juan Hill of the 
1960s.  His blindness to the more recent version of San Juan Hill signifies Ellison’s distance and 
ambivalence towards the forces behind this “urban renewal”.  Then again, with Invisible Man in 
mind, I would hesitate to say that his invocation of the 1930s signifies Ellison’s nostalgia for 
Popular Front, the CPUSA or the Harlem Renaissance either.  Like Cavalcante in Canto X, 
Ellison could only faintly see his own present.  His city and the American State were playing 
their own game of representational politics; something his little man allows us to see but Ellison 
himself was silent about.  Like Cavalcante again, Ellison despairs for the unseen fate of 
America’s progeny, both black and white.  Perhaps it was this despair that motivated Ellison to 
think our democratic potential in errant trajectories and obscure chromatic forces.  In these he 
saw the possibility to think democratically; to envelope even the absurd acolytes of Black 
Nationalist ideology as potential friends.  COINTELPRO and the ideological Cold War games 
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played on a global scale made starker, Schmittian designations by making humanity itself the 
province of politics.  For the American State the line between friend and foe was much clearer. 
Drawing on Bergson, Burke and Brer Rabbit; William Sumner and Louis Armstrong, 
Twain, Crane and Henry James; Ralph Ellison’s notion of integration should not be resuscitated 
as a politics.  As such, it is (and was) too easily recuperated by the very logic it sought to 
undermine.  Instead, it should be seen as Ellison’s hopeful attempt at truly democratic thinking 
about the human.                 
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